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    INTRODUCTION 
 
GEOGRAPHY IS NOT WHAT YOU THINK IT IS; IT IS NOT WHERE 
             YOU THINK THERE IS   
 
My dissertation, “A Sense of Place and the Uncertainty of the Self” deals with the 
making of roads, maps, journeys, and voyages in the eighteenth century and their wider 
cultural impact of these developments. The combination of the enclosure of commons 
and the building of turnpike roads accelerated the dissemination of commodities and print 
and broadened opportunities for travel. Their effect on “The Sense of Place” as John 
Barrell has called it expanded, sometimes beyond the point of recognition, the worldview 
framed by a parish or an estate. Turnpikes and canals moved people as well as goods, and 
rearranged the figure of an author in the landscape as a wanderer along the major routes 
of Britain. There existed new opportunities for excitement, mobility, and resettlement, 
and they were cut through by nostalgia, displacement, and occasionally a sense of terror. 
A variety of these geographical experiences that I will discuss are dependent upon new 
practices and procedures in various discursive fields, including science, literature and 
politics, which are not immediately of a geographical nature. A much larger set of 
conditions of geographical experiences include three types: firstly, the development of 
geographical techniques as part of the “transport revolution”; secondly, the literary 
“movement” and its genres – the traveling poem, sentimental novel, the grand tour, 
georgic and pastoral poem, the lyrical ballad, and ballad poetry in general; and thirdly, 
contemporary geopolitics as part of the British imperialism. These three conditions are 
indissolubly linked with each other; it is impossible to think the one while ignoring the 
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others. My dissertation begins with a kind of revindiction of geography as a medium 
rearticulates a certain modes of geographical experience in a specifically formal way.         
My discussion of the conditions of geography engages in an ongoing scholarly 
discussion of geography as a “medium” or a four-dimensional vehicle by means of which 
one acts, experiences, thinks, and writes. Geography, insofar as it has a natural or 
architectural design, makes itself articulated doubly: first by a set of spatial markers, such 
as place, body, and property, and second by a set of temporal markers, such as duration 
and memory. I begin my dissertation by making it as clear as possible that geographical 
thought does not exclude time and, by extension, history. Within my geographical 
framework, time does not simply flow in a linear way, but it moves at a distance which is 
always variable. Historically speaking, it was a commonplace in the eighteenth century 
that a geographical travel was also a time travel. Christopher Ridgway, for instance, 
suggests “rethinking the picturesque travel” along these lines:    
The conjunction of geographical progress and historical awareness meant 
that whatever terrain one traveled through – principal highway, city street, 
rural lane, or uncharted wilderness – the process was not simply one of 
voyaging through space (whether known or unknown, empty or filled), for 
travel also encompassed a fourth dimension – time. But time does not 
mean simply the hours expended on a journey (the pedestrian or 
equestrian duration), for it also embraces exposure to the past, to a series 
of histories and narratives particular to specific places.1  
 
 
The “picturesque travel” is more than merely a metaphor, for it unfolds another 
historical illumination of the mutual appropriation of history and geography in the 
“Great Map of Mankind.” Edmund Burke, in his correspondence to William 
Robertson (1721-1793), the Scottish historian who sent him a copy of the History of 
America wrote as follows:  
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We need no longer go to History to trace it in all stages and periods. 
History from its comparative youth is but a poor instructor. When the 
Egyptians called the Greeks children in Antiquities, we may well call them 
Children; and so we may call all these nations, which were able to trace 
the progress of Society only within their own limits. But now Great Map 
of Mankind is unroll’d at once; and there is no state or Gradation of 
barbarism, and no mode of refinement, which we have not at the same 
instant under our View (9 June 1777).  
 
It would be mistaken to imagine that Burke discards “History” in favor of “Geography” 
or opposes “History” to “Geography” or displaces “History” into “Geography.” But he, 
with his cartographic connection, shows that history and geography are neither 
completely independent activities nor separate domains but reciprocally interconnected. 
That is, the globe becomes now historicized, and history spatialized at the same time. 
This contemporaneous moment of reciprocity is not only a phase shift in the sense that 
the new civilization takes the place of the old civilization but also a paradigm shift in 
that the ancient, textual geography makes way for the modern, empirical geography. 
Burke’s “Great Map of Mankind” also illustrates the doubled articulations of near/ far, 
local/ global, chorographic/ geographic, regressive/ progressive, national/ imperial, 
gradual/ speedy, and ancient/ modern. And it suggests the need for a rigorous 
reconceptualization of the relation of geography to the picture (and its implied 
description); to the prospective eye; to the notion of neighborhood in a topological and 
topographical sense as well as in a Freudian sense of the term “Nebenmensch,” which is 
translated into the “next-man” or an “adjoining person”; and lastly but not the least, to 
cartography. My dissertation claims that geography is not the surrounding of the land, 
but rather the impossibility of its (en)closure. Geography is not simply a context either, 
for its architectural punctuation is never final.  
 x 
As a kneading process of difference, geography anticipates a topographical and 
also topological frame to continually present outside forces and influences for the 
human experience of geographical difference. My dissertation calls into question a 
corporeal experience and its related positive notion of geography, for it assumes a 
stable notion of the thinking subject, which subsumes every experience within 
consciousness and its correlate, a conscious speaking subject. This positive 
geographical experience does not combine into an exclusively meaningful and unitary 
act of consciousness; their resulting articulation of experience, thinking, and rewriting 
does not emerge as linear and developmental, even though the effect of that resulting 
triptych may appear seamlessly sutured. Instead of constructing a developmental, 
positivist notion of geography, I offer to treat geographical experience as an 
unaccountable event of ambiguities that emerges in places as diverse as voyages of 
discovery as well as science and literature, whenever the matter of rewriting 
extraordinary, remarkable geographical experience is at stake. In “catastrophic” events, 
for instance, like the death of Captain James Cook in Hawaii, there is not a fixed point 
at which a catastrophe occurs but an ever-present inability to define precisely the ways 
in which the catastrophe happens.    
My study of geography engages itself, first and foremost, in an experimental 
approach that reexamines the “essentialist” definition of geography. By asking accepted 
ideas of geography what undone theoretical work may be left for us to do, and to what 
extent it needs to be reconfigured, retrofitted, or displaced, I take a critical distance from 
the “essentialist” definition of geography whose problematically permanent notion of 
fixed “Time” and “Place.” Robert Mayhew and John Agnew criticize: “Most histories of 
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geography have been retrospective impositions of contemporary definitions, and most 
asides about the politics of geography have been retrospective politics grafted unto 
retrospective geography” (13). Mayhew argues that a majority of geographical writers 
under his consideration establish a “timeless essence which defines geography,” with that 
essence relating to the twentieth-century debates within geography. For instance, it may 
involve an ecological approach for Stoddart or a regionalist one for Hartshorne, but the 
history of political geography is also to the point for John Agnew:   
The use of the term “political geography” dates approximately from 1750 
when the French philosophe Turgot coined it to refer to his attempts to 
show the relationship between geographical “facts,” from soils and 
agriculture to settlement and ethnic distributions, to political organization. 
Political geography, in other words, was conceived as a branch of 
knowledge for government and administration – as state knowledge. As a 
self-confessed sub-area of academic Geography, the term is even more 
recent, dating from the 1890s. As reinvented at that time, the field was 
particularly oriented to justifying and providing advice about the colonial 
ventures in which the Great Powers were then engaged. The word 
“geopolitics” was also invented in the 1890s, by the Swedish political 
scientist Kjellen, to refer to the so-called geographic basis of world 
politics.2   
 
Agnew and Mayhew concur that a geo-political definition of geography has been almost 
unchanged from the moment when it was recounted by Mary Shelley in her 
Frankenstein: “Among the lessons that Felix had bestowed upon Safie geography had not 
been omitted. I had learned from these the relative situations of the different countries of 
the earth.”3 Geographer’s task, as represented in the education of the Monster was to 
determine relative location upon the earth and to describe the political as well as physical 
entities to be found in those locations.  
Mayhew is very close to saying that this “functional” practice in geography 
shaped and affected a traditional sense of geography well into the early nineteenth 
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century. In this regard he is similar to Edward Said, who scrutinizes the role of memory 
in relation to sites where tradition has a role to play. The memory “enterprise,” according 
to Said, is a “geographical” practice of reconstituting, preserving, and condensing a sense 
of place that underwrites the integrity and legitimacy of a specific cultural community in 
the present. With a different set of questions, however, Mayhew approaches the issue of 
what I call the “geographical authorship” in the eighteenth century print culture. In asking, 
“Who were the authors of geographical books, and who were the consumers of such 
books?” he pays particular attention to geographical authors, or writers of small histories, 
dictionaries, and ephemeral poems associated as with those figures Alexander Pope once 
dubbed the “Grub Street Dunces,” such as Thomas Salmon, Laurence Echard, Edward 
Wells, and John Ogilby.4 Not only does he discuss the significance of “grubstreet” 
geographers, no matter how modest it may be, in developing a modern “composition and 
grammar” of geography, but, more emphatically, he keeps the track of the political 
alignment of geography into the Royal and the Whig and the Tory geographers, who all 
in all contributed to institutionalizing geography as a “discipline,” or a form of the 
Enlightenment knowledge.    
Mayhew’s “discursive” project describes a history of geography in which “the 
meaning of a political statement would be defined by the difference that articulates it 
upon the other real or possible statements.”5 If statements and discourses have meaning 
insofar as they are made to perform abridgements and permutations on other possible 
statements and discourses, one might be left with a “discursive composition” of 
“syntactical components” of geographical expression, such as the “subject” of the men of 
geography, the “agency” of recounting events, and the “object” of the origins and 
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evolution of political, geographical ideas. Mayhew’s discursive practice synthesizes a 
topic of geography and a spatially informed social discourse into the intellectual “site” 
where politics and history constitutes the British history of geography. It is not my 
concern to question the validity of this description of politically inflected geography. 
While it may, in any case, be sufficient to underlie its historically situated character, for 
me, it is more a question of how, as Neil Smith points out, “specific societies produce 
equally specific geographies,” and, conversely, “how one goes beyond the boundaries of 
discourse and feels the tangible, historical, political, and cultural geographies one 
discursively evokes.”6 Smith’s suggestion takes me to David Livingston’s pluralist 
approach to geography. Mayhew and Livingston shares a similarity in making obsolete 
the essentialist notion of geography, but Livingston’s “contextual” geography is restricted 
to the particular meanings one has had in different times and places, and there have been 
different sorts of geographical knowledge practiced and promoted at various times in 
various settings. The signifying process of geographical meaning articulates itself upon a 
variety of “media” of geographical units, such as times and places and settings. This 
dialectical convergence of medium and message into a statement of “the Medium is the 
Message” constitutes the core of Livingston’s notion of the Enlightenment geography. 
Livingston states as follows:  
We want to use geography to employ a comparative approach and search 
for a broader vision of the Enlightenment, one that draws upon local 
settings to enrich a Euro-American perspective, while at the same time, 
considering how ideas of the Enlightenment and of geography, and 
perhaps retaining -even reinforcing national identities- also transcend 
national boundaries and the influence of local settings.7  
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Livingston’s claim may be paraphrased into a statement that he wants to use geography to 
determine a proper set of relations between the one (vision) and the many (places).   
When Livingston tries to impart a proper and irreversible sense of order to a 
multiplicity of the constituents of contextual geography, he performs as similar a division 
of labor as Immanuel Kant did two centuries ago in putting an inner sense of geography 
in a temporal sequence (Kant’s nacheinander) and putting the constituents of the earth in 
a spatial sequence (Kant’s nebeneinander). Although Livingston plays out the 
paradigmatic opposition of one to many in space, the key issue to Kantian division of 
geography was to provide the preliminary Idea for knowledge of the physical world. 
“Physical geography is the first part of knowledge of the world. It belongs to an idea 
(Idee) which is called the propaedeutic to understanding our knowledge of the world.”8  
Beyond merely describing the physical world, Kant sought for an architectonic system of 
knowledge designed a priori for finding the inner unity and law to govern the manifold 
parts of the world: “By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As 
systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, 
makes a system out of a mere aggregates of knowledge” (99). Kant’s labor of division 
entails the conceptual priority of the inner and systematic “architectonics” of the 
knowledge of the world over the outer surface of the world. As Kant constituted the 
ideational geography where a priori representation of the world becomes a structuring 
authority of his cultural production of geography, Livingston maps out the relationships 
between one global vision and multiple local settings through the difference of positions 
in the coordinates of domination, oppression, marginalization, on one hand, and the 
Enlightenment, on the other hand. This idea of the Enlightenment geography that 
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Livingston suggests is, then, a privileged moment, in the discipline of geography, a kind 
of power that works to characterize, classify, and specialize and to distribute a labor of 
division across an uneven scale of the hierarchy of the metropolis centers of influence 
over the local settings. According as the Enlightenment Idea operates, then, by the 
determination of degrees of similarity and difference in relation to the “Euro-American 
perspective,” which endeavors to integrate the features of self-varying deformation into 
an increasingly homogeneous knowledge of the world, the geographer is bound to be left 
with an incomplete geography by default, even though not by definition, as the whole 
(one) geography is part of the parts of the multiple, inconsistent, open places.  
 Since geography as a discipline studies the spatial relations among things that 
coexist alongside one another and constitute the surface of the earth, Livingston as well 
as Kant confronts, like their precursors, a critical issue of determining the frame of 
reference of neighborhood. Where does neighborhood continue to extend, and where 
does it stop to constitute another neighborhood? Then, what constitutes a minimal unit of 
geography? How does geography reach an “indivisible” whole? Or is it infinitely 
divisible at a variable distance? The notion of neighborhood is linked, in effect, with the 
historical and philosophical notion of the continuum; that is, it presupposes a principle of 
the double articulation of continuity and contiguity, proximity and distance, community 
and its neighborhood. Within my frame of reference of the notion of neighborhood, it 
traces back to the seventeenth-century thinking of spatial trajectory represented by those 
figures, such Leibniz, Descartes, Galileo, and Newton. The question of the continuum 
was crucial, for instance, to Leibniz: “Only geometry can provide a thread for the 
Labyrinth of the Composition of the Continuum, of maximum and minimum, and the 
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unassignable and the infinite, and no one will arrive at a truly solid metaphysics who has 
not passed through that labyrinth.”9 An eighteenth-century figure named Joseph Banks, a 
Lincolnshire landowner, serves, in the third chapter of my dissertation, as the example of 
a local “agent” who will reenact the historical contingency of the geometrical continuum, 
that is, the spatial coordinate, for his figure is situated between the British and the “local” 
islands and renegotiates his “in-between” positions in the Seas. My purpose of this 
chapter is not to solve the historically enduring question of the continuum but to see to it 
that the philosophical notion of the continuum was not unrelated to a practical 
cartographic problem of reconfiguring nautical rhumbs from the Mercator projection, for 
instance, for Thomas Hariot, an Elizabethan explorer and mathematician.10 In trying to 
solve the cartographic problem of how much the given latitude needs to be changed in 
order to produce a marine chart that preserves true directions, he also asked in a similar 
manner to his contemporary continental philosopher this question of “How can a line, a 
particularly coast line, [which is] composed of infinite parts and infinitely turning around 
the center, be finite?” A finite but ever-variable orbit around the center that Hariot 
grappled with approximately four centuries ago is now very close to the image of the 
“strange attractor,” like the Butterfly effect, which is continually deferred toward the 
infinitely large and infinitesimally small. My notion of neighborhood reveals another 
related terrain of singularity, for the continuous continuum is concerned with distributing 
a whole series of ordinaries and regularities all the way to the following continuum. That 
is, the continuous neighborhood, in connection with the continuum, organizes disparate 
elements within continuous spaces. Maximum and minimum are such (mathematical) 
cases of singularity; the bump on the road is another practical example of singularity.  
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 When Foucault dreams of a “new age of curiosity,” he does not mean that 
singularity is a cognate of the eighteenth-century curiosity.       
Curiosity is a vice that has been stigmatized in turn by Christianity, by 
philosophy, and even by a certain conception of science. The word, 
however, pleases me. To me it suggests something altogether different: it 
evokes “concern”; a readiness to find strange and singular what surrounds 
us. . . I dream of a new age of curiosity. We have the technical means for 
it; the desire is there; the things to be known are infinite; the people who 
can employ themselves at this task exist.11  
 
Let us associate the “technical means” for a brief moment with the “Freudian means” for 
finding the uncanny from what surrounds us. Freud’s “concern” to find the “virtual half” 
to bear witness to what the present continues to lack feeds into his concern for 
Nebenmensch,” the “next-man,” an “adjoining person,” or the next neighbor. As Kenneth 
Reinhard explains it, “insofar as the Nebenmensch is always this next person, always 
embodies in a particular person who fills the arbitrary place of the neighbor, it 
materializes an uncanniness within the social relationship.”12 The neighbor, for Freud, 
embodies the “fundamental antagonism both within and between the familial and the 
social,” the “strangeness” that the adjoining person may cause. When Wordsworth did 
not yet know to how to mediate the psychological and the social, he sought for the next 
person, to whom he could transfer his narration. My dissertation, in the final chapter, asks 
and further examines why the first encounter that William Wordsworth had after 
returning to the British isle from the Continent in the early 1790s was the Female Vagrant 
who had been displaced by force onto Salisbury Plain. Why does Wordsworth try to 
“subjectivize”13 such displaced figures as the Female Vagrant and the Sailor and later the 
leech-gatherer in his poetry? What is at stake is the question of why the poet “moves” 
them into a “trance” to repeat a narrative of their social predicament. My work on 
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Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain poems engages the occasion of the transference and its 
working-through. I argue that Wordsworth’s revision of  Salisbury Plain into Adventures 
on Salisbury Plain both anticipates and exceeds the libidinous economy of the 
Unconscious, as Freud represents it in his critical essay titled “The Uncanny.” While 
keeping the track of the transference of narration from the Female Vagrant to the Sailor, 
my reading of Salisbury Plain poems claims that Wordsworth, unlike Freud, does not 
have a strong stake in curing transference neurosis; he gives that job to the vagrant 
woman in Adventures on Salisbury Plain in order to practice his poetic technique of 
narrative intervention in Salisbury Plain poems. My dissertation bears witness to the fact 
that my notion of singularity suggests similar but “something altogether different” from 
those of Foucault’s curiosity and Freudian uncanniess alike.  Put differently, my 
dissertation is framed by the history of mathematics and the science of trajectory in the 
“long eighteenth century” from a certain number of critical thinkers, among them some 
who belong to our era, such as Kevin Hetherington and Bruno Latour, or to the history of 
philosophy, such as Thomas Hariot, John Locke, David Hume, and Rene Decartes, who 
participated in a philosophical debate as to what part geography plays in the continuum of 
place as divisible or indivisible. A common trait to those who help me to think through 
the conceptual metamorphosis of geography and its implied singularity is the attempt to 
speak of the history of geography without putting the human subject defined by his or her 
intellectual categories at the center of their epistemological system.14  
The geography-information link has too often been conceptualized in the form of 
an all-inclusive experiential and epistemological dyad, with the shifting back and forth 
between the two and the flickering effect that produces creating often deceptively illusory 
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knowledge that embodies and nourishes each other. Livingston suggests, “We want to 
consider the potential for thinking about geographies of enlightenment knowledge as 
information was produced in and about certain places, for example, as it traveled by word 
of mouth, in manuscript or in printed form, and as it was trusted and acted upon by others 
elsewhere” (13). In the wake of this circumscribed oscillation between geography and 
information, the materiality (and also method as the way as in methodos) of geography is 
silently eclipsed, pushed to the periphery of literary backdrop, to the margins of critical 
intellectual inquiry:  
The historian as social critique and observer, history as a privileged 
interpretive practice, became familiar and accepted in academic and 
popular circles. In contrast, Geography and geographers were [then] left 
with little more than the detailed description of outcomes, what came to be 
called by the chroniclers of the discipline the ‘areal differentiation of 
phenomena’ – the accumulation, classification, and theoretically innocent 
representation of the earth’s surface.15    
 
With the Soja’s problematic of the disciplinary division of labor, therefore, my 
study goes backward, rediscovering forgotten empirical questions within an 
epistemologically shaped discursive ecology, undoing the socio-economic matrix that it 
established, and above all, going beyond an ever-tightening grid of the disciplinary 
compartmentalizing of geographical professions. In an essay titled “Postscript to the 
Societies of Control,” Gilles Deleuze characterizes disciplinary societies as follows:  
They [disciplinary societies] initiate the organization of vast spaces of 
enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one enclosed 
environment to another, each having its own laws: the first family; then 
the school (“you are no longer in your family); then the barracks (“you are 
no longer at school”); then the factory; from time to time the hospital; 
possibly the prison, the preeminent instance of the enclosed 
environment.16 
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If in the disciplinary societies, as Deleuze argues, one is always starting again from 
school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory, then, Moll Flanders, the 
eighteenth-century novel character epitomizes the very characteristic of continually 
starting over from marriage to marriage, from threshold to threshold, and from family to 
prison. Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders consists of a series of incidents, including five 
marriages, counterfeiting, theft, imprisonment at Newgate, eight-year transportation, and 
settlement in America. The distribution of these “singular” incidents envisions the 
distribution of real disciplinary space across the feminine body of Moll, in the sense that 
she keeps coming back at the road of “bifurcation” in the choice either of money and 
property or of the involuntary lack of moral propriety. As Moll’s governess instigates her, 
“My governess was something impatient of my leading such a useless unprofitable 
life.”17 Moll’s governess knows more than anyone else about Moll and serves as an ear 
for Moll, but the vector of Moll’s desire moves toward productivity as if it were a social 
imperative “to concentrate; to distribute in space; to order in time; to compose a 
productive force within the dimension of space-time whose effect will be greater than the 
sum of its component forces” (Deleuze 1). Furthermore, Defoe seems to endow his 
character Moll with the human capacity to think until she gets imprisoned with the very 
architecture of fabricating virtue, i.e., the Newgate prison: “In short, I began to think, and 
to think is one real advance from hell to heaven. All that hellish harden’d state and 
temper of soul, which I have said so much before, is but a deprivation of thought; he that 
is restored to his power of thinking is restored to himself” (358). Moll becomes an 
efficient part of the disciplinary society after her confinement in the penitentiary, or that 
the formal constancy of a self-contained set of incidents invests the author with a desire 
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of producing an aesthetic property, since Defoe may, as Ian Watt suggests, be a muster of 
incident, incapable of a cohesive whole.  
My example of Moll is not, however, concerned with how fittingly Foucault’s 
analysis permits one to speak of the “author function” she partakes of, but rather with 
how much difference the invention of Moll effects in treating a historical specificity of 
literary property. Moll Flanders is the book made into a commodity by the author, but, 
then, the question remain as to why Moll gives an “abridgement of this [the Wickedness 
of her Life] whole History, the Picture of her conduct for 50 years in miniature” (366). If 
she wants to market herself by selling a discourse on moral propriety, then, why is it that 
she pays obsessive attention to her own value, detail, and to whom it belongs? Foucault 
raised the question of the “author function” in his article titled “What is an Author?” in 
relation to the historical “coming into being of the notion of ‘author’ – that is, of the 
emergence and evolution of the author function within the social formation of discourse. 
In discussing the material conditions of the emergence of the “author” in the disciplinary 
society, Foucault argues that it derives from the socio-economic matrix of ownership: 
Once a system of ownership for texts came into being, once strict rules 
concerning author’s rights, author-publisher relations, rights for 
reproduction, and related matters were enacted – at the end of eighteenth 
century and the beginning of the nineteenth century- the possibility of 
transgression attached to the act of writing took on, more and more, the 
form of an imperative peculiar to literature. It is as if the author, beginning 
with the moment at which he was placed in the system of property that 
characterizes our society, compensated for the status that he thus acquired 
by rediscovering the old bipolar field of discourse, systematically 
practicing transgression and thereby restoring danger to a writing which 
was now guaranteed the benefits of ownership.18       
 
Foucault emphasizes that the exceptional figure and function of the author emerges itself 
as an effect of the extension of ownership that constitutes the economic-legal nexus of 
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disciplinary power within which the author is embedded. “The ‘author-function’ is tied to 
the legal and institutional systems that circumscribe, determine, and articulate the realm 
of discourses; it does not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual” (Foucault 113). 
As scholars from McLuhan and Eisenstein to Lunsford have long argued, book 
technology and the attributes it supports are the institutions most responsible for 
maintaining the notions of authorial individuality, uniqueness, and ownership that often 
drastically affect the conception of the “singular (univocal) relationship that holds 
between an author and a text [as] the manner in which a text apparently points to this 
figure who is outside and precedes it.” This point of view suggests that Moll is not 
necessarily posited as the human subject as an originator or shaper of a work but 
functions as an operation in a “milieu, or else a “site” wherein there converge, and are 
recorded, the cultural constructs, discursive formations, and configurations of the author 
function in relation to property and moral propriety. As Moll instantiates a social position 
as a form of property in this discursively interlaced matrix that precedes the author and 
from which he or she is not easily extricated, so the author performs a disciplinary 
function by “providing the basis for explaining not only the presence of certain events in 
a work, but also their transformations, distortions, and diverse modifications through his 
biography, the determination of his individual perspective, the analysis of his social 
position, and the revelation of his basic design” (111). The author that Foucault describes 
becomes almost indistinguishable from its ideological function as he explains the author 
as a “certain functional principle by which, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by 
which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, and the free composition, 
decomposition, recomposition of fiction” (119). The discursive analysis that Foucault 
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establishes by “depriving the subject, i.e., Defoe and its surrogate Moll of its role as 
originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable function of discourse” (119) 
suggests that the character Moll, as an “ideological product,” plays a role quite 
characteristic of the emerging capitalist economy - industrial and bourgeois society, 
individualism and private property.  
 It is true that Moll does not idealize capital but she situates herself in the very 
condition of circulation. To this extent, she seems to have the compulsive desire to sell 
her story of moral propriety, but she writes her own value in a book, I argue, mainly 
because she does come through all singular states in her life to be the owner of her self:  
When a woman is thus left desolate and void of Council, she is just like a 
Bag of Money, or a jewel dropt on the Highway, which is a Prey to the 
next Comer; if a Man of Virtue and upright Principles happens to find it, 
he will have it cried, and the Owner may come to hear of it again; but how 
many times shall such a thing fall into Hands that will make no scruple of 
seizing it for their own, to once that it shall come into good Hands (182).   
  
Moll’s imaginary recognition of her body as a commodity or a lost thing enlivens her 
narration, giving life, blood, and flesh to it. She creates her market by making her state of 
being stripped away from humanity self-advertised and, conversely, by allowing the 
reader to take the godly position. The reader must judge this being empowered by 
judging their own moral judgment, which is the singular gaze of novel character Moll; 
that is, “commodity” is telling its owner’s tale, which exemplifies Moll’s slippery sprawl 
across the early eighteenth-century British society.  
Moll is a geographical traveler, and her unsettling experience feeds into 
geographical attributes as a character who proposes herself as singular, exemplar, and 
unique in her life-experience of the times. The character of Moll offers the reader the 
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shape of the outside in the sense that the reader finds not only outside buildings and 
institutions but also a writing of the singular event that they form part of. The singularity 
of Moll’s character, as Deidre Lynch suggests, designates “the legible, graphic elements 
of writing,” “a typographical object,” or “a unit of information,” which “moves and 
makes all their way all over the social map” (361). When Moll serves as an index to the 
multiplicity of locations and circumstances, her story constitutes a new type of history, a 
new mode for the discussion of a social phenomenon of “destabilization on the move,” or 
unsettling social experience for anybody who speaks in her name.   
The asymptotic relationship that I am describing between cognitive mapping and 
the singularity of experience rearticulates the issue of “who speaks, where and why” at 
the moment of Foucault’s conclusion in his critical article: “All discourses, whatever 
their status, form, value, and whatever the treatment to which they will be subjected, 
would then develop in the anonymity of a murmur. We would no longer hear the 
questions that have been raised for so long: Who really spoke?” (119) There is a point in 
invoking the metaphor of a spider-web strung among tree branches (as the emblem of a 
discourse among discourses) in order to mention that by achieving a certain density of 
saturation discourses reveal each of its correspondences and nodes as a network of 
discourses in the “anonymity of a murmur.” With this possibility one can go in the 
direction of the self as a point or a node of points connecting it to all other points in the 
network. This postmodern thinking of inter-textuality ensures that nobody can ever be 
simply inside or outside who (and what) is everywhere among us, i.e., Moll. This idea 
becomes even stronger if Jean-Francois Lyotard’s analogy is involved: “Young or old, 
man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at ‘nodal points’ of specific 
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communication circuits, however tiny these may be. Or better: one is always located at a 
post through which various kinds of message pass.”19 By “post” Lyotard most likely 
means the modern European “post office,” which serves as a nodal point in a network of 
telecommunications, and, to be elaborated a little later, the British turnpike roads played a 
similar role in the middle eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The postmodern 
sensibility in treating the self as de-centered or displaced is not inconsequential in 
moving the character of Moll perpetually in transit at a crossover of geographical roads, 
ruins, and empty places. She is the singular, exemplar character that is being insulated 
from her regular neighborhood.  
The singularized character of Moll along the road allows one to speak of a 
different mode of authorship grounded on the interrelated matter of owning and of 
(re)writing her singular experience. If the book of Moll Flanders takes on the character of 
autobiography, it is because Moll rewrites how the “I” of her singular self comes to 
acquire a legal standing of her own narrative as in Olaudah Equiano’s conversion 
narrative of The Interesting Narrative. Take a brief example of the “I” in Equiano’s own 
narrative: “It is, therefore, I confess, not a little hazardous, in a private and obscure 
individual, and a stranger too, thus to solicit the indulgent attention of the public; 
especially when I own I offer here the history of neither of a saint, a hero, nor a tyrant” 
(italics added 31). Like the “I” of Moll, the “I” character of Equiano hinges upon the 
“puncept” of “owning” in the one sense of “acknowledging and also confessing (a thing) 
to be true and valid as well as in the other sense of “making (a thing) one’s own,” as the 
Oxford English Dictionary informs it. Bearing the weight and value of £ 15 in person, 
Equiano introduces himself as Gustavus Vasa, the name of a slave. The economy of his 
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singular, interesting narrative makes a surplus value out of his non-person as a lost slave 
or “thing,” just as the singularity of Moll’s social predicament makes a commodity in 
transaction out of her body as a “lost woman.” As Miguel Tamen explains this strategy of 
personification, “my literal autobiography of a former nonperson would be a story whose 
initial chapter would be about my own story is permeated by the possibility, to which I 
am now quite foreign, of not being able to tell it at all.”20 Equiano concludes, “My life 
and fortune have been extremely chequered, and my adventures various. Even those I 
have related are considerably abridged. . . I early accustomed myself to look at the hand 
of God in the minute occurrence. . . To those who are possessed of this spirit, there is 
scarcely any book or incident so trifling that does not offer some profit” (236). It is hard 
to say whether Equiano is more interested in God’s secret hand of Providence than his 
instrumental walk of life. And it is no less uncertain whether he is fundamentally 
interested in religious conversion or the expressive possibility of being free to narrate the 
unaccountable things he encounters.               
What I pay attention to is this common de-nomination of singular experience as a 
point of excess, a surplus, or a supplement by means of which a multiplicity of interests 
are tapped into the quantum of his or her personal history. From the point of the situation 
of social experience, it is a caesura, a zone of undecidability, in which the past memory is 
dislocated into the present and the present is extended into the past. Rather than a 
calculus of the possibilities to become real, geographical memory serves, then, as a 
potential field of singularities in the present situation, which will be unfolded into 
otherness or difference. This movement of difference is what Jacques Derrida calls the 
movement of differance: “We shall designate by the term differance the movement by 
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which language, or any code, any system of reference in general, become ‘historically,’ 
constituted as a fabric of differences.”21 My point of contention is that the character of 
Moll and Equiano is woven out of the fabric of writing and what makes this clothed 
repetition extraordinary is the condensation of social incidents as in William 
Wordsworth’s clothed transformation into the Female Vagrant and back into the Sailor - 
this point of view is one of the consistent themes of my dissertation. The relation of Moll 
and Equiano to their memoirs lies between a trace and the self when the trace subsists in 
the world when the event disappears. It's something of the event, but not the event as 
such; it is the trace, a mark, a symptom, a renegotiation of one’s sense of the event. 
Equiano confesses, “If any incident in this little work should appear uninteresting and 
trifling to most readers, I can only say, as my excuse for mentioning it, that almost every 
event of my life made an impression on my mind, and influenced my conduct” (236). 
While a “perpetual surging of invention” of the character of Equiano includes his 
invested story of the middle passage, there is a rupture in the subjective relation of his 
singular event to the world. “Constituting itself, dynamically dividing itself,” this interval 
of invention is what Derrida also calls spacing; time’s becoming-spatial or space’s 
becoming-temporal – writing his memoirs becomes the milieu of the Middle Passage, in 
which Equiano’s time does not simply flow, indexing itself from past to present, but 
varies, traversing his reflection-record and anticipating his virtual encounter of the 
reader-subscriber.          
The alignment of writing a text with “scaping” the land convokes a different 
mode of ownership in Mark Rose’s study of authorship and ownership. Rose suggests 
another way of investing the links between property and land in order to create a different 
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mode of analysis by which authorship become inextricably linked with the notions of 
property, originality, and personality. He states, “I am not concerned with the production 
of the author as a consciousness so much as a representation of authorship based on 
notions of property, originality, and personality.”22 It is Rose’s specific focus to argue 
that “all forms of property are socially constructed and, like copyright, bear in their 
lineaments the traces of the struggles in which they were fabricated” (8). And it is not a 
coincidence that Defoe was highly interested in experimenting with what could be called 
“copy-left” matter of editorial abridgment in his writings, including Moll Flanders and 
Robinson Crusoe. It was debatable whether an abridgement of an existing book could be 
a new work, and an abridger could be entitled into an author. Defoe’s intervention in 
appropriating the undetermined agenda in abridgement is a process of realizing the 
possibility of owning his own character by means of the power of fiction. Combining the 
real and the imagined, abridgement and authorial property on equal terms or at least 
privileging one over the other, Defoe’s writings represent thus a land or place for the 
generation of “counter-spaces” of imagination, alternative spaces of authorial 
intervention in the dominant order of things:  
To conclude, what we observe in both Defoe’s writings in the period just 
before the passage of the Statue of Anne is an early moment in the 
formation of the discourse of proprietary authorship. How would one think 
about an author’s relationship with writings? The most familiar metaphor 
was paternity, but to invoke the representation of a text as a child in order 
to bolster the author’s right to sell his works in the marketplace presented 
rhetorical difficulties. An alternative metaphor, literary property as a 
landed estate . . . it contributed to a new way of thinking about literature.23     
 
By recalling the history of copyright, the Statue of Anne did not settle the theoretical 
questions behind the notion of literary property, but it rather represented a significant 
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moment in the process of re-establishing copyright under the rubric of literary property 
and not the “right to copy.” And the new way of understanding literary property is by 
way of geography as a surface of plane on which to set forth and describe the world. 
Robinson exclaims in his journal, “Let the Naturalists explain Things, and the Reason 
and Manner of them; all I can say to them is, to describe the Fact, which was even 
surprising to me when I found it; though I knew not from what it should proceed; it was 
doubtless the effect of ardent wishes, and of strong Ideas form’d in my Mind.”24 
Robinson’s notion of property is a process of realizing his own character on his own 
island. As Majorie Swann suggests, we need to understand that a historical development 
of authorship bore no inevitable relationship to printed books: “We should not privilege 
the cultural code of print to the extent that we fail to consider how other material 
practices might also have affected writer’s new models or resources for authorial self-
fashioning.”25 Among many “other material practices” of authorship, Rose argues, “The 
imprinting of the author’s personality on the common stock of the world is a work of 
original authorship. The basis of literary property is not just labor but personality and this 
reveals itself in ‘originality.’” The imprinting the author’s personality in the land is, for 
Swann, linked with expressing the author’s distinctive relation to the land: the 
construction of landed identity was intertwined with modes of representation by which 
the English estate came to be portrayed as a cultural space in which a collection of 
physical objects takes place in allegiance to the estate. Unlike the authorial figure as the 
product of an extension of the technique of constituting the author’s individuality as an 
operation in the shifting terrain of discourses, I argue that the upheaval of spatial 
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character in space is part of a generic procedure of reinventing an operator by means of 
which the character describes singular and personal experiences in writing.  
The “fidelity operator” is the concept of Alain Badiou that I borrow in order to 
account for a particular role that the character performs in a place where he or she is 
situated. Badiou explains, “The process of a truth is fidelity (to the event), i.e., the 
evaluation, using a specific operator (that of fidelity), of the degree of connection 
between the terms of situation and the supernumerary name of the event.”26 For instance, 
the character of the young Wordsworth in the letter of Llandaff is the very instance of a 
fidelity operator, who evaluates the political situation surrounding France and Britain and 
tries to put into practice a Revolutionary possibility of thinking the Other in his early 
Salisbury Plain poems. Robinson Crusoe is the interventional naming of a prototypical 
character from the point of view of the “anomie” situation, not knowing whether his cast 
island is paradise or prison and struggling to build himself a secure place. The emergence 
of this operator is thus “locatable by the emergence of a language inside the situation, 
whose multiple referents are conditioned by an as yet uncompleted generic part of” 
writing (Badiou 96). Badiou’s point of view of the supernumerary operator is highly 
germane to a critical reading of writings whose temporal distance between experience 
and writing one’s experience is accompanied by spatial disjunction, for the character 
traces in situ random and indiscernible materials of the event, “starting from the non-
existent point at which the event has convoked the void and interpolated itself between 
the void and itself” (95). The void of Robinson’s island represents the void space of 
writing on which to take account of the deconstruction of reality whereby the reality “out 
there” surrounding Robinson’s castaway once again melts back into the conditions of 
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fictional writing. To this extent, the narration of the character sounds like a record of the 
factual history, but it is a re-articulation and re-enactment of the situation of the event. 
The common trope of a “true story” or “history of facts” is therefore the result of the pure 
event of contracting the mutual interest in rediscovering personal accounts of the singular 
experience of geography. In those writings with the particular temporal gap of a decade 
between original accounts of experience and the author’s publication of it, such as Aphra 
Behn’s Oroonoko, Oliver Goldsmith’s The Traveler, and John Galt’s Annals of the 
Parish, for instance, each author’s reflection-record bears witness to an interventional 
method of using a spatial operator in order to re-evaluate a totality of his or her total 
experience in the geography of the event, that is, to account for the singular void of past 
experience that the event has convoked in the present situation.       
Balwhidder, a novel character in The Annals of the Parish (1821) is such a fidelity 
operator who describes how the construction and development of the turnpike road 
reconfigures the social life of the minister Balwhidder’s parish, Dalmailing, near the west 
coast of Scotland. Balwhidder’s characterization of the features of the parish reenacts the 
development of the turnpike road in Scotland: “The King’s road, which then ran through 
the Vennel, was mended; but it was not till some years after, I shall record by and by, that 
the trust-road, as it was called, was made, the which had the effect of turning the town 
inside out” (34). Note the temporal modality of the future anterior in the account of 
Balwhidder. The mutual appropriation of the past and the future tense indicates that he is 
in the process of going back to the moment when the turnpike was constructed. While he 
is looking back on his memory of the parish, his account takes a “natural” course of 
historical development. Initially, Balwhidder’s parish holds it responsible to repair and 
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maintain the King’s road. The poor condition of the King’s road is, as the narrator 
describes, “a narrow and a crooked street, with many big stones here and there.” When 
the Lord Eglesham from London is stymied in the quagmire of the road, he petitions “an 
act of parliament to put down the nuisance” and “undertakes the trust road” (42). The 
result is that “the town gradually, in the course of years, grew up into that orderliness 
which makes it now a pattern to the countryside (43)”; that is, that the turnpike trust road 
generates a serial replication of homogeneity across the nation. The turnpike road system 
contributes to a “visible increase of worldly circumstances” (Galt 65), a concurrent series 
of events that will take place across the scale of geography in the same year of 1789: the 
construction of another new road from the mainline of Glasgow, the set-up of the stage 
coach, easy accessibility to the Glasgow market, and, most of all, a book shop in 
Cayenneville, a two-to-three mile distance from Dalmailing. The event of the turnpike 
road, the taking place of an interregional circuit or an extensive communications network 
of the turnpike roads brings together, distributes, and circulates the real time information 
across the nation. The speed and motion of the turnpike road enables people “not simply 
to judge the rest of the world by what one sees going on around oneself, but to walk 
abroad into other parts and thereby enlarge one’s sphere of observation, as well as ripen 
one’s judgment of things” (Galt 136). Balwhidder serves for the author as a fidelity 
operator to allow one to ask the postmodern questions regarding the possibility of reading 
turnpikes as what McLuhan called a “break boundary?” Does the idea of the human body 
survive the “extension or self-amputation of one’s physical bodies” in the speeding up 
made possible by turnpike roads, especially the “explosion of the eye?” How much 
“instantly” and also how have authors reacted to new media? Galt’s reevaluation of the 
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change of the parish of Dalmailing is a gradual adaptation of thinking to the change of 
place in its material conditions.   
While Franco Moretti has noticed how the system of central places works within 
the “changing geography of village narratives,” I read that the turnpike road shapes and 
affects a continuous process of societal restructuring of the parish across the scale of 
geography. Moretti enumerates the “system of central places at work,” including “school 
in Irville, university in Glasgow, lawyers and doctors in Edinburgh,” which thus form the 
radius of the central-peripheral zone based on the dichotomy of the city and the country. 
For Moretti, cotton-mill manufacture in Glasgow is a determining social event to “re-
center social life”: “the building of the cotton-mill, a new genius, as it were, had 
descended upon the earth, and there was an erect and out-looking spirit abroad that was 
not to be satisfied with the taciturn regularity of ancient affairs” (Galt 128). Moretti reads 
that the sense of the region is gone and replaced by a “web of commercial reciprocities” 
ranging from Cayenneville via Glasgow and Edinburgh to London. Similarly, Galt 
notices how city economy invents things that are to become city imports from the rural 
world, and then reinvents the rural work, as well as how the new work is added to the 
older work and then the new divisions of labor are added to other appropriate varieties of 
older work, as is the case of “tambouring, in such a manner as to supersede by precept 
and example that old-time honored functionary, the spinning-wheel” (Galt 128). Moretti 
focus on the “Symbolic” central places play at the heart of Dalmailing, but I call attention 
to how the “Semiotic” communications network cuts cross the almost real-time 
information transmission.  
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To put it in terms of Julia Kristeva, the figure in the landscape is not the function 
of the transcendental ego, for expanded geography puts sujet en proces, the subject on 
trial, in process in its never-ending rapprochment between the symbolic act of 
consciousness and a multiplicity of indeterminable referents in the world.  
Sense as a trial and the speaking subject on trial articulate themselves on 
the impetus of the interaction between the two modes of signification: the 
symbolic and the semiotic. The emergence of the semiotic in the symbolic 
is subservient to the transformational conditions in the relation between 
subject and receiver: anguish, frustration, identification or projection all 
break down the unity of the transcendental ego and its system of 
homogeneous sense and give free rein to what is heterogeneous in sense.27  
 
This heterogeneous links, connections, or networks to the subjective relation to 
something indeterminable of an event is what Kristeva calls the semiotic; and I call the 
semiotic cut-cross the transcendental ego’s precipitous engagement in giving meaning an 
event of geography. When Balwhidder sets forth a continual process of changing social 
life of Dalmailing, seeing the turnpike through the eyes of an immanent stranger makes 
his vision opaque because of a dense degree of change vying for attention and 
designation. “Beyond a certain threshold, this quantitative pressure produces a 
catastrophe in the coherence of the symbolic.” This means that the status of an absolute 
observer is weakened and that geography cannot be described “from the exterior” as if 
one were an ideal, god-like observer. That is to say, the priority of horizontal 
directionality over vertical dimensionality (fixity) is a precondition of geography where 
one finds him or herself defined by a meaningful “observational” relation. Geography is, 
then, the practice of reorganizing all theoretical and practical experiences, one which cuts 
a vertical figure horizontally and promotes new values of the flow of displacement in the 
case of the geographical retreat of Anne Finch into the country house, Robinson’s 
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singular camouflaging in the “anomie” state, Banks’s “sidelined movement” into the 
infinitely expanded receptacle of the South Seas, and Wordsworth’s uncanny movement 
of Salisbury Plain by means of the ancient transport system. These heteroclite places 
existing in different modes emerges themselves into an “outside” that is in fact immanent 
to each artistic world, a name of the multiple connections to one’s sense of place. 
Therefore, there is no geography outside of plural and heterogeneous worlds.  
Each chapter in my dissertation is a variable evocation of the same central theme: 
geography and the uncertainty of the self. The rediscovery of geography in and out of the 
eighteenth-century and the Romantic writing provides the most revealing literary and 
theoretical world; this is the insistent premise and promise of my dissertation. The first 
chapter on Anne Finch describes the early eighteenth-century use of landscape to portray 
identity against the backdrops of household, estate, and state. When Anne Finch retreated 
to the country house in Eastwell Park after her husband’s political disgrace, her country 
house provides for her a loophole, or an aperture through which she could view new 
possibilities for her own poetical and political expression. If architecture wishes to 
dissent from the management and organization of space, how would it go about doing 
this? Finch’s country house plays a pronounced role in con-vert-ting (noting the 
etymology of “vert” as change and transformation) her political predicament into poetry; 
that is, the country house becomes the medium and the material infrastructure of her 
poetry alike. This chapter suggests that the means of feminine communication becomes 
the means of feminine production in the sense that the metropolitan, male Republic of 
Letters is different from a loosely dispersed spatial network of provincial, feminine 
community. While Finch is transporting herself beyond her country seat to make new 
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allies with female matrons, I argue that Finch’s “metis” practice also takes account of a 
counter-history of the structure of feminine abject feeling in the eighteenth century.         
Chapter 2 engages in the eighteenth and the early nineteenth-century development 
of turnpikes and its wider cultural impact. The turnpike road system made geography 
fragmented, but it simultaneously reshaped fragmented geography into a more organized 
network of improved roads, which in turn formed a network of routes for compiling and 
distributing information, i.e., routes of copyrights and commodities. The turnpike “trusts 
system” also contributed to the transformation of space itself into a commodity. Initially, 
turnpike roads were controlled by the Justice of the Peace, but from the 1750s on, a 
turnpike “trusts system” constituted a network of investments, in which place became an 
object of speculative investment. The result is that place ended up as a marketable entity, 
thereby generating a serial replication of homogeneity. Drawing upon critical spatial 
theorists, such as Edward Soja, David Harvey, and Nicholas Poulantzas, I discuss that the 
turnpike road makes possible the double articulation of the macro-level analysis of the 
economic infrastructures of transport and also the micro-level of diffusion, piecemeal 
character, and dissipation of social development across the national scale of British 
geography. Geographical configurations of places are now shaped around new transport 
and communications systems and physical infrastructures, new centers of production and 
consumption, new agglomerations of labor power, and modified social infrastructures. 
The turnpike road system makes it possible that the real time information – especially 
news and print – circulates almost simultaneously across the nation. A network of 
turnpikes underpins information at a distance, but it, more crucially, reinforces the power 
to act and move instantaneously, from afar. In questioning how Daniel Defoe envisions 
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this restructuring of the world, I discuss further the issue of copyright as a property in 
conjunction with the geographical development of road-making. As far as the South Seas 
are concerned, the issue of landscape presents disturbance to the voyaging self. Robinson 
is a foundational and prototypical “anomie” as Christopher Herbert calls it. The practical 
character shown by Robinson in an unknown island is a disguised form of fortification 
that Anne Finch reinforced in her retreat to the countryside. Robinson’s camouflage in 
the landscape is a provisional, ad hoc practice that improvises to contingences that exist 
within the unknown island. Rather than reproducing the dominant order of the British 
society, Robinson’s camouflage amplifies fortified or minor organizations of place that 
also operate as prison, thereby reconfiguring the island into a sort of affective geography.     
When I discuss Robinson Crusoe in my second chapter, not only do I study the 
issue of copyright in conjunction with geographical development, but I also make the 
island of Robinson Crusoe a “way station” to the island of Tahiti in order to de-nominate 
the very spacing of utopian and fantastic imagination of geography. In my subsequent 
chapter 3 on Joseph Banks will be introduced as a singularized traveler, voyaging into the 
unknown in the South Seas. In analyzing Banks’s journals that he brings back from his 
circumnavigation around the world, I see Banks as a strange attractor of romance in the 
island of Tahiti; that is, that romance shapes and enables both fantastic and empirically 
organized accounts of the world encountered by Banks. My broader concern is to 
demonstrate that the history and geography of geography is a complex process in which 
events determined by local interactions coexist with projects informed by global 
conceptions about the task of geography and the aim of knowledge. And it is also a 
dramatic history of ruined ambitions, failed ideas, and accomplishments that do not 
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achieve the significance that they should have attained, which is the case of Banks back 
in the metropolitan city of London.  
My study of Banks’s circumnavigation takes as its starting point the historical 
contingency of the spatial coordinate in mapping out the transit of Venus in order to settle 
down the national issue of cartographic longitude. In the second half of the eighteenth 
century, new state intervention in science, colonies, and the economy emerged out of the 
Britain. Riding this new tide into the ocean, an expedition left Plymouth harbor in August 
1768 bound for the South Seas. Banks, together with James Cook, was following in the 
wake of Dampier and Byron. James Cook’s expedition traced the conjuncture of an old 
South Seas myth, the Terra Incognita and a modern investigation. Alexander Dalrymple 
had hoped that he might have secured the power, dominion, and sovereignty of Britain by 
locating the rumored southern continent. While this thirst for commercial advantages was 
not new, it was joined now to new kind of cultural curiosities. The Admiralty had agreed 
to carry the Royal Society to Tahiti, where a scientific observation of the transit of Venus 
would allow a calculation of the distance of the earth from the sun. Urbane voyagers, 
such as Joseph Banks, aimed to bring the riches of scientific measurement back with the 
scope of European knowledge, but the opportunities for “anomie” were manifold. 
Banks’s fellow voyager, James Cook, one of the finest hydrographers and cartographers 
the Royal Navy had employed, was widely assumed by the loss of his mind as he died in 
1779.   
   The transition from the island of Tahiti back to the island of Britain could be 
described in a psychoanalytically inflected point of view. A certain psychological 
symptom of Crusoe’s compulsiveness is caused arguably by his refusal to listen to the 
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interdiction of his father in the name of nom du perre. It takes approximately twenty-
eight years for Crusoe to work through such a psychoanalytical problem, and his island 
becomes a site where healing takes place. And Banks’s infatuation and transmigration in 
the South Seas reveals a state called “psychasthenia.” Defined as a disturbance in the 
relation between self and surrounding territory, psychasthenia is, as Celeste Olalquiaga 
explains it, a state in which the space defined by the coordinates of the organism’s own 
body is confused with represented space. Incapable of demarcating the limits of its own 
body, lost in the immense area that circumscribes it, the psychasthenic organism proceeds 
to abandon its own identity to embrace the space beyond. It does so by camouflaging 
itself into the milieu. To Banks, Tahiti is not what he thinks it is or where he thinks it is; 
that is, it is always already elsewhere in the sea of fantasy. This psychoanalytically 
inflected direction does not mean to say that the rest of my dissertation would be 
governed by the method of psychoanalytical reading, because chapter 4 aims to anticipate 
and exceed a psychoanalytically inflected spatial metaphor. Chapter 4 puts into operation 
a cultural poetics of the georgic and topographical and locodescriptive expression.   
Chapter 4 deals with the issue of the elevated prospective view in the literary 
genres of the georgic and locodescriptive poetry. With regard to georgic and the whole 
question of genre, I raise it in the context of pastoral, the idealized literary representation 
of the countryside, and the sort of landscape painting that supported such an idealization. 
The invention of landscape painting coincides with the elaboration of the “view” as a 
space contained within a picture, but which opened up the setting to the world beyond. 
The discovery of an adequate technique for framing and defining depth signals the 
invention of landscape as a cultural space. My critical reading of the eighteenth-century 
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georgic and topographical poetry deconstructs and provincializes the delocalized 
cartographic eye in their poetic projects to give universalizing place to a specific locale. 
Rather than standing and surveying from on high, this new mapping eye is imagined as 
moving through the world, describing a prospect of society from a multiplicity of stations, 
stakes, and places. Arguing that the unfolding of events in a literary genre inevitably 
suggests (though not necessarily conjunctive) parallels to the unfolding of imperial events 
in the world, my reading of the British georgic and topographical poetry pays attention to 
the fact that the British topographical poems organizes the field of perception of an actual 
landscape to take into account the urban, architectural, agricultural, and political 
consequence of what has happened to the land. Geography serves, in this chapter, as a 
surface or plane of inflection between mapping and drawing, by which a drawing pen or 
the eye traces back what takes place on the surface of the earth. When the rapidity of 
movement and speed expands the prospect eye beyond a certain point of recognition, the 
traversing eye, like a mapping impulse, reemerges within the very world it pictures, 
displacing a human subject into an anonymous, liminal figure being destabilized on the 
move in the world.       
 Chapter 5 traces William Wordsworth as a traveler in the Salisbury Plain poems. 
When Wordsworth took to the road in 1793, looking for the enigmatic figures, such as 
the Female Vagrant and the leech gatherer, he sought for a poetical and political 
framework for these displaced people. In writing Salisbury Plain in his early work, 
Wordsworth’s sense of homelessness transformed the place of Salisbury into the sea, and 
he sailed on a gypsy caravan into the sea. The aim of this chapter is to develop further 
Michael Wiley’s Romantic Geography in terms of geographical imagination. With its 
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imagining of the possible utopia, Wordsworth becomes political, since he takes the 
criticism of his own time to its highest point; that is, Salisbury Plain keeps the track of 
the social accidents of the disintegration of the community.  
The most important contribution of this chapter in my dissertation is to 
demonstrate that Wordsworth induces the narrative technique of making what Freud calls 
“an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to rational intervention” as the 
practice of authorial intervention. Freud’s notion of “an artificial illness which is at every 
point accessible to our [rationalized] intervention” provides the best example of the 
master puppeteer motif that Wordsworth experiments with the transference of narration 
in the revision of his early Salisbury Plain into Adventures on Salisbury Plain. One 
particular way to read Wordsworth’s knots of revision is to track the transference of 
narration, the transference of speech from one interlocutor in Salisbury Plain to the other 
in Adventures on Salisbury Plain. A traveler’s speech is replaced by the “artless” story of 
the Female Vagrant, which is given to the Sailor in Adventures on Salisbury Plain. By 
bringing home the vagrant woman’s story as a deliberate art and connecting it to his life, 
the Sailor suggests the theme that he is representing the inability of escaping 
“transference neurosis” when, under the stress of war, revolution, and social dislocation, 
transference neurosis has become ordinary neurosis. My discussion of Wordsworth’s 
Salisbury Plain poems show that Wordsworth argues, like Freud, that artificial illness is 
as dangerous as real ones, and no less dangerous for the analyst as for the analysand. In 
this chapter, I claim that Salisbury Plain poems represent all illnesses as artificial- that is, 
in the vocabulary of the poem, as the result of a political cause which has the social 
consequence of making an illness transferable from person to person, poem to reader. By 
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ultimately holding the Sailor responsible for what has happened to him, Wordsworth 
testifies to the fact that the Sailor accepts the social consequence of the crime that he has 
himself given rise to, without escaping into the artificial and unpredictable pre-texts that 
the vagrant woman’s narrative suggest in Adventures on Salisbury Plain. While 
valorizing Karen Swann’s thesis that the Spenserian repetition is uncanny, I suggest the 
theme of forgery in Salisbury Plain poems, not only because Wordsworth resembles all 
the vagrants, travelers, gypsies, who are opaque figures and inhabitants of another world,, 
but also because it is almost impossible whether Wordsworth reiterates or represents the 
Female Vagrant in Salisbury Plain poems. What defines the extraordinary power of 
Wordsworth’s disguised repetition is a rehearsal of social accidents, the condensation of 
them one into another, with an echo which makes each the double the other.  
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CHAPTER I  
 
ANNE FINCH’S STRATEGIC RETREAT INTO THE COUNTRY HOUSE  
 
Political retirement to a garden becomes standard practice in the eighteenth 
century with the Temples at Stowe, Bolingbroke and Dawley and Pitt at his garden in 
Burton Pynsent. Any patriot politician worth “his salt” speaks from the countryside, 
boasting of how his claim to power is based on his entire removal from the circuit of 
power. When Anne Finch (1661-1720), Countess of Winchilsea writes, “My hand 
delights to trace the unusual things, and it deviates from the common and known way,” 
she retraces the trajectory of her remarkable political retreat into the country house in 
Eastwell Park. Most importantly, Finch’s catastrophic “spatial retreat” reveals the socio-
geographical restructuring of the times and its new nexus to Finch’s poetry. In this 
chapter, I explore the material conditions of Finch’s poetic writing in terms of geography.   
There are contemporary currents in literary or aesthetic criticism of literature that 
intersect to some extent with my geographical approach, e.g., the so-called “Green” 
criticism. That is, my work on Finch engages critically in an on-going scholarly 
discussion of the recent study of the relationship between literature and environment in 
Green literary criticism propounded by Jonathan Bate and his acolytes, such as Karl 
Kroeber in eco-criticism, Laurence Coupe in Green studies, James McKusick in Green 
writing, and Richard Groves in Green imperialism. For instance, Nicolle Jordan’s 
approach to “environmental thought” in Finch’s “nature poetry” endorses Groves’s point 
of the “emergent conservationist sensibilities” of earl modern England,” thereby showing 
 2 
how Finch mourns the loss of the old oaks to make the terras. Within the framework of 
Finch’s “environmental thinking,” according to Nicolle’s argument, it was in the final 
analysis an “ethos of stewardship” and “ecological well-being” that maintains an 
“estate’s and nation’s legitimacy and stability” in a post-Revolutionary era (255-260).  
Pushing a little further the issue of how she envisions and experiences the country house 
in a situation where the manor itself did not devolve into her husband’s hands until the 
death of Charles Heneage, fourth Earl of Winchilsea, in the year of 1712, I want to 
suggest that this dispossessed situation provides for Finch an alternative way of 
imagining the conditions of the new poetic dispensation that allows her to reclaim the old 
countryseat poetically. The objective of my critical engagement is, then, to suggest 
another way of investigating the links between poetry and geography, to create a different 
mode of analysis by which geography become inextricably linked with a plane of 
inflection between the private experience and the public writing. In so doing, my work on 
Finch aims to reveal a fresh, critical perspective on my proposed geography and its 
mediated experience.         
To the extent that Finch’s poetry relies on an intersection of geography and its 
experience, Finch’s poetic career anticipates the Romantic poet, William Wordsworth’s 
poetic career. It is not simply that Wordsworth praises Finch as a “nature poet” in noting 
“some delightful pictures” in her poems, but it is rather that the political context of the 
time when Wordsworth as a “very angry young man” was working on his first version of 
Salisbury Plain was very similar to the political context of the time when Finch worked 
on “The Hurricance,” “The Spleen,” and “Absolute Petition for Retreat.” In these poems, 
Finch is acutely conscious of the geographical medium, for instance, the hurricane, by 
 3 
means of which she is communicating her poetic thinking. As a result, it is hard to 
distinguish whether the hurricane’s movement is equivalent to a potential pro-Stuart 
upheaval or an actual manifestation of her mental turbulence. Finch’s undecidable poetic 
voice is then connected with the voice of the Female Vagrant in my last chapter. When 
Wordsworth took to the roads in the 1790s as a reluctant traveler, looking for the 
enigmatic figures, such as the Female Vagrant and the leech gatherer, Wordsworth sought 
for a poetical and political framework for these displaced people. To anticipate what will 
come a little later, the Female Vagrant has a geographical station, that is, the Stonehenge 
through which she has wrought certain motifs of a political tradition on hollow ground, 
such as the American war, the death of husband and children, the dispossession of home, 
family, income, and grievances of the poor. It is arguable whether the voice of the Female 
Vagrant reiterates or represents the voice of the male poet or, if not, the vernacular. 
Although there is an indelible mark of difference between the Female Vagrant and 
aristocratic Finch, the Female Vagrant and Finch come close by virtue of their social 
predicament in the common loss of their familiar places.   
With the efficacy of the voice of the femme forte, Finch shows how vulnerable her 
political situation is when she retreats into the country house, and there she finds a 
loophole, or an aperture through which she can view new possibilities for her life and 
poetry. Why does a particularly architectural figure, such as a loophole or an aperture, 
appear in accounting for a political situation affecting Finch’s retreat into the Eastwell 
manor? “Is space political?” one can ask, echoing Fredric Jameson, who raised the same 
question elsewhere. The problematic of his questioning is germane to the discussion of 
Finch and the Female Vagrant alike, first of all, because their social position is altogether 
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incommensurable with the status quo of their situated society. That is, Jameson proposes 
an “allegorical” relationship between a work of art and its situated society:  
The political rewriting or appropriation, then, the political use, must be 
also allegorical. . . I want to suggest that the political relationship of works 
of art to the societies they reside in can be determined according to the 
difference between replication (reproduction of the logic of that society) 
and opposition (the attempt to establish the elements of a Utopian space 
radically different from the [previous or existing] one. At their extremes, 
both these stances raise some questions: for instance, can even the most 
undistinguished work still altogether replicate or reproduce the hegemonic 
spatial logic?  
 
The issue of whether the Female Vagrant’s voice reiterates (that is, replicates) or 
represents the poet’s voice is related to Wordsworth’s allegorical sense of his own 
society. The poet’s incommensurability with his or her own political ground leads, then, 
to Finch’s allegorical relation to the country house in that she refuses to “underscore and 
reinforce whatever division of labor is active in the social order in question” (Jameson). 
Interiority and inferiority was a social construct marked on the newly constituted body of 
the feminine in the eighteenth-century Britain. The idea of supposedly ideal woman 
emerged within the institutions of domesticity established by the construction of the 
patriarchal household. The house simultaneously expresses the individuals, locking them 
into spatial practices that define and reproduce the body. The exterior of the house serves 
as a male mask displaying the man’s status to the world. As the unified self, protected by 
a seamless façade, the exterior is masculine. A man’s house and estate stands in his place 
as an extension of his propriety. On the other hand, the interior of the house is the scene 
of reproduction and femininity. The wife merely maintains this very hegemonic spatial 
order she is placed in. The division of gender topography defines two disparate but 
interrelated positions represented in the spatial order that Jameson explains.    
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 Finch’s maintenance and management of the country house anticipates and 
exceeds the so-called “functionalistic” division of architecture into a set of feminine/ 
private/ interior and masculine/ public /exterior. With reference to Nancy Armstrong, 
Finch’s life and her poetic writing in “the country house that is not the country house” 
could make it possible for “competing interest groups to ignore their economic origins 
and coalesce into a single domestic ideal.” Although life at Eastwell is a kind of 
retirement, Finch, nevertheless, maintains links to a wider literary and social world in 
many channels such as through poetic writing, through correspondence and visits with 
her former friends at court, through friendship with the three generations of Thynnes of 
Longleat and her Kent neighbor, Catherine Cavendish, countess of Thanet as well as 
Thanet’s daughters and through literary exchanges with Pope, Swift, John Gay, and 
Nicholas Rowe. In this sense, the country house provides for Finch the poetic site of an 
alternative of oppositional (gender) politics, one at odds politically and poetically with 
the dominant division of both the country life and role of woman in early Augustan 
period.  
When gender relations play a subtle but pronounced role in Finch’s poetry, I 
argue that Finch’s “metis architectural practice” serves as a critical mode of converting 
her political disgrace into new possibilities for her poetical and political expression. This 
point will be pursued further in accounting for Defoe’s novel character Robinson’s 
“metis” practice in the colonial landscape in my chapter 2. Six years after Finch 
published her poetry collection of Miscellany Poems, Defoe published a male version of 
the isolated rural society in a novel form of writing Robinson Crusoe. While Finch 
retreats “allegorically” into the countryside on a chorographic scale, Robinson enters into 
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geographical digression into the South Seas as a development often identified with the 
coterminous rise of romance. With the metis practice Robinson converts an unmanned 
island into a surrogate home. In so doing, however, he builds his own habitat, the country 
manor most defensively with spikes and other sharp obstructions. As Defoe noted in The 
Complete Gentlemen, “We find the Moderns begin to gain upon the Ancients extremely, 
not least because of improvements in mathematics, fortification, encampments, 
entrenchings, military discipline, besieging and defensing town, in all of which the 
knowledge and experience of the present age is infinitely beyond what ever went before 
them” (The Spectator 25 June 1712). The two modern figures, Finch and Defoe, take 
advantage of immediate circumstances in order to seize the initiative in articulating their 
own spatial experience of the early eighteenth-century British society.         
My work on Finch, then, charts a new territory to reveal the militarized 
infrastructure of feminine literary production. In the first half of the eighteenth century, a 
garden was converted into a fort. The impending anxiety of civil war that loomed over 
England, Scotland, and Ireland as well as the continuing wars that Britain waged in 
Europe and its colonies contributed to militarizing the landscape and fortifying gardens. 
As Robert Williams points out, gardens were occasionally constructed in or afterwards 
embellished with, a defensible format; that is, the British garden was transformed by the 
science of fortification of the times into a war machine represented by seize architecture. 
Seize architecture was equipped with its particular loopholes and traces designed to 
inflect and survey all the other sites of the landscape. And the restructuring of ruins 
designed in constructing seize architecture defends potential ruins caused by massive 
attacks and artilleries. Finch camouflages herself in this fortified landscape and converts 
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her “ruined” political life into a poetic engagement in the high politics of the late Stuart 
era.     
After the “bloodless revolution” of 1688, the Catholic Finches, with other so-
called “non-jurors,” refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Protestant King William 
III, and Anne Finch lost her position as one of Mary Modena’s maids of Honor at the 
Stuart court. While the burden of her political loyalties forced Finch to retreat spatially 
from the court to the provincial Eastwell Manor, a country house in Kent, her retreat does 
not follow the model of political banishment into shade. Her retreat into the country 
house is not simply a personal issue but profoundly affected by the high politics of the 
late Stuart era. As a strategically political and poetical activity, her retreat is, I argue, 
indissolubly related to her poetic predicament and, by extension, the feminine means of 
literary production. Finch makes of her private and individual retreat a political and 
poetic artifact with a considerable degree of influence and power over the very public 
world from which it appears to be withdrawn. Sarah Churchill, Duchess of Marlborough 
was widely considered to at most powerful woman in the early eighteenth-century 
England, and yet the focus of my argument is that the spatial retreat provides the 
conditions of dehiscence as spacing and swerving, dispersal and digression. When Finch 
retreats as a political figure to the country house, her country house in Eastwell Park 
provides for her a loophole, or an aperture to inflect and survey the political and literary 
terrains of the British history, thus transforming her backward glance into a fortified 
vision of the absent Stuart politics and also a forward vision of the print culture in the 
eighteenth century.     
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 Recently, critics have called attention to Finch as a significant participant in the 
political debates as regards the Glorious Revolution and its aftermath. Arboreal imagery 
in Finch’s representations of retreat, shade, and darkness carries pronounced political and 
poetical implication. To understand the occasion of shade, we need consider that being in 
shade has a specific reference to being out of favor at court. In retrospect, Finch offers an 
autobiographical reference to Mary’s and the court’s favor in an elegy following Mary’s 
death in 1718, “On the Death of the Queen:”  
The Sovereign Mistress of my vanquish’d mind 
Who now survive but to attend her hearse 
With dutious tribute of recording verse 
In which may truth with energy be found 
And soft as her compassion be the sound 
Bles’t were the hours when thro’ attendance due 
Her numerous charms were present to my view 
When lowly to her radiant eyes I bowed  
Suns to my sight but Suns without a cloud 
Towards me their beneficial aspect turn’d  
Impressed my duty (57).  
 
She compares, metaphorically, the court to “suns without a cloud” as if to reenact 
Hamlet’s line “I am too much in the sun.” Another point to make of these lines is that, 
like such near contemporary royal women writers as Aphra Behn, Margaret Cavendish, 
and Mary Astell, Finch identifies herself with the Queen as an exemplum of sovereignty, 
who “speaks with conscious sense / Of Real Worth and matchless excellence” (99-100). 
In this regard, the heliotrope of the Queen as another Sun and not the Moon reinforces the 
commonality, particularly, with Astell – she claims that women are inferior to men not by 
nature but by default, that is, due to the lack of education. As John Mallinson points out, 
Finch also attributes the predicament of women not by nature – “a weak or wounded 
brain” but to faulty education (39). In terms of education, however, the court provided 
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Finch with a favorable atmosphere that must have sharpened her intellectual and artistic 
sensibilities. Her “duty” as a maid of Honor was, McGovern remarks, thrust into an 
exciting environment that included many of the most prominent literary figures called 
“the Courtly Wits” (22). The “heliotropic” court “nurtured” Finch with classical and 
canonical education; her literary reputation, together with her loyalty, was bound to 
blossom as time unfolds. Until her marriage to Heneage Finch in 1648, she lived at court 
with Mary of Modena and her English and Italian waiting women. The maids of Honor 
performed reading, singing, and painting in court masques. Importance for Finch’s 
education at court, they were, Carol Barash remarks, schooled both in French and Italian 
translations of the classical texts, and they were urged to make their own English 
translations of these works (262).  
 The “bloodless revolution” of 1688 drastically affected the Finches’ lives. As 
Gentleman of the Bedchamber to the Duke of York, Finch’s husband refused to take an 
oath of allegiance to the Protestant King William III. He was arrested while trying to 
follow the fallen James II but released eventually. Thereafter the Finches retired from 
London and the Court. They were deprived of their royal privileges at Court. As Finch 
remarks, she finds herself thrown away, “Blasted by a storm of Fate, / Felt thro’ all 
British state.” Her “feeling” of personal and political deprivation is a sensitive register of 
an uncertain and unstable British history. Finch’s “felt thought” – by which Raymond 
Williams means unpleasurable sensations of “disturbance, blockage, tension, emotional 
trouble” (Politics and Letters 167) affects and redefines Finch’s sense of the present, that 
is, “this, here, and now” of the present British state. By drawing on Williams’ notion of 
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“feeling,” what I would like to argue is that Finch’s personal mode of feeling and, by 
extension, affect engages poetically in the historically unstable present.   
As a poetic site of engagement with her present situation, a Pindaric mode of 
writing explores a “perplexing Form” that can “crowd with boding dreams the 
melancholy Head” (13) and wreaks havoc with the senses.  
I feel thy force, whilst I against thee rail; 
Thro’ thy black jaundice I all objects see, 
As dark, and terrible, as Thee 
My Lines decri’d and my Employment thought  
An useless Folly, or presumptuous Fault:  
Whilst in the Muses Paths I stray, 
Whilst in their Groves, and by their secret Springs 
My hand delights to trace unusual Things, 
And deviates from the known and common way (75-83).  
 
In the course of the poem, Finch exploits the spleen’s capacity for distortion, its “fond 
Delusions” and “fantastic” visions. Writing in the irregular Pindaric mode, her self-
consciousness is implicated and enveloped in the social field; that is, Finch explores the 
possibility that certain modes of affect pre/conditions any individual’s subject’s sense of 
history. Charles Hinnant elaborates the significance of a splenetic mode of poetic 
enunciation as follows:  
It is significant that the I does not appear in “The Spleen” until halfway. 
For a poet as self-conscious as Finch, this delay is a deliberate decision, 
expressive not only of a particular sense of self but of the particular 
conditions under the speaking subject should be established. The I of 
Finch’s poems often defines itself in opposition to an implicit they – just 
as the self it constructs is defined by its opposition to the world (222).  
  
 
Before I discuss the significance of the line “My hand delights to trace unusual 
Things” in terms of a “particular condition” out of which Finch emerges, that is, 
differential gender articulation, it is worth amplifying the fact that Finch is acutely 
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conscious of the genre in which she is working. For I contend that the hallmark of 
Finch’s poetry is a critical mode of converting address, while noting the Latin etymology 
of the word “vert” as change and transformation. Finch converts the hurricane of 1703 
into another Pindaric mode of address “Upon the Hurricane in November 1703, referring 
to this Text in Psalm 148 ver. 8 Winds and Storms fulfilling his Word.” As the title 
shows, this poem stages an encounter between divine will and human institutional system.  
Throughout the Land, unlimited you flew, 
Not sought, as heretofore, with Friendly Aid 
Only, new motion to bestow 
Upon sluggish Vapors, bred below 
Condensing into Mists, and melancholy Shade 
No more such gentle Methods you pursue, 
But marching now in terrible Array (3-9) 
 
Finch surveys a public world where nothing remains in place from the heaven-revealing 
storm of 1703. “The Earth agen one general Scene appears; / No regular distinction now, 
/ Betwixt the Grounds for Pasture, or the Plough, / The Face of Nature wears” (194-7). 
The figure of the hurricane through the poem indicates the motions of sliding, bending, 
varying, twisting, undermining, loosening, yielding, and resigning; the figure works, 
Hinnant argues, to establish a continuity of reference to the winds and to divine power 
that moves- yet is distinguished from – them. In other words, the author figure takes a 
third agency by which her critical stance bears witness to the fact that she does not belong 
to the party agendas represented by Tory and Whig. “Nor WHIG, nor TORY now the 
rash Contender calls” (172). And she is also located at an equal distance both from the 
deists’ rational system that embodies divine purposes and from Hobbesian “tertium super 
partes,” primarily concentrated in the hands of the brutish military. “Free as the Men, 
who wild Confusion love, / And lawless Liberty approve, / Their Fellow-Brutes pursue 
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their way, / To their own Loss, and disadvantage stray” (198-201). I suggest that the 
author’s position is supplementary, since Finch does not belong to either party or two 
competing philosophies of nature; rather she never ceases to circulate throughout, 
problematize, and intervene in the nation’s dilemma.  
When now, too soon the dark Event  
Shews what that faded planet meant;  
Whilst more the liquid Empire undergoes, 
More she resigns of her entrusted Shores, 
The Wealth, the Strength, the Pride of diff’rent Shores 
In one Devoted, one Recorded Night, 
Than Years had known destroy’d by generous Fight 
Or Privateering Foes (259-266).  
 
It becomes clear that the hurricane brings forth a challenge to the state of things in the 
Britain of 1703, questioning the very basis on which the nation’s structures -“wealth,” 
“strength,” and “pride”- stand.  
From a political perspective, Hinnant argues, what is significant about “Upon the 
Hurricane” is that Finch resists the temptation to use the hurricane of 1703 as a pretext 
for framing a judgment upon the events of the previous years. What confirms this poem 
as a poem of public significance is rather its critical insight into the political implications 
of this precipitous encounter between divine power and British institutional system.  
O Wells! Thy Bishop’s Mansion we lament,  
   So tragical the Fall, so dire th’Event!  
   But let no daring Thought presume  
   To point a Cause for that oppressive Doom.  
   Yet strictly pious Ken! Had’st Thou been there,  
   This Fate, we think, had not become thy Share (91-6).  
 
Finch identifies herself with Bishop Thomas Ken, another non-juror who did not adapt to 
the new dispensation. The fact that his replacement Bishop Kidder was crushed to death 
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with his lady in his palace allows Finch to trace the political changes of Church and Court 
that affected her life directly. Though Finch is cautious in attributing the dismantling of 
Bishop’s mansion to any simple cause, she is, nevertheless, addressing a force that not 
only refuses to identify itself with party agendas but also, in fact, produces her mental 
crisis from political banishment. This does not mean to say that the hurricane’s action is 
equivalent to a political upheaval. Rather, Finch’s Pindaric poem “Upon the Hurricane” 
exceeds the gendered usage of “the loose and unequal lines of the Pindaric ode so 
fashionable with women” (Perry 127) of the early eighteenth century. Her poetic activity 
engages itself in the relationship between the public and private political spheres, 
emphasizing the complicated place of the female subject in the modern construction of 
politics and gender (Barash 261).  
 Unlike the roots of many “trees … Master’d soon and soon o’erthrown” in the 
hurricane which prevails across the British Isles in 1703, her “root” remains firm. “A 
helpless vine is found, / Unsupported on the Ground, / Careless all the Branches spread, / 
Subject to each haughty Tread, / Bearing neither leaves, nor Fruit, / Living only in the 
Root” (153-158). The figure of a helpless vine is an arboreal image for a “weaker sex,” 
an image of a feminine parasite. The under-presence of her root, however, cuts across a 
variety of verse genres; her retreat is not an act of passive resignation into shade, 
darkness, death, or oblivion, but the process of transforming her political predicament 
into an active poetic activity. “Whilst for my self, like Solitary Men, / Devoted only to 
the Pen / I but a Safe Retreat admist thee crave / Below the Ambitious World, and just 
above my Grave” (177-80). She asks for a “Safe Retreat,” Barash reads, a place where 
she will have the same access to poetic language as politically oppositional male poets 
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(267). She goes further than this by inverting the masculine identification of light, 
clearing, and, by extension, Enlightenment. As Ruth Salvaggio points out, she opens 
man’s systems of light into the space of “the other” (106). While adding the Latin word 
umbra to Salvaggio’s discussion of “the other,” I would like to suggest that Finch’s 
representation of shade is a “spectral,” “haunted,” “other,” or “nether” world of the 
feminine. The representation of shade, where shade is always already understood as 
pastoral, is used to produce an other feminine subject and Finch as representative of a 
new femininity. “Peace and Rest” are, Finch claims, “under Ground” (234). To the extent 
to which Finch retreats into a “subterranean Place,” shade “transports” her into a poetic 
vantage point where “all Heaven shall be survey’d / From those windings and that Shade” 
(293-4). We might say that Finch invents the poetic shade, like a resource of “spiritual” 
inscription to provide a release for the poetic psyche. Calling attention to “the positive 
energies” of shade, Salvaggio argues that she seek them in the feminist potential for a 
writing that exceeds the dualistic oppositions fundamental to systematic thought” (106) 
on gender.  
 Finch articulates radically differential gender relations. They are radical, because 
her address of gender relations has the possibility of modifying and transforming the line 
of political debates. I endorse Rachel Weil’s claim that views of gender do not exist as a 
codified, coherent entity in the Stuart England. If, as Weil suggests, politics is an arena in 
which ideas about gender, or relevant to the social construction of gender, are shaped and 
transformed (4), poetical activity is by default a political practice to subvert and 
destabilize gender relations. When Finch says, “Man of Place and Power;” and yet 
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“Woman of Abjection,” her interest in gender relations intersects with Astell, another 
“radical” Anglican woman writer.  
 Men are possessed of all places of power, trust and profit, they make laws  
and exercise the Magistry, not only the sharpest Sword, but even all the 
Swords and Blunderbusses are theirs, which by the Strongest Logic in the 
world, give them the best title to everything they please to claim as their 
Prerogative. … Our fathers have all along both Taught and Practised 
Superiority over the weaker sex, and consequently Women are by nature 
inferior to Men (Astell 29).  
 
While it is uncertain whether Astell and Finch knew each other, they share the same 
structure of feeling, when Finch says, “the dull manage of a servile house / is held by 
some our outmost art and use” (“The Introduction” 19 –21). As Perry points out, if Mary 
Astell and the countess of Winchilsea knew each other, no clue of the acquaintance 
remains; but they were both borne along on the same historical current (118). Their 
politics were very similar; that is, both were high-church Tories and non-jurors living in 
similar social milieu.    
Finch calls further into gendered question the matter of writing:  
  Did I, my lines intend for public view, 
  How many censures, would their faults pursue, 
  Some would, because such words they do affect, 
  Cry they’re insipid, empty, incorrect,  
    … Alas, a woman that attempts the pen 
  Such an intruder on the rights of men (Introduction 1-10)  
 
She testifies to the fact that a woman who writes and especially a poet who writes as a 
woman would perform an act of “transgression,” insofar as writing is invoked as a kind 
of public property. If she speaks from a position of authority, the act would be 
stigmatized as a form of crime. At this juncture, Finch’s poetical lines exemplify an act of 
political struggle for the new social ties among women; her poems not only “represent” 
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and record the lived experience as a woman, but they also serve, more crucially, as 
practices to redefine and renegotiate the political line of public and private distinction.  
 Finch’s withdrawal grounds her poetic turn from the public to private world as 
authoritatively female. Finch continues to say in her Introduction, “She fights, she wins, 
she triumphs with a song, / Devout, majestic, for the subject fit, / And far above her arms, 
exalts her wit; / Then, to the peaceful, shady palm withdraws, / And rules the rescued 
nation, with her laws” (46-50). Finch’s predicament does not simply address “the 
constraint of being a woman” as a surviving stratagem as an eccentric and/ or versifying 
poet. Her strategy of working from an abject predicament takes a supplementary turn of 
the screw with regard to private and public dichotomy; that is, her writing as a “private” 
woman or her writing of women’s privacy disrupts and subverts the “standard” hierarchy 
between private interiority and public exteriority.  
Finch’s writing inscribes her retreat as the possibility of rupture, the divergence 
from the natural division between private and public. Finch’s writing, she claims, 
“delights to trace unusual things, / And deviates from the known and common way.” One 
way to appreciate Finch’s claim is to see a pitfall of the conceptual predicament of “male 
discourse and systems” (Salvaggio 106). The term predicament has also been 
synonymous with category, particularly as it denotes the basic system of classifications 
that all knowledge can be compartmentalized. Insofar as male discourse and systems 
dreams of dominion over the physical organization of space, especially the ordering of 
the political distinction of interiority and exteriority, femininity and masculinity, they 
cannot but perpetrate the violence of categorical concepts. In its concretization of 
inclusion and exclusion, architecture, at this conjunction, establishes the groundwork for 
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society’s so-called policing practices of the reductive (re) production of stable distinction 
between femininity and masculinity. Finch’s act of retreat can’t be considered as a 
passive allocation and distribution to the naturalized conceptual predicament of 
differentiation. If her writing “traces the unusual things and it deviates the known and 
common way,” it is an activity to testify to the management and organization of space in 
the early eighteenth century. The failure to consider the management of space means, 
both for Finch and for feminists, to remain still in the conceptual predicament (category) 
of female abjection.   
It is illuminating that Finch redefines private abjection in a critical mode. In her 
“To the Nightingale,” she says:  
Poets as thou were born,  
Pleasing best when unconfined,  
When to please is least designed,  
Soothing but their cares to rest.  
Cares do still their thoughts molest,  
And still th’ unhappy poet’s breast,  
Like thine, when best he sings, is placed against a thorn (7-13). 
 
It is arguable whether Finch records the lived experience of abjection or whether her 
poetic language evokes as the eighteenth-century “common way” of abject feeling. But 
the point that I would hope to make is that she redefines the division between natural and 
abject, open and confined, natural authority and labored molestation. In so doing, she 
rethinks and re-forms her abject retreat as a poetic and political practice to intervene in a 
naturalized labor of division and a stabilized division of labor, i.e., the political line of 
gender relations. “Thus we poets that have speech, / Unlike what thy forests teach, / If a 
fluent vein be shown / That’s transcendent to our own, / Criticise, reform, or preach, / Or 
censure what we cannot reach” (30-35).  Finch reconfigures the relationship between the 
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public and private spheres in reinventing the structure of feminine feeling. And Finch’s 
efficacy lies, as Carol Barash claims, in the fact that Finch generates a web of metaphors 
– solitude, inwardness, what Julia Kristeva calls abjection – that would become, over the 
course of the eighteenth century, figures both of women’s emotions and the power of 
masculine poetic language (261). She makes of her private retreat a poetical and poetical 
artifact with a considerable degree of influence and power over the public world from 
which she appears to be withdrawn.  
 Where the public sphere is defined as a space of institutions and practices, Finch’s 
retreat into her provincial country house, Eastwell Manor, is, one could argue, a private 
and individual withdrawal from the public sphere. For the principles of the public sphere 
involves an open discussion of some issues and concerns of the public good. Furthermore, 
the public sphere consists of the organs of information and political debate such as 
newspapers and journals, as well as institutions of political discussion such as political 
clubs, literary salons, public assemblies, and coffee houses. What I argue is not whether 
Finch was regarded as a powerful and influential woman. I attempt, rather, to elucidate, 
first, how she converts her predicament of political defeat into poetry; second, how the 
feminine means of communication becomes the means of feminine literary production; 
and, last but not the least, how feminine literary production engages itself in destabilizing 
the private and public division.  
 While endorsing Barash’s claim that Finch follows the tradition of the femme 
forte, I understand that her retreat serves as a loophole as in fortification. I pay attention 
to Robert Williams’s research that the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century 
was “a time when the science of fortification at its zenith” (50). Just as a loophole in 
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fortification functions as an aperture to inflect and survey all other sites of the field, 
Finch’s retreat into Eastwell Manor serves as a channel to which everything goes and 
through which the entire real historical process of the outside world- for instance, the 
reconstruction of the country house and the massive militarization of landscape- envelops. 
In her poem “The House of Socrates,” for instance, Finch dubs this period as an “over-
building age:” that is, the period of the country house boom and the massive mock 
militarization of landscape.   
The country house in the eighteenth century was an architectural practice to 
portray identity against the backdrops of household, estate, and state. As John 
Summerson points out, the building of the country house in England was assuming a new 
significance in the minds of those who were able to build them – a national, even a 
patriotic significance (81). The architecture of the country house was a vehicle of 
expressing political and social allegiance to the state as well as in the family estate. The 
Eastwell Manor “performs” its architectural character in Jacobite fashion. Finch’s settling 
in Eastwell Park is, in this regard, a process of converting her political failure into poetry, 
which has political ramifications. Eastwell Park is sublimated into what she calls 
“Poetry’s native of the Place,” that is, a navel of her poetry:    
Whilst Eastwell Park does each soft gale invite,  
  There let them meet and revel in delight,  
  Amidst the silver beeches spread their wings  
  Where ev’ry birds as in Arcadia sings  
  ……………………………………….. 
And Poetry’s a native of the place. 
Those Eastwell hills let ev’ry breeze renew, 
Which from adjoining seats kind neighbours view; 
Please’ d in the artfull gardens which they boast (88-104).   
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As the title of another poem, “Upon Lord Winchelsea Converting the Mount into a 
Terras,” illuminates, Finch converts her retreat into a poetical artifact much in the same 
way that Lord Winchelsea, her husband’s nephew, converts the mount into an 
architectural artifact, i.e., a terras. Finch starts her poem by arguing that Eastwell Manor 
conceals all the beauties of the park, and that it is an error of the old to remove the pivotal 
point of the beauty of the landscape. However, just as the Roman Caesar came, saw, and 
won the battle, the old ancestor refined a bare mount into a civilized lineament. Rugged, 
striated lines of the natural mount are changed now into a smooth view-sight, just as the 
mount makes way for a human design to build up architecture. Rather than eulogizing the 
old ancestor, Finch asks why there could be no vision without the division of labor. 
While man’s labor produces the glory of the seat from the same natural ground, woman is 
alienated from the landscape. At this conjuncture, Finch laments the loss of the oak tree: 
“When untimely fate / Sadly prescribed it a too early date, / The heavy tidings cause a 
general grief, / And all combine to bring a swift relief. / Some plead, some pray, some 
counsel, some dispute; /Alas in vain, where power is absolute” (29-34). Serving as a 
counterpoint, this passage evokes the violence of absolute paternal power in order to 
mention a catastrophic event of cutting down the oak tree. She goes further in saying that 
absolute power displaces communal speech acts into whispers and unspeakable groans. 
While it is very hard impossible to say that she recalls the traumatic memory of the loss 
of her favor, trees are sentenced to death as if they were the faithful ones in their 
unwavering pledge of loyalty to the King. It is certain, however, that the old ancestor 
performs his absolute power and authority over her imagined affiliations with laborers. 
She is reenacting what the “bloodless” Revolution has caused to her life, and in so doing, 
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she exceeds the cultural function that she is made to internalize, which is, household 
management. Instead of merely using a discourse on the moral stewardship, Finch’s 
poetic description creates the conditions of imagining stewardship and proprietorship for 
the future reader. She declares a higher aim to forge the new landscape in the poetic 
space of authorial regulation and management:     
  The new wrought gardens give a new delight   
Where every fault that in the old was found 
Is mended, in the well disposed ground.  
Such are th’effects, when wine, nor loose delighs  
Devour the day, nor waste the thoughtless nights,  
But generous arts, the studious hours engage,  
To bless the present, and succeeding age.  
Oh, may Eastwell still with their aid increase,  
Plenty surround her, and within be peace.  
Still may her temperate air his health maintain,  
From whom she does such strength and beauty gain.  
Flourish her trees, and may the verdant grass 
Again prevail, where late the plough did pass:  
Still may she boast a kind and fruitful soil,  
And may someone with admiration filled 
In just applauses and in numbers skilled,  
Not with more zeal but more poetic heat,  
Throughly adorn bravely what we relate (89 -96).  
  
The signification of the “wrought garden” has a double aspect, first of all, in relation to 
language, which creates the poetic conditions of cultural engagement in the discourse of 
moral stewardship, and also in relation to its referents, i.e., the loss of the old oak trees 
and the new terras. That is, Finch’s poetic intervention in forging the landcape is 
deconstructing the old while establishing the new. On the one hand, Finch anticipates and 
exceeds the country-house poem convention in that she eulogizes an owner of the estate 
while correcting the folly and violence of the old ancestor. When Finch identifies herself 
with the new owner, on the other hand, she, as Nicolle argues, traverses an ongoing 
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discourse on the management of an estate. Finch looks to engage ideologically in the 
prevailing discourse of moral proprietorship, but I argue that her poetic writing does more 
than an ideological engagement, for she is layering up the strata for enacting power in 
poetry; that is, her ancestor’s visibly enacted power in cutting down the oak trees 
provides for Finch an invisibly enacted power in educating a “futuristic” cultural logic of 
how to “read” the newly wrought garden. She aims to elevate the Jamesonian sense of 
political allegory to the higher cultural logic of poetic regulation. Even though she looks 
like a slip, or a displaced object for grafting onto the country house, her poetry enables 
her to be the poet of dehiscence as the instance of spacing and swerving, dispersal and 
digression.      
The country house also supplies Finch with a medium of poetry; and it serves, 
more significantly, as the material infrastructure of new social and political ties among 
her female friends. Finch enjoyed recognition and friendship from other female friends 
through what McGovern describes as “an informal, loosely structured type of network” 
(120). “To a Friend,” Finch writes, “in Praise of the Invention of Writing Letters.” “The 
Wings of Love were …/ … shaped into a Pen, / To send in Paper-sheets, From Town to 
Town, / Words smooth were they, and softer than his Down. / … And hopt, from Bough 
to Bough, supported by the Wind” (11-16). The image of the letter as anima, the Latin 
word meaning breath, breeze, and spirit (as in the Latin word pneuma), shows that the 
author figure becomes a mode of address like her breath moving everywhere with the 
breeze. “That the dark Pow’rs of distance cou’d subdue, / And make me See, as well as 
Talk to you; / That tedious Miles, nor Tracks of Air might prove / Bars to my sight, and 
shadows to my love” (33-36). Like what Kristeva calls the semiotic mode of 
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signification, her mode of correspondence functions to cut cross the symbolic and 
masculine “bars” of communication, that is, the public postal services to censure the 
letter. As “the Charms / That under secret Seals in Ambush lie,” her letter 
correspondences extends in the rhezomatic conjunction, “and … and … and …,” thereby 
securing her “the fond Engagements and the Ties” (An Epistle to Madam Deshouliers 29) 
among her female friends. The similarly invested structure of feminine feeling goes even 
further, anticipating the future control of an emerging British printing culture.         
Till time, which hastily advances, 
And gives to all new turns and chances, 
 …………………………………………  
New Augustean days revive, 
When wit shall please, and poets thrive. 
Till when, let those converse in private, 
Who taste what others don’t arrive at; 
Yielding that Mammonists surpass us, 
And let the Bank our-swell Parnassus (A Tale of the Miser and the Poet,  
93-103) 
 
The private means of communication becomes the feminine means of literary production.  
 I think that the poem titled “A Description of One of the Pieces of Tapestry at 
Longleat” is a nice place to consummate my discussion of Anne Finch, since Finch’s 
poetic “voice” comes from a particular “shuttle” of writing poetry. As Geoffrey Hartman 
suggests, the shuttle represents the weaver’s instrument by which the synectoche 
substituting part for the whole, but it also contains a metonymy which names the 
productive cause instead of the product (338). Finch’s address to Raphael’s tapestry 
cartoon has been transferred along a continuous series of adjacent metonymical parts 
from Sergius Paulus (the proconsul of Asia), through St. Paul, Elymas (the sorcerer who 
was struck blind by St. Paul), Lictors, Barnabas, to Henry Theanor. The productive cause 
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could be attributed to Finch’s practice of representation. I argue that Finch’s practice of 
representation is an occasion of what Anne Bergren calls the metis practice. She 
elaborates as follows:  
Metis works by continual shape-shifting, turning the morpe of defeat into 
victory’s tool. Its method includes the trick or trap (dolos) … and the 
ability to seize the opportunity (kairos). Each of these exploits the 
essential forms of metis, the “turning” (tropos) that binds opposites, 
manifest in the reversal and the circle, in weaving, twisting, and knotting, 
and in every joint (italics added  8).  
 
Bergren’s metis practice intersects with Finch’s mode of converting her predicament into 
a strategically poetic and political activity. Her mode of address is conversing with her 
female friends; that is, she not only establishes the scene of collaborative feminine 
writing, but also establishes her female friends as the surrogate writers and readers.  
  Thus Tapestry of old, the Walls adorn’d  
  Ere noblest Dames the artful Shuttle scorn’d:  
  Arachne, then, with Pallas did contest,  
  …………………………………………………..  
  But all the Fame, that from the Field was brought,  
  Employ’d the Loom, where the kind Consort wrought: 
  Whilst sharing in the Toil, she shar’d the Fame, 
  And with the Heroes mixt her interwoven Name (1-9).  
 
Finch identifies herself with Ovid’s Arachne who equips herself with a transformative 
force of tapestry; and she also envisions tapestry as feminine. “All Arts are by the Men 
engross’d / And Our few talents unimprov’d or cross’d” (12-13) But Finch attempts to 
shatter and subvert the very opposition of gender relations between feminine inferiority 
and masculine superiority. For this, she engages herself as if in rhetorical competition. 
“My burden’d Thoughts, which labour for a Vent, / Urge me t’ explain in Verse, what by 
each Face is meant” (22-23). Finch seeks for the (productive) cause “why Nature acts not 
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still by Natures Laws” or “why all Illumination quench’d or veil’d” in Raphael’s tapestry 
cartoon. In other words, Finch is searching for the cause that gains its materiality in the 
effects, i.e., “an absent cause” immanent in the structure of effects – “Deprivation,” “the 
Negatives of life,” “One important Want,” uneven gender topography, or her political 
predicament. 
  But to thy Portrait, Elymas we come 
Whose Blindness almost strikes the Poet dumb;  
And whilst She vainly to Describe thee seeks, 
The Pen but traces, where the Pencil speaks.  
Of Darkness to be felt, our Scriptures write      
Thro’ all thy Frame such Stupefaction reigns, 
As Night it self were sunk into thy Veins:  
Not by the Eyes alone thy Loss we find, 
Each Lineament helps to proclaim thee Blind.  
An artful dimness far diffus’d we grant, 
And failing seem all Parts through One important want (66-79) 
 
Insofar as Elymas’s blindness deprives her of her speech and voice, Elymas is, 
paradoxically, accountable for the poet’s agency. Finch chooses, Salvaggio argues, to 
write poetic lines figured through weaving to take her into that space of displacement and 
absence (115-116), even though she retains a stigmatized mark of as “illegitimate” a poet 
as Elymas is a false prophet called Bar-Jesus (a pseudo-Christ). She does this in order to 
engage in the metis practice of turning her predicament into strategically political verse. 
Furthermore, Finch’s productive cause is overdetermined, because the poet’s being dumb 
is, metonymically speaking, caused by the “traumatic” event of the bloodless revolution 
of 1688. Finch’s poetic consciousness traces its cause retrospectively and casts it forward 
in her poems; the result is the future anticipation of control and its converting force of 
address. The future anticipation of control implies a critical stance from which Finch 
continues to engage politically and poetically with the displaced Stuarts in their absence. 
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The “metis” practice reconfigures the feminine means of communication as the means of 
feminine literary production. In this conjunction, the country house supplies Finch with 
an infrastructure of the new social ties and alliances. Anne Finch exerts much more 
influence and power over the public sphere from which she appears to be withdrawn than 
those who simply occupy that world. Finch transports, as the semiotic vessel, beyond the 
private sphere.  
 Political retirement to a garden becomes standard practice in the eighteenth 
century with the Temples at Stowe, Bolingbroke and Dawley and Pitt at his garden in 
Burton Pynsent.  Any patriot politician worth his salt speaks from the countryside, 
boasting of how his claim to power is based on his entire removal from the circuit of 
power. Anne Finch’s retreat into the country house in Eastwell Park says the opposite. 
While showing how gender relations play a subtle but pronounced role in architecture, 
this chapter aims to re-conceptualize the infrastructure of the feminine literary production 
and to argue that the country house is the medium and at the same time the material 
condition of her poetical writing. If architecture wishes to dissent from the political status 
quo, how would it go about practicing this opposition? This chapter suggests Anne 
Finch’s architecture practice of metis as a critical mode of converting her political 
disgrace into new possibilities for her poetical and political expression. Anne Finch’s 
position is very close to the position that William Wordsworth takes in regard to the 
Female Vagrant’s social predicament.    
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CHAPTER II 
 
ROBINSON CRUSOE AND COUNTER-SPACES OF IMAGINATION 
 
In this chapter, I consider both the development and the discourse of the 
“turnpike,” to see the turnpike system as the case of the modern production of space in 
Britain and to suggest the need for a formative interpretation of its occurrences within the 
British literature. By suggesting a theoretical convergence of three possible readings of 
the turnpike, this chapter investigates the era of Daniel Defoe’s life and experience in 
order to analyze Robinson Crusoe as a champion of the author cast away in a foreign 
locale and his alternative imagination of claiming the ownership of property. As Jonathan 
Lamb suggests, Crusoe’s voyaging represents human activity in the Lockean state nature, 
that is, the condition where rational self-preservation is played out. A series of 
concatenated events recurs throughout Crusoe’s voyage: Crusoe’s identity is unsettled; he 
is cast away in an unmanned island; the land is not occupied; and Crusoe makes the 
island his own by means of his uncomfortable and almost obsessive activities of 
occupying, cultivating, using, and appropriating every part of the island. I argue that 
Crusoe’s recursive activity testifies, paradoxically, to the imperfection of the Lockean 
paradigm of the State of Nature in a remote and foreign land, and impels Crusoe’s 
fanatical imagination of property and its related copyright. In a luxurious gesture, Crusoe, 
in an island deprived of familiar things and objects, promises that he shall give the reader 
the Copy, and he implicitly suggests that it shall be “free of charge”: “All as handsome 
about me as I could, I began to keep my Journal, of which I shall here give you the Copy 
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(tho’ in it will be told all these Particulars over again) as long as it lasted” (64). I explore 
into the rich “passage” of what Crusoe aptly describes as the “great thoroughfare of the 
Brain” (181) to find out links between geography and literature.               
The significance of the turnpike system has been overshadowed by scholarly 
attention to other measures of enclosure, such as houses, libraries, schools, hospitals, 
factories, and prisons. Building on Michel Foucault’s spatial view of things, which 
analyses discontinuous but actual spaces, territories, domains, and sites, the first reading 
of the turnpike engages in how relations of power and discipline were inscribed into the 
apparently innocent spatiality of the British social life, how human geography became 
filled with power relations. This point of view recuperates that power relations stand in 
for a range of disciplinary techniques that will be enacted concurrently and over the next 
half-century in England by such measures as systematic numbering of houses, 
establishment of a police force, decennial censuses, and other expanding information 
gathering and surveillance networks, especially such as restrictions on casual labor and 
poor laws.1 In this framework, the turnpike circulates as a form of currency which flows 
between social and political languages that constitutes the truth-effect of despotic British 
governance. Thomas Paine, for instance, evoked the despotic rhetorical trope of the 
British turnpikes to be compared with Edmund Burke’s demonized troping of the French 
Revolution: “It is not among the least of the evils of the present existing governments in 
all parts of Europe, that man, considered as man, is thrown back to a vast distance from 
his Maker, and the artificial chasm filled up by a succession of barriers, or a sort of 
turnpike gates, through which he has to pass” (305). In the next paragraph, Paine 
establishes his truth claim to natural rights by saying, “the duty of man is not a wilderness 
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of turnpike gates, through which he is to pass by tickets from one to the other” (305). 
While in a different social context, William Cobbett expresses his concern about turnpike 
tolls by asserting that owners and gate-keepers are changing the nature of the public more 
than they are legally entitled to charge.  
Another point of view sees the turnpike as the watershed of an economic take-off. 
This economic perspective concerns the wider economic effects of the “transport 
revolution” on the economy of Britain, and the key effect is the transformation of the land 
into a national circuit of market accessibility with direct benefits of the “modernization of 
transport services,” “travel times,” and “forward linkages” to agriculture as well as 
industry. In this view, the turnpike road system wields a spatially structuring force of 
uneven development via fragmentation and redistribution of geography. The turnpike 
road system made geography fragmented, but it simultaneously reshaped fragmented 
geography into a more organized network of improved roads, which in turn formed a 
network of routes for compiling and distributing information, that is, routes of copyrights 
and commodities. This economic point of view concerns “the sense of place” as John 
Barrell has called it; its effect of the turnpike expanded, sometimes beyond the point of 
recognition, the worldview framed by a parish or an estate. While I will discuss further 
this effect on the sense of place in my fourth chapter, it is worthwhile to register another 
bifurcating point with regard to the turnpike: How much crucial role did the transport 
system play in an industrial take-off compared with inland trade and traffic enabled by 
canals? Reinterpreting Paul Hohenberg and Lynn Lee’s macro-level analysis of the 
“central place” and the “network system,” I take a viewpoint that the turnpike performs 
the double articulation of consolidating social, political, and economic power – it was 
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developed by means of bills in Parliament in the same way as enclosure- and diffusing a 
piecemeal character of development in a “patchwork” of improved and unimproved 
highways (Philip Bagwell 41).   
By asking what kind of language the turnpike gives us, the last but not least point 
of view of the turnpike finds its geographical expression in the framework that Neil 
Smith, Nicos Poulantzas, and Edward Soja maintains in light of the organization of a 
continuous, homogeneous, and fragmented space-time such as it lies at the real 
substratum of the spatiality of Britain. The turnpike serves as the medium and outcome, 
the precondition and embodiment, of the modern production of space in the eighteenth 
and the next centuries. Jacques Derrida and Paul Virilio add another theoretical depth to 
those contemporary spatial theorists by suggesting that the turnpike and, by extension, 
canals underpin information at a distance and reinforce the power of instantaneous action 
and mobilization to “make domination at a distance feasible” as Bruno Latour has also 
called it.           
The Gentleman’s Magazine described the historical condition and future direction 
of English roads:  
England, all things duly considered, may be justly called the finest country 
in the world; for tho’ nature may have been unkind to her in point of 
sunshine, and certainty of weather, yet industry in general, and the 
advantage of a maritime situation in particular, have raised her to so high a 
pre-eminence over other nations, that all foreigners both envy and admire 
her. . . . The only solid objection I can make to this amiable recess, 
secreted, as it were by the hand of nature, from the gross of the European 
continent, is the wretched state of many public roads. I allow it would be 
an endless work to attempt to reform all the little branching ones; to aim at 
this, might to give up the whole. But the great arteries, the more 
considerable veins of every country, the ducts that lead from vital parts to 
the more eminent extremes, these should be kept open and permeable 
(301).     
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Nothing would better express the poor quality of the parish road before the turnpike road 
than the saying that if a drop of sweat should happen to fall from any of them it would 
produce a quagmire on the road.2 A parish held it responsible to repair and maintained the 
little branching roads within its boundary. An Act of Parliament authorized village 
authorities to claim six days of labor from every male villager per year, which was known 
as unpaid statutory labor to provide a source of public finance for road improvement. 
Any parish whose roads were “bad” was answerable to the Justice of the Peace at Quarter 
Sessions, when the parish was subject to fines.  
Beginning in the 1640s, the parish had the right to finance road improvement by 
levying property taxes, known as “highway rates.” Invented in 1693 and beginning in 
1696, the “village system of road provision,” which turned to the law enforcement of the 
magistrate for collective cooperation, was replaced by an alternative institutional 
arrangement, that is, the “town-centered” turnpike system.3 Initially, turnpike systems 
were controlled by the Justice of the Peace, but from the 1750s on, a turnpike “trusts 
system” constituted a network of investments, in which place became an object of 
speculative investment. Beginning in 1707, the turnpike trusts proper began to emerge as 
semi-autonomous bodies largely independent of the Justice of the Peace. A trust was 
managed by a group of “trustees” named in its charter. The division and separation of 
trusts from the Justice of the Peace meant that a relatively autonomous group of people 
could assemble principally for the purpose of road improvement. From the 1740s, the 
turnpike trusts gained much more authority independent of the Justice of the Peace. 
Turnpike trusts, enacted by individual Acts of Parliament, designated a local group to set 
up tollgates at various locations on a certain stretch of the road. Each Turnpike Act 
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defined a maximum schedule of tolls that could be levied on different types of traffic, 
including coaches, wagons, packhorses, and livestock. Besides defining the schedule of 
tolls, Turnpike Acts also authorized the trustees of the local group the benefit and the 
right of compulsory land purchase. By 1780 the greater part of the main road system had 
been subjected to turnpike control. Turnpike trustees were empowered to make charges 
fixed in Acts of Parliament for use of their roads and to erect toll-gates where money 
could be collected. They also had an obligation to set up mileposts along their routes and 
were able to borrow money for improvements on the security of future toll income. The 
result was that place ended up as a marketable entity, thereby generating a serial 
reinvestment, redistribution, and restructuring of the parish-centered village into the 
trusts-controlled place. A turnpike “trusts system” exercised a spatial practice of 
improving the road while turning it into a marketable commodity.  
My recharting of the development of the turnpike system calls attention to its two 
elements of both the Central Place and the Network system, or fixed and open circuit.4 
While Paul Hohenberg and Lynn Lees use the concepts to read the processes of the 
making of urbanization, I use them to describe the turnpike road both as the medium and 
the outcome, the precondition and embodiment, of the modern production of space in 
Britain. Drawing on the notion of the central place and also reinterpreting Eric Pawson’s 
“schema of relations between the parish repair system, Justice trusts, and turnpike trusts,” 
I argue that the turnpike “trusts system” functions as the central place of control and 
inspection. The organizational framework of turnpike “trusts system” redraws and 
reproduces the social division of labor within its own body. This process takes place in a 
range stretching from hierarchical and centralized relations to those concentrated in 
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various layers and nodal-points of control and administration; that is, from the echelons 
within which authority is delegated through the allocation of power and authority to the 
modes of recruiting laborers and resources5. Down to the last detail, the framework of the 
system incarnates the “capitalist” division of labor in the processes of articulating and 
distributing the executive power and knowledge of the Parliamentary Acts. That is, the 
knowledge-power relations linked to turnpike “trusts system” find geographical 
expression in particular techniques of the exercise of power – turnpike tolls and taxes as 
devices inscribed in the texture of the land whereby populous flow and mobility are 
enforceable through control and inspection. The turnpike “trusts system” wields a 
straightforward and linear transformation of the “view of the world” placed on a par with 
the coordination of the parish. The parish would become less and less the center of the 
area within its boundaries, and more and more a part of an extended network of long-
distance trading roads to allow commodities and traded goods to reach a nationwide 
market and another growing agricultural regions.  
The economic significance of turnpike roads is linked with the turnpike road 
system as a network. A greater frequency of exchange between villages and market towns 
could encourage, for instance, a greater diversity of agriculture; for as long as roads were 
bad and villages thus isolated, every village had to grow corn for its own consumption. A 
good road system would encourage every village to think of itself no longer as primarily 
concerned to grow its own food for its own needs, but as putting its agricultural produce 
into circulation, and thus as being more dependent on national prices and more part of the 
national economy.6 The improved road transport system provides the basis of intensifying 
and accelerating market accessibility on a sufficiently large scale for the domestic 
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markets to absorb agricultural produce as well as manufactured products. The turnpike 
road system contributes to agricultural development and industrial take-off by “extending 
gradually the advantages of market accessibility to most areas within the central zone”; 
by “initiating the erosion of the subsistence farming and wastelands of the peripheral 
zone”; and finally by “encouraging development in the peripheral zone” (Eric Pawson 
313-322). The turnpike road system generates a kinetic geography that makes things and 
people stop, pass, and move. As figure 1 illustrates, the turnpike road system forms an 
open, dissipative circuit, or a communications network capable of bringing together and 
accelerating the flows of information, commodities, and copyrights.  
 In surveying the shifting domain of England into “islands of improvement in a sea 
of open-field,” Defoe observes the turnpike as follows:  
Upon this great Road there are wonderful improvements made and 
making, which no Traveller can miss the Observation of, especially if he 
knew the Condition these ways were formerly in; nor can my Account of 
these Counties be perfect, without taking notice of it; for certainly no 
public Edifice, Almshouse, Hospital, or Nobleman’s Palace, can be of 
equal Value to the country with this, no nor more an Honor and Ornament 
to it (524). 
 
The turnpike that Defoe observes in traveling throughout the islands of Britain manifests 
itself as the medium and the outcome, the presupposition and embodiment, of a whole 
collection of wonders of remarkable development. Turnpikes move people as well as 
goods, and rearrange the figure in the landscape as a wanderer along the major routes of 
Britain. Like an artist who takes up his brushes and proceeds to paint what he sees in the 
landscape, nothing worth notating escapes the traveler’s picturing eye. This “impulse to 
record and describe the land” sees geography as a “surface on which to set forth or 
inscribe the world” (Svetlana Alpers 147). This geography turns into a fold or an 
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epidermis encrusted with the “arteries and veins” of turnpikes - a line that passes through 
the next field door, the neighboring parish, topographical views, and city views. It 
becomes “that great thoroughfare of the Brain,” that is, a circuit of collecting, 
communicating, and distributing artificial intelligence and information. For the turnpike 
system forms a self-organizing, dissipative (i.e., patchwork) structure of development 
across the scale of the geography of England, “it is impossible, as needless, to set down 
the innumerable Crowd of Thought that whirl’d through that great thoroughfare of the 
Brain” (181).         
Infrastructural expansion represented by the construction of turnpikes provides 
the possibility of personal alienation for Crusoe as a missing person from his comfortable 
neighborhood. From the start, Crusoe couldn’t curb his indomitable desire to “see the 
world.” And his recursive desire gives rise to almost always the same effect on him: to be 
plunged into abysmal conditions, such as being a slave for two years and being cast off 
into an uninhabited island. Seen this way, Crusoe seems to have only two extremes in his 
life: “He cast his self down again into the deepest Gulph of human Misery that ever Man 
fell into, or perhaps could be consistent with Life and a State of Health in the World” 
(35). Even though there is danger in his voyage that the comfort of his identity is 
engulfed, that is, mutilated and alienated by a certain “cannibalistic” world, why couldn’t 
he contract his father’s new aesthetic value of “the middle station of life,” the “upper 
station of low life” as the “just standard of true Felicity?” (4) As if entrusted by the 
chance events of displacement from port to port and from place to place, that is, from 
Hull via the Yarmouth road and Guinea to All-Saints Bay in the Brazils, Crusoe 
ultimately repeats the opportunities of voyage for excitement, mobility, and resettlement. 
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Crusoe’s recursive voyage braid together three different strands of psychological, 
ethical (and religious), and geographical (and also economic) speculation. Although he 
feels in the Brazil plantations that he has “lived like a Man cast away upon some desolate 
Island, that no body there but himself (33),” it is a matter of fact that Crusoe accumulates 
his personal effects. What kind of neighborhood does Crusoe live so that he mimics the 
order of things there? What is then the status of the Lockean notion of society for 
Crusoe? Locke’s state of nature kneads the three major cords of bonds, obligation, and 
alliance into a social contract that men are said to have signed among them in order to 
enter into a collectivity that makes them the men they are. From the time the pact was 
signed, it is as if the group had signed it, were no longer rooted in anything but its own 
history of the social contract. Individuals outside of community are not men, but “wild 
savage beasts” (2. 11), for “it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature 
between men, but only one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community” 
(2. 13). The contract affects men as individuals by making them immediate participants 
in their specific community:  
And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the 
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the 
same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the 
execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between 
any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes 
those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with 
such penalties as the law has established (2. 7. 87).  
 
Locke’s law follows from natural law, which is reason, insomuch as reason governs all 
men. “Reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being 
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possessions: for all men becoming all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely 
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wise maker” (2. 2. 6). Locke’s natural law breaks open a theological code by which he 
legalizes a rule-based society as the state of nature: “Man is bound to preserve himself, 
and not to quit his station willfully, by the like reason, to preserve the rest of mankind” 
(2. 2. 6). Being in his station with a sense of obligation is a good mode of preserving 
himself without being master of other human beings. As James Tully comments, that 
which is an end for man, being preserved, is turned into a normative proposition that he 
ought to be preserved (45). The norm of preservation informs every individual of a good 
sense of observance. “Man living together according to reason, without a common 
superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature” 
(2. 3. 19). Locke reduces nature to human nature, which is reduced to either reason or the 
social contract.     
When the state of nature is reduced to human nature, one of the specific 
challenges to which Locke must respond is that the state of nature is a “fiction,” lacking 
in reality. Even though the state of nature asserts its materiality, its materiality is nothing 
other than the state of nature in its formative or constituting effects. Insofar as the state of 
nature operates successfully by constituting an object domain as a taken-for-granted 
ontology, the material effects of the state of nature are taken as primary givens. Richard 
Ashcraft remarks as follows:  
What is absolutely crucial to Locke’s description of the state of nature is his 
characterization of human nature in terms of God’s workmanship and 
purposes which require that human beings be endowed with free will and 
reason. It is from this standpoint, Locke argues, that an individual can be 
“supposed capable of knowing the law [of nature], and so living within the 
rules of it (104).    
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When this material effect is taken as a departure of Locke’s political argumentation, the 
state of nature comes very close to myth in the Roland Barthean sense of the term.7 To 
understand political power, and derive it from its original, Locke suggests that one needs 
to consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to 
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within 
the bounds of the law of nature (2.2.4). This presumption is not always fully in practice, 
but, as Ashcraft argues, there is no reason to suppose that Locke does not incorporate this 
same principle into the conceptualization of the natural human condition of man in The 
Second Treatise (104). Such assumption is necessary in order to defend the proposition 
that it is possible to make and keep contracts in the state of nature, which presupposes 
trust among individuals. Locke refers to the individual’s existence in the state of nature as 
its formative effects under natural law.   
 When the state of nature is coterminous with the boundary of a society, it leaves 
the world on its sidelines as supplementary with an enormous collection of things 
reduced to the status of objects to be appropriated by human labor. Crusoe goes beyond 
with the Lockean notion of a pre-contractual state of nature toward the world in which 
the Other is imagined to inhabit. Crusoe’s repeated voyage drives him beyond the cultural 
boundary of society. And in this process, the boundary is displaced and dislocated into a 
problematizing place where one can call into question the Lockean premises of the state 
of nature and its closely related human nature. Crusoe indicates that his miseries may 
follow from his action “like a meer Brute from the Principles of Nature and by the 
Dictates of Common Sense only” (83). The principles of nature and the dictates of 
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common sense are fundamentally undermined outside of their cultural premises, 
especially, in other spaces.    
Crusoe’s narration exposes the ways in which he turns an unoccupied island into 
his private property. Crusoe starts writing the journal while talking in the past: 
“September 30, 1659, I poor miserable Robinson Crusoe, in the offing, came on Shore on 
this dismal unfortunate Island, which I call’d the Island of Despair, all of the rest of the 
Ship’s Company being drown’d, and my self almost dead” (52). Crusoe’s use of the past 
tense measures an origin of the event of his coming at the island like the two critical 
methods of “recension and emendation” to identify the origin of history. This almost 
obsessive claim to history repeats and renders almost inoperable the generic procedure 
which Locke expounds in his Second Treatise that one obtains property by mixing labor. 
The general strategy of Defoe’s authorial experimentation with the Lockean paradigm of 
property is to ask one to imagine a circumstance in which ordinary human life comes to 
stand still and to re-imagine the terms by which one bonds to survive. As one can see, in 
the shipwreck that casts him into a desert island, Crusoe is thrown so filled with anxiety 
that “he runs about for a while like a Mad-man” (43). Fearful of unknown space, he 
spends his first night inhabiting the island not in its own terms but above the land in a 
tree. “All the Remedy that offer’d to my Thoughts at that Time, was, to get up into a 
thick bushy Tree like a Firr” (44). What his shipwreck unfolds is, as Lamb claims, that 
consciousness of a rational being is almost indistinguishable from “instinctual self-
preservation which humans share with irrational animals” (27), an encounter of the real 
beneath the Lockean notion of the state of nature:       
I began to look around me to see what kind of Place I was in, and what was 
next to be done, and I soon found my comforts abate, and that in a word I had 
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a dreadful Deliverance: For I was wet, had no Clothes to shift me, nor any 
thing either to eat or drink to comfort me, neither did I see any Prospect before 
me, but that of perishing with Hunger, or being devour’d by wild beasts; and 
that which was particularly afflicting to me, was, that I had no Weapon either 
hunt and kill any Creature for my Sustenance, or to defend my self against any 
other Creature that might desire to kill me for theirs. In a word. . . this threw 
me into terrible Agonies of Mind, that for a while I run about like a Mad-man 
(43).  
 
Confronted with the desired state of his own person, Crusoe feels that his identity is 
insecure and perpetually contingent. Crusoe’s narrative would record, in a large measure, 
a “frailty” or emptiness of the echoes of Locke’s identity and consciousness outside of 
their stable field of application. Crusoe’s incessant activity to thickly layer and fortify the 
pale of barricades and stakes demonstrates the very precarious nature of human 
consciousness on the unmanned island. “My thoughts were now wholly employ’d about 
securing myself against either Savages, if any should appear, or wild Beasts, if any were 
in the Island; and I had many Thoughts of the Method how to do this, and what kind of 
dwelling to make, whether I should make a Cave in the Earth, or a Tent upon the Earth” 
(53). Crusoe is obsessively defensive of himself and apprehensive of strangers, visible or 
invisible, to himself. This is preserving his self which, when preserved, owns the means 
of its presentation both as a property and as narrative.      
Defoe dramatizes or experiments with the notion of the mixing metaphor of 
Lockean property by situating Crusoe in a remote, foreign locale without the common 
rule or law of property. Locke argues that a man has property rights in his own body, in 
his labor as his activity, therefore in those material things that he had “mixed his labor 
with” (2.5.27). His rights are subject to cultural provisos that he should not appropriate 
more than he could make use of, and that there should be “enough and as good left in 
common for others” (2.5.33). The mixed labor implies that whatever has been 
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deliberately transformed by labor becomes the property of the laborer, and this opens up 
the question of to what extent to which the material should be considered to have been 
transformed by a particular activity of labor. Insofar as he mixes his labor with the island, 
the island would be a property in reward for his labor. Crusoe would be born with his 
new gained and constantly experienced authority over his domain, for the laborer should 
have a property right in the material on which he labored. As if to consummate the 
Providential premise of property, Crusoe exclaims, “the island has come to radiate with 
the “Dispositions of Providence [which] “quiet his mind and order every Thing for the 
best” (131).  
Locke claims that God gave the world to the “industrious and rational” and refers 
to the “pains” which characteristically accompany labor. The justification of 
appropriation is that a person deserves to have those items which his toil and industry 
have produced, the products being a fitting reward for the expended effort. As Ashcraft 
elaborates, labor as an activity, and its end product, private property, have become 
through this (theological) shift in Locke’s argument a fulfillment of man’s natural law 
obligations, expressed as the will of God.  
The general point I am making is that, instead of focusing upon the 
declarative, naturalistic language of rights, we view Locke’s discussion of 
property in terms of the intentional language of divinely instituted obligation. . 
. Lockean natural rights are always the active fulfillment of duties owed to 
God (Ashcraft 135).   
 
By performing useful labor, one deserves a reward that accurately reflects the value of 
that labor. This interpretation entails a particular difficulty in interpreting the Lockean 
premise of the divine contract of property, because, as Ashcraft argues, Locke’s main 
intention is to justify the fundamental principle of the Law of Nature by defending the 
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enclosure and productive use of land in civilized countries which have contributed much 
more to the preservation of mankind (140). Locke says, “Land that is left wholly to 
nature that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed as 
it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing” 
(2.5.42). The Locke’s argument of landed property lies in the notion of enacting power in 
order to produce the divine purposefulness of the human obligation.     
To qualify the enactment of power in Locke’s argument of landed property, one 
needs to understand a variety of the geographic techniques that Crusoe keeps performing 
and distributing on the island, including enclosure and its related cadastral survey. I will 
argue that Crusoe’s cadastral survey again exposes the problematic nature of the Lockean 
paradigm of appropriating the “vacant” land. An increasing amount of enclosures of the 
domain of the island shows that Crusoe is mixing his labor by an interrelated multiplicity 
of activities of traveling, touching, using, cultivating, keeping, appropriating, and 
mapping as well as “registering” the island into a text. Enclosure is, Roger Kain and 
Elizabeth Baigent explain it, the “process whereby land that was exploited collectively, or 
over which there existed common rights, was divided into parcels owned in severalty, 
with each proprietor exchanging his share of common rights over the wider area for 
exclusive rights in part of it” (237). It involves the meticulous measurement of a piece of 
land, followed by the surrounding of the land with barriers designed to close off the 
common passage of people and animals. Enclosure also requires a survey by enclosure 
commissioners, usually three in number, and enclosure maps are attested by their 
surveyors on oath as true and accurate. As Kain and Baigent cite it, “Acts of Inclosure 
commonly require a Survey to be made, either by the Commissioners, or by some person 
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employed by them, and a Map to be prepared from it; both of which is generally done by 
a Surveyor, especially appointed for the purpose” (239). Land turns into a “movable” 
form of property by means of the cadastral survey:  
A Plan and Survey of the Number of Acres in each division . . . is called 
the General Survey: Afterwards the known property of every owner in 
each Division is separately to be measured, and this when finished, is 
called the Particular Survey. By means of the latter every Proprietor’s 
Estates is reduced first into its Measure and Number of Acres, and then by 
a Comparison of Measure of the several parts with the Value of each by 
the Acre, as before fix’d, it is reduced into Money, or its whole annual 
value, unconnected with the Common Ground (Cited in Kain and Baigent, 
243).   
 
Land is turned into the cadastral map and it circulates across a “discursive state archive” 
consisting of the enclosure commissioners, the public records office, various country 
record offices, and parish registries (Marzec 138).  
 Crusoe’s exploration into the inlands of the island anticipates the cadastral 
method of survey. After he circuits around the island, Crusoe exclaims, “I was King and 
Lord of all this country indefeasibly, and had a Right of Possession; and if I could convey 
it, I might have it in Inheritance, as completely as any Lord of Mannor in England” (93). 
Confirming that there is no one else but himself and also surveying and planning 
innumerable tracts of land, Crusoe represents the interests of the lord of the manor in 
enclosing his “country habitation.” Crusoe’s act of enclosure, however, exceeds the 
cadastral survey in that it requires roads; that is, Crusoe’s perception of the cadastral 
survey is an opportunity to rationalize the transport system. The method of survey 
presupposes a rectilinear sense of the land:  
The most approved Method of surveying and planning any Tracts of Land 
is to measure the Outside thereof from station to station with a chain, 
taking offsets from the straight line at convenient Distances, where there is 
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any Irregularity in the Figure; and at each Station also to mark the Angles 
or Bearings between the Lines; which is done either by means of a 
graduated Instrument, as a Theodolite, Circumferentor, or Semicircle; or 
otherwise it is done by means of a Telescope and Plain table (Recited in 
Kain and Baigent 243)    
 
 
For enclosure is not only a process that parcels out heath and commons, but also a nexus 
that charts roads and houses; and valorizes the value of space, linking enclosure with the 
turnpike could be considered as reciprocally complementary in favor of the interests of 
trade. As Defoe speculates it, “Trade will be encouraged by [road improvements] in 
every way; for carriage of all kinds of heavy goods will be much easier, the wagons will 
either perform in less time, . . . all of which will tend to lessen the  rate of carriage, and so 
bring goods cheaper to market” (A Tour 1726 439). A political regulation, grounded on 
an Act of Parliament passed in 1691, for instance, authorized municipal counties to set 
the maximum per-ton freight charge on goods being shipped into their jurisdiction. The 
turnpike road would increase significant productivity growth during the middle 
eighteenth century. However, a political factor couldn’t be ruled out in considering the 
passing of the turnpike act, a formal counter-petition.8 At any rate, Crusoe, with a quite 
reap of mind, imagines that it is impossible, as needless, to set down the innumerable 
crowd of Thought [and things] that whirl’d through that great thoroughfare of the Brain 
[of his island].      
 The geographical techniques that Crusoe is reenacting on his island are crucially 
associated with Kevin Hetherington’s process of place-formation. The argument of 
Hetherington is that place is not necessarily a complete product as a commodity but a 
process of giving place to place. Hetherington says, “place is a contingent effect of the 
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processes of placing, ordering and naming that emerge from the actions of heterogeneous 
materials within a given network and the system of differences that are generated to give 
stability to such mobile process” (192). A sense of place derives, according to him, from 
the “spatial ordering of materials and the system of differences that they perform” (184). 
As Steve Pile and Heidi Nast elaborates, a sense of place “involves accounts of places-
bodies in changeable relationships to others, where those relationships are still mapped 
through positions in two dimensional grids of domination, oppression, and 
marginalization, but through the people’s n-dimensional capacities to produce directions 
and organization, to negotiate their connections and disconnections” (Places through the 
Body 413). Rather than a calculus of the possibilities to become real in the future, place is 
a potential field of virtualities in the present configuration, which will be unfolded into 
otherness or difference. Hetherington explains:   
Places are materially constituted through an ordering process that involves 
an ongoing and recursive process that has three parts: i) the placing of 
materials within a network, ii) arranging those placings so that they can be 
known and represented through immutable mobiles and iii) naming those 
arrangements and through that naming trying to allow their mobility and 
deferral to settle down (192).   
 
Place is generated by the placing, arranging and naming, that is, the spatial ordering of 
materials in an over-determined project. A place is of a mobile, open, and divisible 
(variable) process of constant change and transformation. 
Crusoe’s decision not to use the most bountiful part of the island as a ground for 
making a surrogate home shows the very shifting ground in the Lockean premise of 
landed property.  
I was surpriz’d to see that I had taken up my Lot on the worst Side of the 
Island. . . I confess this Side of the Country was much pleasanter than 
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mine, but yet I had not the least Inclination to remove; for as I was fix’d in 
my Habitation, it became natural to me, and I seem’d all the while I was 
there, to be as it were upon a Journey, and from Home (102).      
 
Crusoe makes the “natural contract” to be distinguished from the social contract 
propounded by Locke. Crusoe’s geographical techniques of producing the “Country 
Habitation,” “Enclosures,” or “Fortification” are part of the mock processes of 
reconfiguring the British sense of place.   
Although Crusoe reifies and encloses the lapses of hours and days in the objects 
he uses a labor force in making, Crusoe has “wasted” most of his times in a non-
functional way. For instance, he feels joy at making himself a modest pot: “No Joy at a 
Thing of so mean a Nature was ever equal to mine, when I found I had made an Earthen 
Pot that would bear the Fire” (89). Not only does Crusoe find an aesthetic value in his 
labor, but he also finds that scarcity is a natural relation of himself to the environment. 
Furthermore, Crusoe destabilizes the Lockean notion of property, complicating it with a 
distinction between movable (writing) and immovable (landed) property. As Wolfram 
Schmidgen suggests, Defoe’s novel thematizes the question of landed property by 
“making immovable property resists fully becoming his mobile” (34). Crusoe’s incessant 
activities of making the island enclosed and thus owned are symptomatic of his obsession 
with the land, which carries over the “compulsion to repeat” his narrative of how close he 
is to appropriating the island into his own. And yet geography resists being crossed over 
by Crusoe’s narration. Crusoe gestures toward turning his island into a “General 
Magazine,” or a mobile storehouse: “So that had my been to be seen, it look’d like a 
general Magazine of all Necessary things, and I had every thing so ready at my Hand, 
that it was a great Pleasure to me to see all my Goods in such Order, and especially to 
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find my Stock of all Necessaries so great (63).” The order and also implied grid of the 
general- magazine-like narration, however, does not cover and represent the whole island 
discursively and continues to be infiltrated by all the more empirical experiences. This is 
why Crusoe tries to construct a literary fact as part of a whole process of making the 
island his own. Assuming that fact is taken to refer to some objectively independent 
entity that was out there and owned, how does Crusoe produce a matter of fact that he has 
discovered and owned the island out there as a property? Crusoe’s construction of fact is 
a process of historicizing each part of his story. Crusoe tries to company and suture the 
journal with the actual narrative whereby all the traces of textual production are made 
extremely difficult to detect. If  I mix metaphor a little, when a skilled practitioner tries to 
explain the grounds of a performance, a juggling if you want, to a curious observer, he 
can show the observer how he does it all without a particular knowledge of his own 
principles and still mystifies the observer because the art itself comprises (or black-
boxes) the fact. This yields the most sophisticated fine line between Crusoe’s writing as 
fact and his writing as artifact, not in the sense that fact and artifact are respectively 
natural and artificial, but in the sense that the reality that the reader believes to out there 
circles back into Crusoe’s journal writing, the real conditions of narration of which are 
again made explicit. The reader comes at Crusoe’s island by means of his own 
retrospective account of it, but once Crusoe’s description begins to stabilize, it takes 
place as a reality which takes on a life of its own after the circularity of materiality. 
Crusoe states in the Preface, “The Editor believes the thing to be a just History of Fact; 
neither is there any Appearance of Fiction in it: And whoever thinks, because of all such 
things are dispatched, that the Improvement of it, as well as to the Diversion, as to the 
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Instruction of the Reader, will be the same” (3). This particular deconstruction of reality 
into fact and artifact is characteristic of the Oceanic journal writing that a variety of the 
Oceanic writers, naturalists, and voyagers brought back from their voyage. Joseph 
Banks’s Tahiti journal reveals this split of reality, and yet Crusoe goes further by 
implying that his form of writing is “faction,” the combination of fact and fiction.  
Crusoe’s slippery position toward the Lockean notion of property, that is, his 
inconsistent rendition of theological matrix makes Charles Gildon, Defoe’s 
contemporary, lambaste him. According to Gildon, Christian religion and the doctrines of 
providence are too sacred to be delivered in fictional plot-making. It is therefore a sinister 
and diabolical move to mix secular lies with holy truths of religion. And as if to defend 
himself in front of his opponent’s indictment, Crusoe emphasizes once again, “The Editor 
believes the thing to be a just History of Fact; neither is there any appearance of Fiction 
in it” (3). To look back on a dispute between fiction and fact from the vantage point of 
the history of copyright, one needs to be situated historically back in the legal discussions 
of copyright, to see how the distinction between fact and fiction permeated into the Act of 
Anne.    
The Copyright Act of 1710 was the basis for legislation, which finally recognized 
copyright as a type of property. The Copyright Act of 1709 defined the proprietary rights 
of writers and booksellers, allowing 21 years of copyright protection for existing books 
and 14 years for new books (plus another 14 years if the writers still lived after the first 
term) (Meynell 14).  And along with the lapsing of the Licensing Act roughly in 1695, 
the geographical restrictions on printers were removed, thus making it legal to set up 
presses in the provinces (64 – 97). The lapsing of the Licensing Act in 1695 informed the 
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author of the end of censorship in England, but the most stringent common laws against 
libel and seditious libel were still in effect. In order to establish such a category, distinct 
categories of indictable and nonindictable (that is, news and fiction) would have to be 
defined and established. When Robinson Crusoe was written in 1719, there was no clear 
distinction between news and fiction, and Defoe’s work rested uneasily in that world of a 
discourse which was inclining to separate into two sub-discourses (Davis 85-101). It was 
during the first quarter of the eighteenth century that there was concrete and rapid 
movement toward defining, for legal purposes, factual and fictional narratives. Crusoe’s 
infidel rendition of the Lockean notions of society and property runs the risk of making 
his rather “untrue or a lie, hence damnable” under the copyright acts in the 1710s, since 
copyright tended both to depend on and assist in William Blackstone’s pro-argument of 
Locke’s notion of identity of the author.  
 Locke’s notion of identity grounds itself on the extension of the identity of 
consciousness. For Locke, soul is the same thing as consciousness, just as matter is the 
same extension; that is, body is one site of convergence while soul is the other site of 
convergence. What I mean by convergence is the combination of the parts and ideas in a 
unified form, which constitutes body. I understand that body and soul are constructed in 
the same manner in Locke’s philosophical argument of the soul: “As a body is a thing 
that is extended, figured, capable of motion; a spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so 
hardness, friability, and to draw iron, are qualities to be found in a loadstone” (246). As 
an extended substance, soul changes place:  
For my soul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly capable of 
changing distance with any other body or being, as body itself, and so is 
capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a certain distance, 
or a change of that distance between two points, one may certainly 
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conceive a distance and a change of distance between two spirits, and so 
conceive their motion, their approach or removal, one from another (Book 
II, C. 23, 19)   
 
Locke is saying that soul and matter are both capable of extension; this is their common 
property. In this paradigm, the self manifests itself as “that conscious thinking being 
which is sensible or conscious of pleasure or pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so 
is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends” (2. 27. 17). The Lockean 
notion of self concerns the change of place and entails the theoretical and empirical 
possibilities for personal and cultural alienation. In the case of separation of his little 
finger, insofar as consciousness goes along with it, it would constitute the same self. In 
Blackstone’s words, “the identity of a literary composition consists in the sentiment and 
the language; the same conceptions, clothed in the same words, must necessarily be the 
same composition; and whatever method takes of conveying that composition to the ear 
or eye of another, by recital, by writing, or by printing, in any number of copies or at any 
period time, it is always the identical work of the author which is so conveyed” (2: 406, 
cited in Ross, 6). Blackstone solidifies the Locke’s notion of identity starting from one 
and the same thought into its multiple changes of place between the originality of the 
author’s idea and all its bodily manifestations. In the case of translations and 
abridgements, the identity of the author’s idea couldn’t be seen to be extended. The 
abridgement of a map would be, then, free of charge, because its identicalness is taken-
for-granted as a public entity, and it is capable of being reproduced as similar but 
different copies. In this context, Crusoe exclaims:       
It is impossible, as needless, to set down the innumerable Crowd of Thought 
that whirl’d through that great thorow-fare of the Brain, the Memory, in this 
Night’s Time: I run over the whole History of my Life in Miniature, or by 
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Abridgement, as I may call it, to my coming to this Island, and also of the Part 
of my life, since I came to this Island (my emphasis 181).   
 
When Crusoe says that he shall give his reader the “Copy,” he means that the particulars 
will be told over again (64). Crusoe is exploiting on the fact that his novel writing is both 
factual and historical; that the “format” of the journal is diagramic like a faithful map; 
and thus that his journal writing escapes damnation that he is counterfeiting fact out of 
his fictional writing. It is certain that Crusoe is exploring the lacunae of copyright acts in 
the 1710s, but at the same time, Defoe looks as very eager as Crusoe on the island to 
touch the public world. Encountering the second shipwreck, Crusoe ejaculates thus: “In 
all Time of my solitary life, I never felt so earnest, so strong a Desire after the Society of 
my fellow Creatures, or so deep a Regret at the want of it” (173). When a human 
becomes a human, as Walter Benjamin says, insofar as he endows his or her surrounding 
objects with the ability to look back, Defoe the author hankers after imparting the parts of 
his original and novel creation of Crusoe to the metropolitan London.       
Robinson, on his island, could reconstruct an analogue of society only by giving 
himself all the rules and laws, which are reciprocally implicated with his person, even 
when there still have no objects. The theme of Robinson’s work would be not only a 
story, but “an instrument of research” – a research which starts out from the desert island 
and aspires to reconstitute the origins and the rigorous order of works and conquests 
which happens with time (Macherey 241). But this research is, I argue, concerned with 
how to preserve him and how to keep everything under the contract with Crusoe himself. 
Seen from the example of the mutilated finger from one whole body, Crusoe goes 
through various unsettling experiences to shatter his sense of identity. An experience of 
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being buried alive with the dying goat gives him unsustainable pain of the singular gaze 
from the animal:  
I fancy’d myself now like one of the ancient Giants, which are said to live 
in Caves, and Holes, in Rocks, where none could come at them. . . The old 
Goat who I found expiring, dy’d in the Mouth of the Cave; and I found it 
much easier to dig a great Hole there, and throw him in, and cover him 
with Earth, than to drag him out. . . I have enjoy’d the Certainty that no 
Savages would come to the Place to disturb me, [and] I could have been 
content to have capitulated for spending the rest of my Time there, even to 
the last Moment, till I had laid me down and dy’d, like the old Goat in the 
cave (130).   
 
This uncanny feeling is disturbing to Crusoe while he is gazing and sympathizing with 
the dead animal. The animal is there before Crusoe, there close to him, there in front of 
him – the animal which enters Crusoe’s dwelling place and sees him suddenly alienated 
from his human neighborhood. As Derrida remarks this “unsubstitutable singularity” 
(378), “being after, being alongside, being near would appear as different mode of 
being,” indeed of Crusoe’s being-with the animal subjects in his initial dining on the 
island. Derrida’s encounter of the gaze of a cat is very apt for marking the singularity of 
Crusoe’s geographical experience:  
In any case, they [different modes of being with the animal] express a 
certain order of the being-huddled-together [etre-serre] (which is what the 
etymological root, pressu, indicates, whence are derived the words pres, 
aupres, après), the being-pressed, the being-with as being strictly attached, 
bound, enchained, being-under-pressure, compressed, impressed, 
repressed, pressed-against according to the stronger or weaker stricture of 
what always remains pressing. . . It [the animal] can look at me. It has its 
point of view regarding me. The point of view of the absolute other, and 
nothing will have ever done more to make me think through this absolute 
alterity of the neighbor than these moments when I see myself seen naked 
under the gaze of a cat.9        
 
 53 
The gaze of the absolute other, the annihilation of his person, forces him to think and 
follow after what Pierre Bourdieu calls “practice,” a term for the specific and situational 
activities within a society that cannot be adequately theorized about within that society.  
What Bourdieu describes “a quasi-theoretical reflection” on practice reveals the nature of 
Crusoe’s sovereign mastery of his situation, that is “a mode of practical knowledge not 
comprising knowledge of its own principles” (19). Crusoe’s will to survive exemplifies 
his instinctive practical imperative of self-preservation, which operates as different from 
Locke’s rational and theological demand of self-preservation. Crusoe’s encounter of a 
footprint on the shore amplifies to the extreme Crusoe’s sense of being pressed by the 
possibility of annihilation: “It is not possible to describe how many various Shapes 
affrighted Imagination represented Things to me in, how many wild Ideas were found 
every Moment in my Fancy, and what strange unaccountable Whimsies came into my 
Thoughts by the Way”(142). It may be that Crusoe’s reaction to the footprint on the shore 
reveals another hidden agenda of property, since he couldn’t prove that he arrives at the 
vacant island first in order, but his reaction exposes a paradoxical aspect of the so-called 
sovereign European self caused by contingent human conditions. As Lamb suggests it, 
“supported by nothing more substantial than custom or iteration, the self-evidence of 
favorite British notions [of identity] is subject to sudden collapses or contradictions 
which shatter the illusion of ideological consistency that habit has given them” (7). In this 
plight, Lamb continues to elaborate, the “British recognizes anxiety endured whenever 
the familiar pulse of custom is interrupted by an unpredictable event, or by a 
phenomenon that corresponds to no model or purpose” (7). Crusoe’s singular and 
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personal experiences of a foreign world represent the paradoxical nature of a practical 
culture.  
This “practical” Crusoe acts in defense of the particularity of his personal 
experience and of the rhetorical flair of the voice that alone is fit to speak of it. Michel de 
Certeau has expanded Bourdiou’s notion of practice by applying the Greek word metis to 
it and associating the metis practice with a “vigilant serendipity that exploits the 
occasionaity of events to proclaim the injuries it has suffered.” As Lamb expands the 
significance of the metis practice, “metis finds a home for the singular detail in the 
network of conventional doctrine, just as a cuckoo finds a place for its egg in an alien 
nest. It is a restoration of practical pertinence.” It may be paraphrased that Crusoe finds a 
surrogate home in a foreign island and hankers after “any possible Energy of Words” 
(173), a “recovery of the voice that has been cleverly substituted for” his written journal. 
Just as Finch’s voice of Bas-Jesus is the voice of counter-memory, and the country house 
of Longleat turns into a copy of her own artifact in writing poetry, the sound of Crusoe’s 
retrospective accounts of his experience becomes an “imitation of this part of itself that is 
produced and reproduced by the media of” writing geography.10                 
Crusoe’s subsequent career shows his instinctual grasp of the situations that might 
happen on the island. While Crusoe becomes, as John Richetti says, “more and more an 
unhesitating tactician, openly manipulating for practical advantage the moral and social 
structures that had been theoretical impediments to action” (70), I argue that Crusoe is 
experimenting with a pure sense of the Lockean possibility for handling, extending, and 
transforming the island as part of himself that no one else can claim or usurp. Crusoe’s 
initial reception of the island is characterized by the double negative: Crusoe has no 
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clothes, nor anything either to eat or drink, nor weapon either to hunt or kill any creature 
for his sustenance, and no prospect of Life (36). Crusoe, however, turns this island into a 
utopic place with a chance to make miraculous things open for his touch. He entertains 
different notions of things: “I was removed from all the Wickedness of the world . . . 
[with] no Society, no ravenous Beast, no furious Wolves or Tygers, no venomous 
Creatures, [and] no Pain, no Distemper, no Uneasiness of Body; no, nor Uneasiness of 
Mind” (97-142). What is attachable to the body, what is near, and what is adjacent 
becomes now a property for Crusoe; that is, property is a way to extend his body into the 
island as a surrogate part of himself. Crusoe ultimately ends up realizing his “ardent 
wishes” of anticipation and “strong ideas” of incorporation. Crusoe contracts a new habit 
on the island thus:  
Like many reflections, I afterward made it a certain Rule with me, That 
whenever I found those secret Hints [of some invisible direction], or 
pressings of my Mind, to doing, or not doing any Thing that presented; or 
to going this way, or that way, I never fail’d to obey the secret Dictate; 
though I knew no other Reason for it, than that such a Pressure, or such a 
Hint hung upon my mind (127).      
 
Although the novel is studded with many religious references and symbols that arguably 
form part of a larger pattern, Crusoe is more concerned with the “secular” and “material” 
conditions of deliverance.  A telling example of this is Crusoe’s speculative manipulation 
of the English mutineers. Rather than arming himself with a rationalized system of 
weapons, he deploys varied camouflage that forms part of the landscape. Crusoe 
transforms himself in the disguise of a shamanistic and European priest-hybrid with his 
“formidable Goat-Skin Coat on,” and “with the great cap, a naked Sword, two Pistols and 
a Gun” upon his Shoulder into a “Spectre-like figure” (original italics 233-4). Crusoe 
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becomes a mastermind to orchestrate everything under his conduct. He manages to be 
both stage-manager and actor, appearing in the guise of a governor’s man in order to 
surround the figure of the “governor” with the powerful aura of absence (Peter Hulme 
217). Crusoe persuades the Captain with the abridgement of his whole story, for his story 
or history is a “whole collection of Wonders” (186). Crusoe’s sovereign deputyship 
derives from the curious singularity of his improvisational and circumstantial practices.    
The later phase of Crusoe’s life defines more than utopic nostalgia. Let us recall 
that Richard Steele interviewed with Alexander Selkirk on his arrival after an 
approximately three-year period of voluntary castaway on the island of Juan Ferdinandez. 
Selkirk’s account of his life on the island almost recapitulates Crusoe’s entire life on his 
island with one sensible difference. Steele casts Selkirk’s castaway in a utopian setting: 
“He grew dejected, languid, and melancholy, scarce able to refrain from doing himself 
Violence, till by Degrees, by the Force of Reason, and frequent reading of the Scriptures, 
and turning his Thoughts upon the Study of Navigation, after the Space of eighteen 
months, he grew thoroughly reconciled to his Condition” (236). “When he had made this 
Conquest,” Steele adds, “the Vigor of his Health, Disengagement from the  World, a 
constant, cheerful, serene Sky, and a temperate Air, made his Life one continual Feast, 
and his Being much more joyful than it had before been irksome” (237). Crusoe does 
return with a different notion of the Lockean human nature, since he knows that 
“Gratitude was no inherent Virtue in the Nature of Man; nor did Men always square their 
Dealings by the Obligations they had receiv’d, so much as they did by the Advantages 
they expected” (225). After Crusoe returns to his society, he manages to perform his 
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expected social life, but he does not settle down. As Selkirk confesses, “I am now worth 
800 pounds, but shall never so happy, as when I was not a worth a Farthing” (238).  
Crusoe embarks on another voyage to visit his Island. His voyage “beyond” is not 
simply the return of the repressed, but rather an activity which ultimately implies return 
and repetition to testify to something which is excluded from the frame of the reigning 
historical present of his contemporary British society. Being in the “beyond” is, then, to 
inhabit an intervening space, as Homi Babba suggests it. Crusoe’s “transmigration” is 
therefore a return to the present Britain to reconfigure his cultural contemporaneity, to re-
inscribe his novel and singular rendition of the Lockean propositions on the State of 
Nature, human nature, and property. Crusoe’s interventional (writing) space on the island 
becomes a counter-space of intervention in the here and now of the early eighteenth-
century Britain.    
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CHAPTER III  
 
IN SEARCH OF FANTASTIC GEOGRAPHY IN THE SOUTH SEAS  
 
Wo es war, soll ich werden, Sigmund Freud/ Jacques Lacan  
 
As soon as physical factors, such as the need to overcome the infertility of 
the soil, have brought man’s ingenuity into play, the momentum drives him 
well beyond his immediate objective; so that when his need has elapsed he 
comes to be swept into the great ocean of fantasy from which he cannot 
pull out. May the happy Tahitian stop where he is!  
Denis Diderot, The Supplement au Voyage de Bougainville   
 
As far as Europeans were concerned, the South Seas, the last undiscovered 
portion of the globe, were a locus of terrestrial paradise, utopian drive, intense feelings of 
pleasure; not only these, but they were also the scene of disease, pain, and 
disillusionment. It is with these concerns in mind that I seek to find some theoretical 
orientations for the more empirical readings related to Louis-Antoine de Bougainville’s 
and Joseph Banks’s voyage into the Pacific Ocean. For both of them, Tahiti has been a 
privileged arcadia and, by the same token, an ambiguous place, the border of hospitality 
as well as violence and theft. A naturally fertile environment, such as Tahiti with its rich 
volcanic soil, constant humidity, and tropical warmth, is presented as a body open, 
offered, given over to everything that, on its banks and edges, can happen. Recalling that 
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Tahiti is also surrounded by abysses, gulfs, and reefs, the island encloses the practice of 
eighteenth-century scientific mapping within the floating indeterminacy and contingency 
of romance. Banks’s occasional Arcadian imagery, initial use of classical Greek names 
for the locals, such as Lycurgus and Hercules, and his erotic negotiation with the Tahitian 
women provide the occasion of a recognizable paradise for him. In this respect he can be 
compared with Bougainville and the naturalist Philibert Commerson who accompanied 
Bougainville when they visited Tahiti the year before Banks arrived. Like Banks, 
Bougainville used Arcadian imagery in his published account to describe what appealed 
to him about Tahitian society. Although Bougainville reaches for terrestrial paradise with 
classical examples, Tahiti figured as a place of utopia for Commerson. Banks, on the 
other hand, understands Tahiti as a curious place of the singular as well as the site of 
geographical and astronomical observation. My focus on the similar but different 
response of Banks, Bougainville, and Commerson to Tahiti aims to bring to light how 
Europeans fantasized and/or idealized the world in encountering and “discovering” the 
“new” world.  
Recent studies of Banks have been bifurcated into “static” or “dynamic” readings 
of his circumnavigation. On the one hand, Banks has been depicted as a virtuoso-traveler, 
who pursues his curiosity for the sake of curiosity. This view argues that Banks is nothing 
but an aristocratic gentleman with fortune. That is, Banks is particularly a curio and his 
“scientific passion” for Linnaean botany does not contribute to the scientific progress of 
Natural History in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, Banks fulfills the criterion 
of “the center of influence” as Bruno Latour has called it. The specimens, their accounts, 
illustrations, and figures that Banks brings back from his voyage are being “dispatched, 
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mobilized, and combined” in European museums, libraries, and universities, which form, 
in turn, a “dynamic network” of domestic and international influence and therefore the 
“centers of calculation.”11 Banks makes “domination at a distance feasible” as Latour 
puts it.  
Banks always gets caught in this current ecology of criticism either as a 
maximally licentious curio-hunter or as a minimally licensed botanist. In this context, I 
suggest another possibility that Banks is a singular traveler voyaging into the unknown in 
the South Seas, or that Banks’s self is paradoxical in the sense that he is the Dilettante 
botanist. Furthermore, I’ll try to push Latour’s idea of being embedded as “black-boxing” 
further in order, firstly, to call into question some “uncritical” assumption of writers, such 
as Tim Fulford, who has turned to Latour for understanding Banks and secondly, to think 
what role of Tahiti plays spatially in Bougainville’s and Banks’s journal writing. No 
commentator seems to have noticed that Latour’s notion of “the centers of influence” has 
extended his earlier view of how the active role of scientific theory in shaping and 
constructing fact is effaced, all too often, by being embedded in a laboratory setting.12  
The concept of “black-boxing” refers, according to Isabelle Stengers, to a way of 
remaining under the “established setting” of a scientific project. Scientific theory has 
been so succeeded in constituting a black boxed setting that humanists are told from time 
to time to learn how to engage with the high ground of “objectivity” and “truth” on the 
scientist’s terms.13 The converse is also germane: black-boxed relations have been 
integrated into so many scientific research programs that are themselves accepted that 
only a few humanists practically interest the scientist in calling into question and 
scrutinizing the already-taken-for-granted assumptions. Black boxing, then, establishes a 
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relation between who enters it and who leaves it so much so that no one has, practically, 
the means to contest it. Black-boxing allows an inertial operating assumption to remain 
unexamined.  
The opening of a black box is not an impossible event, but one that should be 
highly improbable.14 If the scientific prestige of Banks as a “purveyor of truth”15 is 
problematic, it is attributed ironically to the number of “boxes” that he fails to close, that 
is, to the number of “facts” that the other naturalists would accept actively in, for instance, 
controlling their reasoning, making their hypothesis legitimate, and establishing assent. 
While Banks comes back with splendid specimens of hitherto unknown plants and 
animals, MS notes, drawings executed during the passage across the Atlantic, along the 
coast of South America, across the Pacific via the Society Island, and the east coast of 
Australia, his three-month stay at Tahiti, like a detour, does additional work to make him 
the case of hybrid identity, which he himself calls “half mongrel” and “half British.” In 
other words, Banks’s Tahitian journal indeed opens a variety of “boxes,” ranging from 
Linnaen botany, ethnography, and anthropology to romance narrative. Banks brings data 
and specimens back and fits them to the categories of the metropolitan knowledge, but 
the European audience understands that romance shapes and enables both fantastic and 
empirically organized accounts of the world encountered by Banks.  
To read the significance of Banks’s “digressive” voyaging in the Pacific is 
paradoxically to investigate the ways in which Latour’s concept of the “centers of 
calculation” becomes “black-boxed” or translated into a folkloric handbook on the 
Oceanic exploration. When Tim Fulford says, “the centers of calculation produced 
writings that he [e.g., Latour] has taught us to see as handbooks or manuals for accessing 
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the remote,” his understanding of Latour’s concept is eclipsed by aligning Latour’s 
“centers of influence” with Michel Foucault’s “disciplines” as a portable substrate of the 
power relations of knowledge: “Bruno Latour, like Michel Foucault, showed that the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment produced a series of interlocking intellectual 
disciplines that empowered those who mastered them to reduce the world to order.”16 
Pushing this point a little further, it may be possible to suggest that the “centers of 
influence” forces a particular discursive, representational exercise upon multiple maps 
and establish the homogeneity of one dominant cartographic image over foreign locales. 
Latour is, however, far from single-mindedly lauding the power of cartography to 
dispatch, mobilize, abstract, and map out the world in mentioning the role of the “centers 
of influence”:      
Most of the difficulties we have in understanding science and technology 
proceeds from our belief that space and time exist independently as an 
unshakable frame of reference inside which events and place would occur. 
This belief makes it impossible to understand how different spaces and 
different times may be produced inside the networks built to mobilize, 
cumulate, and recombine the world.17   
 
He stresses the fact that the “centers of influence” delimit and sort out the vastly collected 
expanses of specimens, space, and time within their embedded setting of connection. As a 
particularly immanent condition of connectivity, the map, for instance, becomes one of 
provincial, local knowledges: “We do not have to oppose the local knowledge to the 
universal knowledge of the European, but only two local knowledges, one of them having 
the shape of a network transporting back and forth immutable mobiles to act at a 
distance.”18 To the extent to which the European map-making process is demystified as a 
local knowledge on the move, cartography is, to put it in the terms of Latour, “not a 
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general framework but a provisional result of connection among entities.”19 It may be 
said, with equal truth, that the gathering institutions like Kew Gardens sort out elements 
belonging to different times and spaces, and not the “universal” times that make the 
sorting. Latour elaborates: “Nothing is unfamiliar, infinite, gigantic, or far away in these 
centers that cumulate traces: quite the contrary, they accumulated so many traces so that 
everything can become familiar, finite, nearby and handy.”20 Rather than taking the view 
that things hold because they are universally true, Latour argues the quite reverse that 
things are true because they hold. Botany is, Latour claims provocatively, the “local 
knowledge generated inside gathering institutions like Kew gardens.”21  
Alongside with Kew Gardens, Linnaeus’s Swedish garden illustrates the local 
status of botany. Lisbet Koerner intersects nicely with Latour in terms of local Linnaeus:  
He [Linnaeus] believed that his science reflected nature’s harmony, which 
in turn was analogous to the order of his own study. He cast himself, then, 
as a political economist and an acclimatization experimenter. He took little 
interest in the exact science, however, or in technological progress (e.g., 
ferrous metallurgy and hydrodynamics). Nor did he interest himself in 
such instruments as diving-bells, steam engines, air pumps, telescopes, or 
even though he used them – microscopes. Linnaeus’s work-spaces more 
recalled a renaissance studiola or a curiosity cabinet.22   
 
Latour’s assertion, together with Koerner’s description, prompts me to ask whether 
Banks functions as a fidelity operator of botany like Dr. Solander, a Swedish student of 
Carl Linnaeus. To ask if Banks becomes the “first global agent of Linnaeus”23 is, then, to 
examine if Banks expands what Mary Louis Pratt calls the “planetary consciousness.”   
 The significance of Linnaeus’s “System of Nature” is, according to Pratt, that it 
alone launched a European knowledge-building enterprise of unprecedented scale and 
appeal.24 The Linnaeus’s system of classification helps the Europeans in the second half 
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of eighteenth century describes all the plants on the earth, known and unknown, 
according to the characteristics of their reproductive parts. That is, Linnaeus’s systematic 
classification consists of “twenty-four basic configurations of stamens, pistils, and such 
four added visual parameters as number, form, position, and relative size.”25 Though she 
argues that the Linnaean system asserts a “harmless hegemonic vision that installs no 
apparatus of domination,”26 Linnaeus’s systematic classification conceals a certain 
imperial agenda of increased knowledge and possession, for the Linnaean systemizing of 
nature is “trans-cultural” and at the same time transactional. It is transcultural in the sense 
that Linnaean exploration relies on the natives in a similar way that James Douglas 
suggested to Captain Cook, Banks, and Dr. Solander when they are about to leave for 
Tahiti: “To exercise the utmost patience and forbearance with respect to the Natives of 
the several lands where the ship may touch . . . equally under his [God’s] care with the 
most polished Europeans, perhaps less offensive, more entitled to his favor.” Not only 
this, but it is transactional as well, as Pratt explains: “The systematic surface mapping of 
the globe correlates with an expanding search for commercially exploitable resources, 
markets, and lands to colonize, just as navigational mapping is linked with the search for 
trade routes.”27 The “surface mapping” represents in its clearest grids the “contents” of 
the surface of the earth, and it turns what was unknown into something familiar in the 
map: “These vast contents would be known not through slender lines on blank paper, but 
through which labeled grids which entities would be placed.”28 The coordinate of the map, 
then, imparts, superimposes, and, most of all, determines the degrees of clearness and 
distinctness, i.e., the maximum and the minimum of “singular” points by representing 
them on the surface of the map. As a result, no matter how immense they are, the vast 
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expanses of space summed up in Linnaean nomenclatures become never bigger than that 
of the coordinate of the map. This means that the surface of the globe is reduced in the 
scaled-down map that would subsequently enable the metropolitan centers of knowledge 
to dominate the newly discovered parts of the world from afar. While it may be true that 
Banks searches for a range of the way stations of commercialized Britain to Australia, the 
South Seas rearranges the self of Banks as a singularized traveler encountering a myriad 
of islands and negotiating those exotic locales.        
It should be useful to reexamine situations surrounding Banks’s launching into his 
expedition for the study of nature. Gilbert White noted in his letter to Thomas Pennant, 
“on the sixth day of August [1768] Joseph Banks, who is accompanied by Daniel 
Solander, [and] Mr. Green the [Admiralty] Astronomer set[s] out for Deal in order to 
embark aboard the Endeavor Captain Cook bound for the South-Seas.” John Ellis also 
emphasizes the scientific aspects of Banks and Cook’s circumnavigation in his letter to 
Alexander Garden:  
No more people ever went to seem better fitted out for the purpose of 
Natural History, nor more elegantly. They have got a fine library of 
Natural History; they have all sorts of machines for catching and 
preserving insects; they have even a curious contrivance of a telescope, by 
which, put into water, you can see the bottom to a great depth, where it is 
clear. They have the several sorts of salts to surround the seeds; and wax, 
both beeswax and that of the Myrica; . . . They have two painters and 
draughtsmen, several volunteers who have a tolerable notion of Natural 
History; in short Solander assured me this expedition could cost Mr. 
Banks ten thousand pounds.29 
 
The Endeavor is indeed a “floating laboratory” in the South Seas.30 Banks’s “love in 
excelling in his favorite studies” entails a “scientific becoming” of his passion for 
empiricism. Banks’s eyewitness testifies to and/ or calls into question the credibility of 
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the narratives of other Oceanic writers. Banks criticizes, for instance, Alexander 
Dalrymple (1737-1808) in terms of Terra Australis Incognita: “It is some pleasure to be 
able to disprove that which does not exist but in the opinions of Theoretical writers, of 
which sort most are who have wrote any thing about these seas without having 
themselves in them.” Banks’s “scientific” passion is close to corroborating of the non-
existence of the Southern Continent:  
To strengthen these weak argument another Theory has been started which 
says that it is Necessary that so much of the South Sea as the authors of it 
call land should be so, otherwise this world would not be properly 
bal[a]nc’d as the quantity of Earth known to be situated in the Northern 
hemisphere would not counterpoise in this. The number of square degrees 
of their land which we have already chang’d into water sufficiently 
disapproves this.31     
 
The purpose of Banks’s and Cook’s expedition is twofold: unofficially, to check on 
Samuel Wallis’s supposed sighting of the Great South land for the Royal Navy and, 
officially, to measure the transit of Venus across the sun for the Royal society.32  
While the scientific observation of the transit of the planet Venus was crucial for 
determining cartographic longitude in the South Pacific, the value of the actual 
observations of Venus was next to nil. Cook writes: “We had every advantage we could 
desire in observing the whole of the passage of the Planet Venus over the Suns disk: we 
very distinctly saw an Atmosphere or dusky shade round the body of the Planet which 
very much disturbed the times of Contacts particularly the two internal ones. Dr. 
Solander observed as well as Mr. Green and my self, and we differed from one another in 
observing the times of the contacts much more than could be expected.”33 Problematic is, 
then, a scientific assertion that the island of Tahiti becomes the standard center to 
determine longitude in the South Seas. The standard center of astronomical observation is 
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rather “decentered” and “epicentric.” Herman Sporing, who works as a watchmaker in 
London, undertook to repair the stolen and dismantled quadrant with a set of watch-
making tools barely before the scheduled observation. In this light, Banks marks a 
remarkably minimal point in terms of scientific punctuality, but the double sense of 
“singularity” as inflection calls attention to the self of Banks as “in-between” or 
paradoxical in the sense of affirming the reciprocal directions of sense-making.    
To understand better the significance of Banks’s “singular” traveling, I feel it 
necessary to indicate as precisely as possible what I mean by “singular” and “singularity” 
and in the process to suggest that my notion of singularity is differentiated from the 
eighteenth-century notion of curiosity and its related wonder. While Nigel Leask’s study 
of eighteenth-century curiosity is intended to rethink the “temporal exchange”34 in a local 
encounter between the old European society and the new world, my notion of singularity 
considers the spatial trajectory of contingent encounter in any unknown locale. Since 
there is always an interval, or a zone of indeterminacy between two points of encounter, 
contiguous as they may be, the spatial trajectory of encounter and, by extension, 
geographical digression comprise an aleatory moment whereby any interval becomes the 
site of another complication and entanglement. Rather than a pre-given point, a matter of 
point of view, or distance in any metric sense, what is said to be singular is a set of points 
on a given trajectory, especially, in the neighborhood relation of topology. This means 
that being “singular” is not in relation to “universal” but in relation to “ordinary” or 
“regular.” What is crucial is not what one perceives but how one negotiates one’s bodily 
encounter in the immediate vicinity; that is, what counts in thinking singularity is, then, a 
method of prolonging or extending a remarkable point into the “normal points” of 
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understanding in relation to the metropolitan audience. Banks remains doubly 
singularized as remarkable, insofar as he is not absorbed totally into the calculable 
anticipation of the reader in the metropolis, and also insofar as his identity retains some 
traits of multiple locales with a different set of flora, fauna, animal habitat, and local 
customs and manners.  
The public satire of Banks’s infatuation is very symptomatic of an unbridgeable 
impasse that Banks can’t cross over between his interest in voyaging in the South Seas as 
the Grand Tour and the public interests in him. Linnaeus the Younger, for instance, 
complains:  
I know that Banks doesn’t want to tell me anything before he has 
completed his work; but if only we could speak face to face, we could 
soon agree, since our purposes are different: mine is only to continue the 
system, only to determine the plants’ genera and species and thereby 
preserve the already started central book [Systema Naturae] in the science 
[of Natural History]; but Banks, who has money, wants to illustrate these 
[plants] with descriptions and figures.35  
 
Banks is more interested in finding new species over the course of his voyage than 
extending the system of nature that Linnaeus proposes. He certainly offers himself a 
public persona of the Dilettante and at the same time extends a crucial influence by 
means of journalizing his singular encounters of the world.36  
To say that Banks draws a singular trajectory is to say that Banks manages to 
negotiate the (differential) edges of the encounter with a myriad of islands in the South 
Seas. Banks’s journal records multifarious instances of edge-negotiation. When he was 
drawing nearer to Tahiti, he passes some people “on the shore” [who] “made many 
signals.” Not knowing exactly “whether they meant to frighten away or invite them,” 
Banks exclaims, “Had we therefore out of mere curiosity hoisted out a boat and the 
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natives by attacking us oblige us to destroy some of them the only reason we could give 
for it would be the desire of satisfying a useless curiosity.”37 In this case, Banks is not 
unaware that his curiosity, “self-defense, and preservation in come in opposition to the 
laws of hospitability, duties to which mankind usually give the preference in all cases.”38  
When Banks lay anchor at Matavai Bay in 13 April 1769, he encounters “some of 
the hundreds of inhabitants whose faces at least gave evident signs that we were not 
unwelcome guests” much in the same way that Bougainville received: “A crowd of 
Indians welcomed us on the shore with the most emphatic demonstrations of happiness.”  
We then walked into the woods followed by the whole train to who we 
gave beads and small presents. In this manner we walked for 4 or 5 miles 
under groves of Cocoa nut and bread fruit trees loaded with a profusion of 
fruit and giving the most grateful shade I have ever experienced: in short 
the scene we saw was the truest picture of an arcadia of which we were 
going to be kings that the imagination can form.39   
 
Banks approaches the island of Tahiti in terms of arcadia and particularly the natural 
garden of paradise, whereas the particular arrangement of the natural setting prefigures 
utopia for Bougainville: “We stood in for the land. The whole coast rises in an 
amphitheatre with deep gullies and high mountains . . . As a whole this island presents a 
charming aspect.” Geographical arrangement prompts Banks and Bougainville to 
optimize a useful inscription device for their respective encounters; furthermore, none of 
the negotiations which Banks and Bougainville describe could exist without the particular 
geographical arrangement of the island.  
        In negotiating an ethnic position, Banks mutates between the two extreme roles of 
total newcomer and complete participant, who, in going native, is unable successfully to 
communicate such a singular position to the public. “The chief made us signs that if we 
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chose to eat he had victuals already; we accepted the offer . . . dressed after their way. 
The adventures of this entertainment I must wish to record particularly, but am so much 
hurried by attending the Indians ashore almost all day long that I fear I shall scarce 
understand my own language when I read it again.”40 No matter how absurd or confused 
the circumstances and activities of his “tribe” might appear, Banks, like the ideal 
observer, retains his faith that some kind of a discernible account is attainable. Banks 
adapts himself to the habitus of Tahitian people, which means that Banks has a local 
appellation:  
As for our own names the Indians find so much difficulty in pronouncing 
them that we are forced to indulge them in calling us what they please, or 
what they say when they attempt to pronounce them. I give here a list: 
Ca;tn Cooke Toote, Dr. Solander Torano, Mr. Hicks Hete, Mr. Gore 
Torro, Mr. Molineux Boba from his Christian name Robert, Mr. 
Monkhouse Mato, and myself Tapne.41   
 
As a translator, Banks provided a particularly important service to the expedition by 
facilitating barter for fresh food as Banks puts it: “Dr. Solander and myself . . . all along 
acted in the capacity of market men.” Banks even participates as a character in the funeral 
ceremony of mourning: “My curiosity was raised by his most singular dress. I was 
desirous of knowing what he did during his walk . . . Tomorrow I am going to be smutted 
from head to toe to do whatever they desire to do.”42 Banks is steering a mutable path by 
going native and further hybridizing, though he does not yet understand initially the 
nature of religion: “We have not yet seen the least traces of religion among these people, 
maybe they are entirely without it.”43  
 While Banks tries to expend his time and energy without reserve, Bougainville 
feels responsible for protecting Tahiti as a utopia. For both of them, Tahitian people are 
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remarkably handsome. For Bougainville, the race is superb, with men 5 feet 10 inches tall, 
many reaching six foot, a few exceeding this. Their features are very handsome. They 
have a fine head of hair which they wear in various ways. For Banks, the features of 
women are particularly remarkable: “I espied among the common croud a very pretty girl 
with a fire in her eyes that I had not before seen in the country.” The mildness of the 
climate, the beauty of scenery, and the fertility of the soil where there is no need to labor 
for sustenance cause Banks to imagine the island of Tahiti as a palpable paradise 
especially when there is in a certain degree a lack of sexual inhibitions among Tahitian 
women. Banks is certainly not an unqualified admirer of the beauty of Oberea, or Purea 
known as the Dolphin’s queen and the wife of Oamo: “Our attention was now entirely 
diverted to the examination of a personage we had heard so much spoken in Europe: she 
appeared to be about 40, tall and very lusty, her skin white and her eyes full of meaning, 
she might have been handsome when young but now few or no traces of it were left.”44 
Banks romanticizes the Tahitian women by adopting an indifferent stance on the political 
structure of the Tahitian islands.45 When Oberea takes care to provide Banks with cloth to 
replace the lost jacket, Banks becomes “motley” with his dress being half English and 
half Indian. Banks is not a little taken aback by the unabashed forwardness of the 
Tahitian women. He writes in the journal: “We walked freely about several large houses 
attended by ladies who showed us all kind of civilities our situation could admit of, but as 
there were no places of retirement, the house being intirely without walls, we had not an 
opportunity of putting their politeness to every test.”46 The same women of Tahiti, 
however, present scenes of peace, contentment, and sensual pleasure for Bougainville.   
A large population, made up of handsome men and pretty women, living 
together in abundance and good health, with every indication of the 
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greatest amity, sufficiently aware of what belongs to one and the other for 
there to be that degree of difference that is necessary for good order.47 
 
The Tahitian women are consecrated by Commerson as the idols of love, for which “the 
whole island is its temple, all the women are its idols, and all the men worshippers.” The 
island of Tahiti is, for Commerson, the only ideal place on earth, in which “people live 
without vices, without prejudices, without needs, and even without dissension.”48 
The geniality of the Tahitians provides a utopian venue for Bougainville; he 
names the island of Tahiti New Cythera: “And so I have named it New Cythera and the 
protection of Minerva is as necessary as in the ancient Cythera to defend one against the 
influence of both of the climate and of the people’s morals.”49 While it seems that 
Bougainville promotes Rousseau’s notion of the Noble Savage in a state of nature, he 
pre-idealizes the island of Tahiti as utopia. Commerson also exclaims in his letter on 
“The Discovery of the New Isle Cythera or Tahiti”: “This island seemed to me such that I 
had already applied to the name of Utopia or Fortune, given by Thomas More to his ideal 
republic, even before I knew that M. de Bougainville had named it New Cythera.”50   
When Bougainville leaves eventually, he exclaims thus:    
I cannot leave this fortunate island without praising it once more. Nature has 
ceded it in the finest climate in the world, embellished it with the most 
attractive scenery, enriched it with all her gifts, filled it with handsome, tall 
and well-built inhabitants. She herself dictated its laws, they follow them in 
peace and make up the happiest society on this globe. Lawmakers and 
philosophers, come and see here all that your imagination has not been able 
even to dream up.51 
 
Bougainville’s gain of utopic vision becomes one of “again,” that is, “once more” – the 
possibility of being repeated, i.e., iterability at the heart of the very possibility of his 
 73 
journal writing that is capable of communicating his utopic (nowhere) vision as the 
possibility of the now and the here.  
 Curiosity works for Banks in Tahiti as the re-markable place of the singular.  
Tattooing stimulates a singular curiosity; Banks comes across “a figure of a man made of 
Basket work, roughly but not ill designed” near Marae Mahaiatea.52 The architecture of 
the Marae, the apparatus of sacrifice is particularly singular in the eyes of Banks. Aside 
from serving a religious function, it is a site of social events such as the wrestling 
competition Cook, Banks, and Solander witnessed: “Here was prepared for our diversion 
an entertainment quite new to us, a wrestling match at which the other gentlemen soon 
joined us. A large court yard railed with Bamboo about 3 feet high was the scene of this 
diversion.”53 For this diversion the religious and political significance of the marae was 
not yet discernible to Banks, but, when he visited the grand Marae Mahaiatea in the joint 
circuit of Tahiti, he understands that the Marae was an important open-air venue for 
social and religious ceremonies by the lineage personage which constructed it. Purea has 
built the grand Marae Mahiatea for her seven year old son named Teriirere. Banks has 
found the site remarkable, since “it is almost beyond belief that Indians could raise so 
large a structure without the assistance of Iron tools to shape their stones or mortar to join 
them.”  He has also noticed that the marae in the Windward islands, such as Tahiti, 
Moorea, and Meetia, are much more sophisticated and refined in stonework than those of 
the Leeward islands, such as Maiao, Tupai, Raiatea, Huahine, and Maupiti: “The stones 
are polished and truly as stones of the kind could be by the best workman in Europe.”54 In 
providing a singular arrangement for the new experience, Tahiti exceeds Alan Bewell’s 
assessment of Tahiti as “the island of tropical flowers and accommodating women” or 
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“the place where scientific exploration and botanical study are fused with sensual love,” 
where “male scientific and sexual desire find their appropriate goal in the floral realm.”55 
When Banks negotiates a local knowledge that Tupia equips himself with, he states that 
Tupia is not simply an object of curiosity:   
He is certainly a most proper man, well born, chief of Tahowa or priest of 
the island, consequently skilled in the mysteries of their religion; but what 
makes him more than anything else desirable is his experience in his 
navigation of these people and knowledge of the islands in these seas. . . . 
Thanks heaven I have a sufficiency and I do not know why I may not keep 
him a curiosity, as well as some of my neighbors do lions and tigers at a 
large expense than he will probably ever put me to; the amusement I shall 
have in his future conversation and the benefit he will be of to this ship, 
will I think fully repay me.56  
 
Instead of being diverted by any oddity at all, Banks is, as an in-between figure, 
fascinated by the nexus between native life and local knowledge.  
 Rather than negating or affirming the one variant view in favor of the other 
Banks, I’ve problematized, first of all, a pre-established assumption of the relationship 
between the metropolitan center and the local periphery. Although the center and the 
periphery may form the useful co-ordinates of exploration and, by extension, 
cartography, I understand that the schema of the metropolis and the local runs the risk of 
presupposing symmetrically stabilized power relations between the civilized and 
uncivilized world. As Nicholas Thomas and Nigel Leask have suggested in their 
respective work, the self-sufficient power relations of European travelers begin to be 
“entangled” in local places. Put differently, the local status of encounter is much 
complicated than its metropolitan status. As Bruno Latour also emphasizes, “who 
includes and who is included, who localizes and is localized is not a cognitive or a 
cultural difference, but the result of a constant fight” in the unstable, uncertain power 
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relations of encounter.57 Not only did seaward Europeans bring venereal disease as well 
as the invasive, fatal impact of foreign plants and animals on the flora of Tahiti, but 
landward Tahitians also incorporated the foreigners in their own way, oscillating between 
the two poles of hostility and hospitability.58 Samuel Wallis’s effort to land Matavai Bay, 
for instance, bears witness to the fact that Tahiti is a gaping opening, a “borderline” that 
drives mad the very interior self of Wallis, serving as an ambivalent hiatus, or a sort of 
abyss. When the Tahitians incorporate the foreigners, they quickly learn how to 
manipulate the European sentiment by mourning. While Bougainville sentimentalizes the 
mourning of an old man’s weeping at his departure after his short stay, Banks leaves the 
island of Tahiti with the local knowledge embodied by Tupia and the memory of 
mourning as a “custom we had often condemned in conversation as savoring more of 
affected than real grief.”59  
A generic category of romance does not evoke a cartographic abstraction of 
scattered islands but rather a contingent negotiation as a particularly provisional result of 
encounter among new entities, singular things and temporal ruins. This is the way in 
which one acknowledges the “plurality of histories”60 and the “islands of history” as 
Marshals Sahlins calls it: “the heretofore obscure histories of remote islands deserve a 
place alongside the self-contemplation of the European past –or the history of 
civilizations – for their own remarkable contributions to an historical understanding. We 
multiply our conceptions of history.”61 Then one would not speak of history deriving 
from the Eurocentric past, but rather understand that historical movement comprises its 
own co-ordinations and utopian, fantastic reorientations at once continuous with and 
discrete from the European past, present, and future in the island of Tahiti. The island of 
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Tahiti singularly de-nominates the very fantastic spacing of remote, indeterminate, and 
new space.    
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THERE IS NO MORAL WORLD OUTSIDE OF GEORGIC EXPRESSION   
  
When William Roy (1726-1790) and his successor William Mudge (1762-1820) 
carried out the Survey of the British Isles, their military cartography became nationally 
significant in the subsequent mapping of the South Seas making “dominance at a 
distance feasible” as Latour puts it. This authorial figure, which climbs to the height of a 
mountain, was mirrored in the “cognitive mapping” of the British loco-descriptive, 
topographical, and georgic poetry. The question of why there is an image of concentric 
circles in the British topographical and georgic poetry is indissolubly linked with the 
premise of Jameson’s cognitive mapping: an “ideological extrapolation” by means of the 
“play of figuration”:  
This positive conception of ideology has the merit of stressing the gap 
between the local positioning of the individual subject and the totality of 
class structures in which he or she is situated, a gap between 
phenomenological perception and a reality that transcends all individual 
thinking or experience; but this ideology, as such, attempts to span or 
coordinate, to map, by means of conscious and unconscious 
representations.62   
 
Given the incapacity to map spatially the ultimate cause for urban experience, it follows 
that the missing or unrepresentable cause is immanent in the material conditions of 
reality. That is, the conception of Jameson’s cognitive mapping engages in the 
possibility of extrapolating “our historical moment to the totality of class relations on a 
global scale.” And as such come in the play of figuration as part of connecting the work 
of art with a socialist political project. Against the backdrop of Jameson’s politically 
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inflected play of figuration, Rachel Crawford pays attention to this political agenda of 
the British Georgic poetry: the “isometric relations of words and space are revealed in 
eighteenth-century texts that situate changes in the concept of social space in the 
interstices of topographies and literature.”63 The isotopic relationship between the work 
of art and the world allows Crawford to articulate two strategies of the British Georgic. 
On the one hand, it offered a visual image of the world that issued from a single English 
center. The visual center is a temporal center. Englishness becomes a means of locating 
the heart of a present moment which is both geographical and temporal which is unified 
by an invisible point of view. This means that the English literature sets up the 
coordinates of what is happening out there in the world. To this extent, literature 
becomes a telecommunications form (or play) of intelligence and information. On the 
other hand, it represents the space of England at the same time when it produces English 
space. The georgic is, for Crawford, both a representational space in that the capacious 
form of the poetry epitomizes the prospect it represents. Indeed, Suvir Kaul emphasizes, 
“the poems [of the British georgic tradition] reveal such repression (or representation), or 
more often than not, manage such contradictions by thematizing them, with the plastic, 
expansive dynamic of each poem providing a formal structure for the expression, and the 
reconciliation or sublimation of, such contradictions.64 A georgic formalization, then, 
entails the landscape of events. Within this current state of criticism, I argue that the 
authorial figure serves as a “fidelity operator” to retrace, reconfigure, and rearticulate 
what has happened to the author as a human subject.  
The human subject continually invites outside forces and influences in the 
processes of not only incorporating but also inscribing place. It has worked itself out 
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through a kneading process of difference that is close to geography itself; that is, the 
human subject is locally born out of different semiotic, somatic, and material places. To 
deal with this place is to reassert the materiality of place, a specific effect of placing, 
arranging, and naming materials, things, and objects within a given locale. There has 
been an important stream of work on the improvisational, the repetitive, and the taken-
for-granted rhythms and routines of “everyday life.” Among others, Michel Foucault, 
Erving Goffman, Henri Lefebvre, and Michel de Certeau have been exemplary in 
illuminating the ways in which everyday life takes place in the modern and the no less 
postmodern production of space. But it is equally important to articulate the necessary 
conjunction and the no less signifies disjunction between the topographies of everyday 
life and the tracings through which their materiality takes place in the subject and the eye: 
this is precisely why Michel de Certeau has performed “spatial practices”; it’s why Kevin 
Hetherington, Heidi Nast, and Steve Pile have practiced “the mapping the subject”; and it 
is also why many others have been interested in the connection(s) between cultures of 
colonialism and collecting, cultures of traveling and travel-writing, cultures of 
cartography and space, as well as in the links between visual perception and sometimes 
less ordinary, even extraordinary spatial practices of “light, motion, and speed” in an 
actual landscape. No one ever elaborates a politics of place and taking place without a 
topographical and also topological formalization.  
It has been suggested by recent theorists of cartography and space that the 
encounter between the subject and the objects within a given locale is not a simple case 
of enjoyment, where the senses (especially the eye) organize and consume the view, or 
where the body situates itself in attitudes most apt for pleasure; but that this encounter 
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may partly or wholly consist in impressions caused in the subject by the things 
themselves, and that aesthetic appreciation is not a purely interior event. Instead of the 
subject saying, “What am I doing in this space,” he or she might ask, “What is this space 
doing?” In the Severn River Valley in the West of England during the 1720s an 
exemplary subject bore witness to the fact that the improvement of one urban network 
raised the value of improvement in a neighboring urban network. In that decade, all of 
major market towns in this trans-Severn area had turnpike trusts established along the 
radial roads entering the neighboring cities: Ledbury in 1721, Gloucester in 1723, 
Worcester and Tewkesbury in 1726, and Hereford in 1730. The chorography of turnpike 
trusts system provides John Dyer with a cultural prospect for geographical movement 
across the scale of national boundary. To this extent, the poet looks to praise 
commercialized British imperialism while representing the political economy of wool 
industry. This point of view is, however, an (optical) illusion emanating from a perfect 
suturing of the poetic subject-matter (the fleece) into georgic expression and its 
geographical signification.     
My critical engagement in the British topographical poem(s) involves the 
rechanneling of the contemporary theoretical spatial practice of “topolitics” and begins 
with a dissociating analysis of the eighteenth-notion of topography as the description of 
one’s own soil, the ownership of habitat, the genus or the spirit of place. British 
topographical poems organize the field of perception of an actual landscape to take into 
account the urban, architectural, agricultural, and political consequence of what has 
happened to the land. John Dryden’s London, John Dyer’s Siluria, and William 
 81 
Wordsworth’s Blackcomb mountains provide a specific place for and the taking place of 
the “topolitics” of empire.  
 Permit me to say it and straight out that the inhuman elements of the 
topographical poems under my discussion consist of light, speed, and motion; that the eye 
comprises the human element; that the materiality of place constitutes a sense of place, a 
topographical “undersense”; and that the “zooming” eye underwrites the integrity and 
legitimacy of a specific cultural community, indexing itself to a continuum progressing 
from past to future.  
Why light, speed, and motion? One can ask if “light, speed, and motion” are the 
common poetic tropes, suggesting that they may not necessarily be connected with the 
topographical sense of place. Let’s recall that tropes are tours, changes of place, from 
somewhere to somewhere else; that rhetoric presents itself as a theory of places: 
displacement, voyage, transfer, metonymy and metaphor, translation or quotation. The 
quotation as such is, according to etymology, equivalent to setting in motion to move 
from one place to another. And pay attention to the language of a mathematician, 
Mandelbrot: “Look at the fractal object; if its dimension is comprised between 1.1 and 
1.5, then you will easily find a geographical object that resembles it.” Metonymy gradates 
across the surface of that small, fractal, geographical object. Then, the psychological 
thesis that there is no sexual rapport may be paraphrased into a proposition that there is 
no geographical rapport but struggle and resistance. I am not going to defend and practice 
the rhetorical analysis of the poems, but I propose two answers to the question.  
Drawing on John Barrell and Svetlana Alpers, the first answer is description; the 
second the organization of the field of perception. They both concur that the eye, 
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attracted by an area of light, travels immediately toward a landscape; and the eye captures 
the new objects in the landscape. And conversely, the new objects invite and perceive the 
eye for describing landmarks. The second point extends the first into a reading of 
eighteenth-century pictorial representation. According to Barrell, the representation of 
landscape develops a certain set of patterns: viewpoint and vanishing point. The eye is 
stretched at speed to the vanishing point and comes back to the foreground; and the eye 
“telescopes” the landscape, tracing the landscape to the vanishing point and following 
back the singular or new objects in the landscape forward, from near. “The eye moves at 
such speed over the landscape, only because it can organize so efficiently the objects in 
its path into a preconceived structure, which allows them an identity only as landmarks 
on the journey the eye makes to the horizon” (Barrell 22). From his explanation, I derive 
my point of the emergence of the traversing eye to trace forward the landscape. The 
forward movement of the eye particularly provides the coordination of a prospective, 
conic eye-view of the landscape, which entails the inseparability of the conic view with 
the cartographic survey. A few corollaries ensue that the eye organizes and determines 
the field of perception for describing the scene of what has happened to a specific place.  
It is with these concerns in mind that I read first John Dryden’s poem titled Annus 
Mirabilis. The poem traces forward “the year of wonder 1666,” the taking place of the 
two events: war and fire. The sea provides the scene for describing a wondrous, naval 
victory of Britain over Holland: “Our little fleet was now ingag’d so far, / That, like the 
swordfish in the whale, they fought: / The combat only seem’d a civil war, / Till thro’ 
their bowels we our passage wrought” (Stanza 79) The panoply of the acts of the naval  
war is organized at a distance or rather organizes the distance of vision; the visual signals 
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of the victory are “zoomed” in at a speed exceeding vocal signals: “And now reduc’d on 
equal terms of fight, / Their ships like wasted patrimonies show; / Where the thin 
scatt’ring trees admit the light, / And shun each other’s shadows as they grow” (Stanza 
126). The “tracing forward” movement of the eye also traces in time to evoke history as 
an invocation of the future anterior, that is, the smooth timing belt of diachronic history 
formation of the British naval empire: “Then, we upon our globe’s last verge shall go, / 
And view the ocean leaning on the sky” (Stanza 164). The survey writes an unbounded 
victory at a distance, from afar.    
I pay particular attention to another event of fire, because the city of London after 
the fire provides a crucial link between topographical reading and the rereading of rebuilt 
topography. It is not simply wondrous that the city survives the Great Fire, but the fire is 
the most singular and monstrous for the eye: “th’ infant monster, with devouring strong, / 
Walk’d boldly upright with exalted head . . . No help avails, for hydra-like, the fire, / 
Lifts up his hundred heads to aim his way” (218, 249). The fire is the event to “implode” 
the whole of the city; it decomposes the city like a hydra-like movement into further 
smaller parts and ultimately “the ground zero.” As the city is burnt and destroyed totally, 
topographical reading is concerned with a newly established textured geography. The 
taking place of rebuilding means that a different kind of order emerges out of that hydra-
like, opportunistic movement, a “chaotic” order contingent upon the continuous, 
contiguous encounter of the disorder of the fire which it is opposed to but also closely 
aligned with. As Daniel Defoe describes it, rebuilding “has spread the Face of it [London] 
in a most straggling, confused manner out of all Shape, uncompact, and unequal; neither 
long or broad, round or square . . . and yet all these put together are still be called 
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London: Whither will this monstrous city then extend? And where must a 
Circumvallation or Communication Line of it be placed?” (318). London is destroyed but 
somewhere between the uniformly turned ashes something happens: the Line, 
architectural, cartographic, topographical, and also textual, happens for Defoe. Any effort 
to remap or redraw the contours of the city is, then, tantamount to an effort to recover, 
redefine, and reconfigure the city itself. Since the topographical referent is all gone, 
rebuilding, rearranging, replacing London literally takes place in writing London. It is 
non-representable, non-mimic, and non-narratable. To put it in terms of Defoe, “it is, in 
the first place, to be observed, as a particular and remarkable Crisis, singular to those who 
write in this age, and very much to our advantage in Writing, that the great and more 
eminent Increase of Buildings, in and about the City of London, and the vast extent of 
Ground taken in, and now become streets and Noble Squares of Houses, by which the 
Mass, or Body of the whole, is infinitely great in our Time” (326). Writing London is 
descriptive; the rebuilt city is phase-transitional. At this conjuncture, Dryden re-defines 
the phase-shifting London as a commercially textured body of empire: “Methinks 
already, from this chymic flame, / I see a city of more precious mold . . . more great than 
human, and more august, [and] a constant trade-wind will securely blow / And gently lay 
us on the spicy shore” (293-304).” This determination comes out of the poetic 
formalization or organization of an indeterminable, uncertain, “transistant” place, into an 
on-going process of fluid empire65.  
 British commerce, notably, the exemplary trade in wool moves from the local, 
domestic “Siluria,” the Trans-Severn area, into global realms beyond the British borders, 
into the Mediterranean, Russia, the Indies, Africa, Asia, and even the Americas.  John 
 85 
Dyer’s The Fleece (1757) keeps the track of the routes of the very geography that Visco 
da Gama and Columbus explored more than two centuries ago. The prospective of the 
Severn is associated with the unifying vision of sheep sheering and the commercial 
prosperity of localities and its implied prosperity of a nation and the felicity of a naval 
empire: “near at hand, the wide Majestic wave of the Severn slowly rolls / Along the 
deep-divided glebe: the flood, / And trading bark with low contracted sail, / Linger 
among the reeds and copsy banks / To listen; and to view the joyous scene” (1. 713-720). 
Dyer’s topographical prospect favors a kind of “holographic” selection that reflects (or 
refracts ideologically as an instance of anamorphoscopic vision) the whole domains of 
labor related to wool trade. The poet’s survey, for example, flows the rhythm of 
repetitively laborious everyday life across scale from the rural hills of Siluria to the city 
of Leeds as the exemplary city of the British clothing industry: “And ruddy roofs, and 
chimney-tops appear / Of busy Leeds, up-wafting to the clouds / The incense of 
thanksgiving: all is joy; And trade and business guide the living scene, . . . they issue 
from cells / In bands unnumber’d eager for their work . . . repeat their virtuous efforts, 
and succeed. / Thus all is here in motion, all is life” (3. 303-321). The commerce of 
fleece makes it possible to make horizontal, fraternal connections across a variety of 
labors.   
 The taking place of interior furnishings, such as “folds,” “tapestries,” and “dress” 
props and replaces the world into a new order grounded on the British commercial, naval 
empire: “The whole globe/ is now, of commerce, made the scene immense; / Which 
daring ships frequent, associated / Like doves, or swallows, in th’ethereal food . . . For 
these, o’er all / The Kingdoms round, our draperies are dispersed” (4. 169 -344). Dyer’s 
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geographically traversing vision of commerce provides a way station to reappropriate the 
whole unity of Britain by means of the political economy of the fleece: “Thus feeble man, 
/ With man united, is a strong nation . . . to find / Whate’er may soothe distress, and raise 
the fall’n, / In life’s rough race: O be it as my wish! ‘Tis mine to teach th’inactive hand to 
reap / Kind Nature’s bounties, o’er the globe diffus’d” (4. 488-502). Siluria serves, then, 
as a poetical as well as economic crossroad to bridge rural to urban and also national to 
international domains. Rather than a pastorally extensive area, the Trans-Severn area is 
indissolubly linked with the poetic dynamic of national and international commerce, the 
political economy of which involves the production and distribution of labor: “the care of 
sheep” for raw material, “labors of the loom” as the means of production, and “the arts of 
trade” as the means of distributing and consuming the national commodity. Dyer’s 
topographical sense consists of speed and motion: “the labors of the loom bring / 
Superior treasures speedier to the state . . . to speed / And to celebrate the union” (3. 609-
10). The kinetic geography of commercial labor is represented as a “circular machine” of 
motion in the poem: “We are shown / A circular machine, of new design, / In conic 
shape: it draws and spins a thread without the tedious toil of needless hands. / A wheel 
invisible, beneath the floor . . . gives motion.” The poet’s poetic formalization of the 
topographical sense of Siluria articulates the will to clothe the world with the soft fleece 
and, by extension, the British commercial civility: “Man / With soft fleece shall 
everywhere be cloth’d” (4. 686-687).    
My “topolitical” reading also engages in a critical reading of the ways in which 
Dyer represents Siluria’s local identity in linear time, indexing itself to a continuum 
progressing from a past pastoral haven to a way station to the ongoing progress of 
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commercial empire: “Siluria’s flowery vales, /Where the first springs arise of Britain’s 
happy trade, / now spreading wide, / Wide as th’Atlantic and Pacific seas, / Or as air’s 
vital fluid o’er the globe” (4. 691-695). The invocation of diachrony is a method of using 
collectivity selectively by manipulating the past in a functional way, a method of 
representing the land to meet some “moral” purposes for the author. Inventing the optical 
image of the continuous “time belt,” Dyer reinforces an imperial mode of vision to be 
compared to that of William Wordsworth in his poem titled “View from the Top of Black 
Comb (1810).”  
In his unpublished Guide, Wordsworth declares a topographical preeminence of 
Black Comb: “Ascend to the top of the Mountain Black Comb, from which I can assert, 
on the best authority, may be seen a more extensive view than any other eminence the 
Island affords” (302). While explaining the outlook of the Dudon from the summit of the 
Black Comb, he writes: “The Stream is very interesting for the space of a mile above this 
point, and below, by Ulpha Kirk, till it enters the Sands, where it is overlooked by the 
solitary Mountain Comb, the summit of which, as that experienced surveyor, Colonel 
Mudge, declared, commands a more extensive view than any point in Britain” (161). 
When Wordsworth took a holiday at the seaside to improve the health of his two children, 
he obtained the account of the British Ordnance Survey from a neighbor at Bootle66. The 
Reverent named James Satterthwaite as the incumbent of the Bootle parish provided 
information on the Survey in conversation while the Wordsworths were on the holiday. 
Wordsworth traces forward the taking place of the British Triangular Survey in the 
northern areas in the 1810s.   
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 While Wordsworth invokes the cartographer as a “ministering Angel,” he situates 
himself in the same cartographic station that Mudge must have taken in his survey, for 
“from the summit of BLACK COMB/ the amplest range/ of unobstructed prospect may 
be seen/ That British ground command.” The vision of the Romantic poet traverses the 
courses of the British Ordnance Survey following the great rivers of Britain: the Trent, 
the Annan, Tweed and Clyde. “British ground commands/ low dusky tracts / Where Trent 
is nursed, far southward/ to the south-west/ The hoary peaks of Scotland that give birth/ 
To Tivot’s stream, to Annan, Tweed, and/ Clyde. Wordsworth’s line of eyesight overlays 
a series of concentric circles on the terrain, thus securing the author a “conic” view, since 
the line of eyesight emanates from the summit of Black Comb. The cartographic quality 
of Wordsworth’s perspective echoes with Mudge’s cartographic survey.  
 Wordsworth reconfigures the “taking place” of the Ordnance Survey on the top of 
Blackcomb to reinforce authorial power. To produce a paramount authorial figure, which 
stands on a “lofty mountain” or “above the convex of the globe” is a power-laden 
activity, since it is to force a particularly dominant, representational exercise. “As we left 
the plain, uplifting slowly/ (Above the convex of the watery globe)/ into clear view the 
cultured fields that/ streak/ Her habitable shores, but now appears/ A dwindled object, 
and submits to lie/ At the spectator’s feet.” The author requests the reader to align himself 
with his cartographic point of view, since the author embodies the national event and thus 
empowers himself to give people national pride. “Look home/ ward now! / In depth, in 
height, in circuit, how serene/ The spectacle, how pure!- Of Nature’s/ Works.” The 
cartographic survey reinforces imperial assumptions for Wordsworth. The image of a 
series of concentric geographic circles expands from the domestic place into realms 
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beyond the territory of Britain. The poet overlays his wheel-spoke line of the eyesight 
from Cambrian Hills to the shores of Spain, thus securing him an imperial mode of 
vision: “Look homeward now!” Wordsworth traces forward the landscape, from afar: “In 
depth, in height, in circuit, how serene / The spectacle, how pure! – of Nature’s works, / 
In earth, and air, and earth-embracing sea, / A revelation infinite it seems; Display august 
of man’s inheritance, / Of Britain’s calm felicity and  power (28-34).  
 My reading of the topographical poems has discussed the taking place of the 
events within a given locale, suggesting the ways in which place not only provides a 
stage, an arena, or a “theater” for each poet’s “topolitical” formalization to trace forward 
the landscape of the event but place also gives place “a doing.” The “topolitical” 
negotiation between performance and performative, between writing and spacing, 
between memory and anticipation, (and equally important, between reason and affect) 
engages itself in a critical reassertion of the circularity of the materiality of place. My 
topographical and “topolitical” conjunction has a theoretical affinity with Joseph 
Addison’s georgic procedures of “dressing” meaning spatially. I discern the generic 
procedures of the Georgic: moral expression, spatial design through geographical 
digression, and description of the landscape “put in a dress” (Addison 4). One could say 
that there is no georgic morality outside of its geographical expression67; that a moral 
percept “enters, as it were, through a byway” (Addison 6); that the innumerable Crowd of 
Thoughts whirled through the great thoroughfares of the Brain (Defoe 181). By paying 
attention to the geographical expression of “the byway and thoroughfares,” I understand 
that the geographical techniques that will be enacted concurrently in “scaping” the land, 
for instance, the turnpike road system, provide the precondition and the outcome for a 
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topological and georgic formalization. The double articulation of the “topolitical” 
formalization as the taking place of and the tracing forward of the events in the actual 
landscape operates therefore as a poetic or further cultural logic that a specific locale will 
perform in its material taking place in writing place.  
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                                                       CHAPTER V  
 
                                  SALISBURY PLAIN, SALISBURY PLACE  
 
This chapter attempts to provide a history of the evolution of the Salisbury Plain 
texts, including how William Wordsworth changes the characters and their roles from 
Salisbury Plain to Adventures on Salisbury Plain, and then use this as the basic 
framework for my psychoanalytically inflected reading of Salisbury Plain poems. Other 
literary historical points will be established: the poetical significance of the French 
Revolution and the general, growing popularity of old English verse ancient ballads as a 
context for the renewed interest in Spenser and Shakespeare. The issue of forgery in 
relation to dighting concerns four-tiered signification, first of all, in relation to language, 
which is old-fashioned, out of date, and antique; and in relation to its referent, which is 
made to seem ancient and/or ruinous, like heritages in landscape gardens; and also in 
terms of the old and the new, of which the logic of dighting moves from the imposing 
monument of the old to the transistant monument of the new (taste) by deconstructing the 
old. This “dighted” space both depends on, and assists in, the political context of the time 
when Wordsworth as a “very angry young man” is working on his first version of the 
poem. When I approach the issue of the ancient transport in Wordsworth’s Salisbury 
Plain poems, I aim to chart a new territory to reveal the complex geographies of 
Romanticism.     
 “The Sailor has risen in my esteem. Heaven knows there was need,” William 
Wordsworth writes in a 1799 letter to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in order to pick up a 
 92 
strong nodal point of revising of his early Salisbury Plain poem into Adventures on 
Salisbury Plain. One particular way to read Wordsworth’s knots of revision is to track the 
transference of narration, the transference of speech from one interlocutor in Salisbury 
Plain to the other in Adventures on Salisbury Plain. A traveler’s speech is replaced by the 
“artless” story of the Female Vagrant, which is given to the Sailor in Adventures on 
Salisbury Plain.  
My reading of Salisbury Plain poems engages itself in Wordsworth’s different 
need to “salvage” the Sailor from the Female Vagrant in the revision of Salisbury Plain 
into Adventures on Salisbury Plain Salisbury Plain. What I hope to suggest is that 
Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain poems both anticipate and exceed the “libidinous” 
economy of the Unconscious as Freud represents it, especially in his own critical essay, 
“The Uncanny.”68 When Wordsworth joins the disjoined parts of Romantic social life by 
using romance narrative to explore the “obscure walks of destiny”69of those who must 
pursue it, he elaborates the poet’s role through the other roles filled by unknown others, 
such as the Traveler, the Female Vagrant, and the Sailor, which he adopts in relation to 
each other. Much in the same way as the modern physician Freud in the analytical scene 
of transference, the Romantic poet selects and verifies garbs and roles of each character. 
These roles of the Female Vagrant and the Sailor do not come “over and above”: they 
are, on the contrary, the internal generic elements of repetition, particularly Spenserian 
revision.70 What defines the extraordinary power of that disguised repetition more 
profound than bare revision is the reprisal of social accidents, the condensation one into 
another, with an echo or resonance which makes each the double of the other, as he states 
a dynamic of revision in the same letter: “Now by way of a pretty moving accident and to 
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bind together in palpable knots the story of the piece I have resolved to make her the 
widow or sister or daughter of the man whom the poor Tar murdered.” The invention of 
“palpable knots of the story” to make the vagrant woman the widow or sister or daughter 
of the murdered by the local, homeless Sailor provides the best example of the master 
puppeteer motif and of formal consonance with the issue of transference, the Freudian 
notion of “an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to our intervention” 
(“Recollection” 165). To read Wordsworth with the Freudian notion of the uncanny and 
the issue of transference is particularly to analyze the development of Wordsworth’s 
poetic force, or to put it in Freudian terms, to make his poetic power accessible and 
intelligible to the reader of Salisbury Plain poems. My work rethinks questions about the 
ways in which Wordsworth achieves power as a poet.        
But I shall argue that Wordsworth, unlike Freud, does not have a strong stake in 
curing transference neurosis; he gives that job to the vagrant woman in his revised 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain. He wants to learn how the transference is induced so that 
he can practice his poetic technique of narrative intervention. That is, Wordsworth 
argues, like Freud, that artificial illness as dangerous as real ones, and no less dangerous 
for the analyst as for the analysand. In this essay, I claim that Salisbury Plain poems 
represent all illnesses as artificial- that is, in the vocabulary of the poem, as the result of a 
political cause which has the social consequence of making an illness transferable from 
person to person, poem to reader.71  
The emergence of an “abysmal,” itinerary traveler in the Plain lends attention to 
the issue of the “turns of chance” in relation to Wordsworth’s career. As the Traveler of 
Salisbury Plain asserts:   
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When men in various vessels roam the deep  
Of social life, and turns of chance72 prevail 
Various, and sad, how many thousands weep 
Beset with foes more fierce than e’er assail 
The savage without home in winter’s keenest gale (29-33) 
 
As Wordsworth explains how he arrives at Salisbury Plain in the Advertisement of Guilt 
and Sorrow; or Incidents Upon Salisbury Plain in the year of 1841, “the monuments and 
traces of antiquity, scattered in abundance over that region, led me unavoidably to 
compare what we know or guess of those remote times with certain aspects of modern 
society, and with calamities, principally those consequent upon war, to which, more than 
other classes of men, the poor are subject” (Gill 217). The Plain comes upon him as a 
savage soil where there isn’t a certain blockage or threshold between the modern man and 
the ancient savage as a consequence of war, revolution, and social displacement.  
What is peculiar to Wordsworth’s modern society from a political point of view is 
that it is a process that turns people into indeterminable beings who do not fit into organic 
community or integrate quite smoothly into the state. The modern society unleashes 
patterns or flows of migration that put people into a situation where, in relation to each 
other, they are not able to tell who they are.73 The modern men become no worse than 
“savages without homes” (SP 36). The “transnational” situation of displaced people is a 
modern case in point; that is, the phenomenon of social dislocation consists in moving, 
changing land or terrain, going from one place to another, or beyond (trans) one 
terrestrial or earthly place toward another. Wordsworth might speak of a principle of the 
indefinite of the body; each of us is becoming capable of anybody. Wordsworth gathers 
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the same passion as anybody in the same political situation, as he asks himself, “in those 
wild assemblies / men who all of his hard lot partake, / Repose in the same fear, to the 
same toil awake?” (SP 16-19) The indefinite body is experienced as a portent state of 
being that forces him to rearticulate some of critical stances that he maintained in the 
1793 Letter to Robert Watson, bishop of Landaff: “You should have felt like the bulk of 
mankind; their sorrows should be familiar to you” (47).74  
 Wordsworth’s search for form is a search conditioned by losing his ground. The 
traveler says, “Life is like this desart broad, / Where all the happiest find is but a shed, / 
And a green spot’ mid wastes interminably spread” (420-3). The desire for the “green 
spot” is symptomatic of the anxiety of losing one’s ground, the absolute anchorage, the 
ownership of habitat, or the common place. From the outset Wordsworth’s poetic trope 
“unhouzed” represses a social reading that there was a formerly home, and is thereby 
capable of prefabricating identifiable common places for virtual, “homeless” reader 
rather than empirical merchant, artisan, or householder: “Hard is life when naked and 
unhouzed / And wasted by the long day’s fruitless pains75 / The hungry savage’ mid deep 
forests, roused / By storms, lied down at night on unknown plains / And lifts his head in 
fear (emphasis added SP 1-4). In the moment of “pining for happier days” (12) comes 
pain, but it is not enough to remember the “memory of pleasures” (22) in the abstract nor 
even to represent the repressed event in all its particularity. Wordsworth seeks to install 
himself directly in the Spenserian legacy in order to accomplish a living working through 
blockage, i.e., the repressed in the unconscious.  
 Wordsworth has to figure out what would be the condition for him to be the poet; 
and his first choice is Edmund Spenser. As Karen Swann has asked, “Why should 
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Wordsworth have composed his most ambitious and significant poem, Salisbury Plain, in 
one of the most taxing of metrical patterns, the Spenserian stanza?” Wordsworth couldn’t 
have written in blank verse, because of Milton, or to put it another way, because of the 
Oedipal anxiety of influence that Harold Bloom theorizes. To write the blank verse is to 
go on the Plain “unarmed,” so to speak. Spenser is a benevolent father figure in contrast 
with Milton. In this respect, Greg Kucich’s work on Romantic Spenserianism provides a 
historical insight into the eighteenth-century reception of Spencer as “malleable,” 
“adaptable,” “vulnerable,” “flexible,” or “correctible.” Further than this, Kucich 
articulates another crucial trait to fit in the historical conditions of an incommensurable 
gap or “rift” that Wordsworth couldn’t resolve politically: allegory, which implies 
revisionary dualism. Kucich says, “The Romantics are especially inspired by what 
appeared to be the dramatic center of Spenser’s allegorical world: the mind’s particular 
division between real and ideal experience” (95). While arguing that the tension of reality 
and ideality sets into resisting romance, Kucich elaborates:  
In adapting Spenser’s allegorical duality to their own situation, the 
Romantics radicalized his politics to give him a more palpable social 
consciousness and to intensify his drama of the mind in conflict. Behind 
this important revisionary maneuver lay their inclination to … cultivate 
the more subversive, dissatisfied element of Spenser’s political 
experience, a discontent that greatly appealed to the revolutionary 
sentiments of the young Wordsworth, Coleridge, and many of their 
contemporaries. (101)  
 
Spenser equips Wordsworth to poetically engage the world in which he moves and 
toward which he is moving and wants to move. Wordsworth both anticipates and exceeds 
the libidinous economy of the unconscious repression in order to engage himself in a 
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liminal “trance” logic that would be elevated to the position of a poetic law to “move” the 
public in the phase of his early poetic career in the 1790s.           
 Wordsworth sets up poetic diction of Salisbury Plain to the extent to which 
Spenser’s archaic diction retrofits Wordsworth circumstantial awareness of “roam[ing] 
the deep of social life,” that is, floating or abysmal indeterminacy. In so doing, 
Wordsworth’s terminology is akin to Freud’s terminology in his critical essay, “The 
Uncanny.” Wordsworth’s doubling or twinning in “twin swans” (SP 212) blurs 
distinction between identity and otherness. More significantly, Wordsworth takes on 
liminal interface by adopting romance narrative. It is no accident that Freud invokes 
romance in his unprecedented study of the uncanny. Freud steps into another section of 
aesthetics in search for an internal condition of the uncanny.    
He [psychoanalyst] works in other plans of mental life and has little to do 
with those subdued emotional activities, which, dependent upon a 
multitude of concurrent factors, usually furnish the material for the study 
of aesthetics. But it does occasionally happen that he has to interest 
himself in some particular province of that subject; and then it usually 
proves to be a rather remote region of it and one that has been neglected in 
standard works. … The subject of the “uncanny” is a province of this kind. 
It undoubtedly belongs to all that is terrible – to all that arouses dread and 
creeping horror; it is equally certain, too, that the word is not always used 
in a clearly definable sense, so that it tends to coincide with whatever 
excites dread. Yet we may expect that it implies some intrinsic quality 
which justifies the use of a special name. One is curious to know what this 
peculiar quality is what allows us to distinguish as “uncanny” certain 
things within the boundaries of what is fearful. As good as nothing is to be 
found upon this subject. (219)  
 
For Freud, a remote region is a place he comes back to and goes away from; that is, 
generic mass or magnetism is associated with romance. Just like Freud who filters out 
some peculiar quality of the uncanny from all that is terrible, Wordsworth seeks for a 
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positive internal condition of uncanny repetition in the Stonehenge and the savage 
Druids, both of which are “fearful” and “arouse dread.”  
 The province of Salisbury Plain is “as good as nothing” for Wordsworth, as well: 
a blank sky, void, a vacant plain, no moon, no shepherd, and no watchdog.  
No shade was there, no meads of pleasant green,  
No brook to wet his lips or soothe his ear,  
Huge piles of corn-stack here and there were seen 
But thence no smoke upwreathed his sight to cheer; 
And see the homeward shepherd dim appear 
Far off – He stops his feeble voice to strain; 
No sound replies but winds that whistling near. (SP 46-52) 
 
Wordsworth searches, in caesura of vision, for a figure to articulate the voice of hiatus – 
hio in Latin, from which comes hiatus and also chaos as in chaino, when one opens one’s 
mouth. “While to those walls he hied / A voice as from a tomb in hollow accents cried” 
(SP 80-81). The geographical Salisbury Plain de-nominates the very spacing of its poetic 
site as a void to convoke chiasmus, or as a liminal borderline that is capable of driving 
mad the very traveler in the Plain: “Once did the lightening’s pale abortive beam / 
Disclose a naked guide-post’s double head, / Sole object where he stood had day its 
radiance spread” (SP 105-7). The event of arriving at Salisbury Plain provides the 
material chance of writing the poem of rupture for Wordsworth to pursue a path of the 
poet.  
Wordsworth’s way to disclose a naked guide-post’s double head accords in 
crucial aspects with Freud’s way to (re)discover the uncanny. In a long etymological 
discussion, Freud unfolds, deliberately slowly and cumulatively, that “heimlich is a word 
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the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides 
with its opposite, unheimlich” (30). While calling attention to Freud’s lengthy display of 
etymological research, Helene Cixous points out, the cumulative effects of such 
dictionary research circled, almost uncannily, around the concept of the uncanny by way 
of Grim, Sanders, and Hoffman. Freud’s text is itself “a strange theoretical novel,” “a 
kind of puppet theatre in which real dolls or fake dolls, real or simulated life, are 
manipulated by a sovereign but capricious stage-setter” (525).76 Freud’s “theoretical” 
strategy is to read repression and its symptomatic, recursive repetition in sheer moments 
of the same, in “the constant recurrence of similar situations” or “twist of fortune” (39). 
The Plain represses the fact that there was once a home: the prefix “un” in the word 
“unhouzed” may be a token of repression. And yet the absence of blockage or threshold 
in the primordial world brings in the returning of the repressed modern unhomely to the 
savage. 
The idea of gravity toward submerged weight provides a particularly genetic 
means for Freud to define that Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of 
Heimlich (emphasis added 30). Pensive weight flows under Wordsworth’s mind:   
The thoughts which bow the kindly spirits down 
And break the springs of joy, their deadly weight 
Derive from memory of pleasures flown  
Which haunts us in some sad reverse of fate  
  Or from reflection on the state 
  Of those who on the couch of Affluence rest  
  By laughing Fortune’s sparkling cup elate,  
  While we of comfort reft, by pain depressed,  
   No other pillow know than Penury’s iron breast.  
                         (17-24) 
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A weighty thought may become a chance of hope in the reflection of the very repressed, 
submerged weight.77 It is, however, in the first place for himself that Wordsworth is 
determined to lead his life as a resuscitated druidic savage, before becoming capable of 
violence that the druidic savages have begun in the mode of a proper past, therefore under 
such external conditions of war, famine, and plague that he necessarily identify with a 
figure from the historical past. Rather than a repressive concept of reflection as in Freud, 
I argue, repetition is a dynamic of the Wordsworth in the process of writing Salisbury 
Plain.   
The traveler’s faltering and repetitive movement is uncanny. “O’er Sarum’s Plain 
the traveler with a sigh / Measured each painful step, the distant spire / That fixed at 
every turn his backward eye / Was lost, tho still he turned, in the blank sky (SP 37-41). 
His punctual, mechanistic movement mimes traveling; it migrates without ceasing; but 
becoming lost is a kind of advance.78 His movement is transversed “laterally” by the 
Sailor, the Dead House, and the Female Vagrant. It migrates beyond but does not gain an 
inch of ground. This endless repetition is uncanny and “artless” by virtue of its doubled 
movement to get at a place without spatial movement. The traveller’s movement is 
marked by the infinitely floating movement of a “vessel” to find a spot, a place, or a port 
where one calls in the poet’s language as the privileged site of decision, of authority or 
power. The traveler’s uncanny repetition is not the finding of the hidden half to complete 
itself in the present but an activity to testify to the “other” virtual half which the present 
continues to lack.  
 Michael Wiley notes the significance of the geographical name “Sarum” to 
consider Wordsworth’s social placelessness. Indicating precisely that Sarum was once a 
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central, thriving Wiltshire town which residents long ago had abandoned for Salisbury 
just over a mile to the South, Wiley asks what it ultimately means for Wordsworth to 
repress that the poem’s many non-places or absent features are locatable (21).79 For 
Wiley, the blanking of the highest spire in the Plain implies first and foremost the 
absence of social time and by extension social disorientation. The emergence of a blank 
space inscribes “its own new form of (perhaps revolutionary-utopian) temporal order” 
(27). However, Wordsworth’s acute awareness of circumstantial gravity may have kept 
him from actualizing or materializing the society, which “blanks out or deconstructs on 
his poetic landscape as more than a spot of momentary spot” (37).  
 The Stonehenge is indeed more than a “spot” of comfort. The memory of the 
Plain does not merely convoke sheer pleasure derived from having a home. The 
Stonehenge could have been an artifice of violence as much as it could have been a place 
of beauty, harmony, and concord; that is, it serves as the unsettling hiatus80that 
deconstructs the distinction between the modern and the savage, as the “double head” 
which has been consigned to the other world. Since the savage also have “thoughts” that 
weigh on the poet, it will pose a threat to the poet to thematize the Stonehenge and its 
repressive, weighty thoughts:  
It is the sacrificial altar fed 
With living men. How deep it groans- the dead 
Thrilled in their yawning tombs their helms uprear; 
The sword that slept beneath the warriour’s head 
Thunders in fiery air: red arms appear 
Uplifted thro’ the gloom and shake the rattling spear. (SP 184-9)  
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The Plain is a particular possibility, chance, or threat of repetition. Stonehenge provides a 
secret, exoteric substance of the uncanny for the poet, whose potent expression keeps 
reader dizzy, that is, losing one’s balance in the repetitive Spenserian form. Wordsworth 
explores the possibility of recapitulating, replacing, in other words, internalizing the 
conditions of power in the Druids. Wordsworth’s poetic power to write the effect of 
“harrowing” voice exceeds the vicious, ruthless, and barbaric attempts of the Druids to 
sacrifice the living men.81 I argue that Salisbury Plain takes account of how you would 
put yourself in another whose statement is committed to violence, whose statement 
enforces cultural power.  
Wordsworth seeks to find an object toward which to enact his newly forged 
power as a poet. At the very instant, he hears the human voice: “It was the voice of one 
that sleeping mourned, / A human voice! / … At dusk a female wanderer hither turned / 
And found a comfortless half-sheltered bed” (136-9). The emergence of the first human 
voice may be contingent in that it may be man’s voice or woman’s voice, but 
Wordsworth would want the female and reinscribe the female as an artist and the artist as 
an “artless,” i.e., “homeless” conjuror who has a design in the Plain. The poet’s access to 
another human voice, to the Female Vagrant’s narrative, is the process of practicing the 
condition of the exemplary poet’s movement.  
Freud’s reading of a nurse in Hoffman’s Sandman takes rational account of 
Wordsworth’s reinscription of the female as the uncanny conjuror. Freud’s analysis of a 
nurse’s story starts with the mother who warns Nathaniel that the “Sand-man was 
coming” before she sends him to bed. Freud explains the role that the nurse plays in the 
child’s mind:  
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When questioned about the Sand-man, his mother, it is true, denied that 
such a person excited except as a form of speech, but his nurse could give 
him more definite information: “He is a wicked man who comes when 
children won’t go to bed … Those who lean towards a rationalistic 
interpretation of the Sand-man will not fail to recognize in the child’s 
phantasy the continued influence of his nurse’s story. (32-33)  
 
The nurse is not in the story, but her continued story is committed to immersing her 
auditor into a state of complete bewilderment. In Salisbury Plain a nurse-like woman, 
who seems to be artless, recounts her story and implants bewilderment.  
He [the traveler] waked her and at once her spirits fail 
  Thrilled by the poignant dart of sudden dread, 
For of that ruin she had a tale 
That might with a child’s fears the stoutest heart assail  
 Had heard of one who forced from storms to shroud 
Felt the loose walls of this decayed retreat 
Rock to his horse’s neighings shrill and loud,  
While the ground rang by ceaseless pawing beat,  
Till on a stone that sparkled to his feet  
Struck and still struck again the troubled horse.  
The man half raised that stone by pain and sweat,  
Half raised; for well his arm might lose its force 
Disclosing the grim head of a new murdered corse.  
Such tales of the lone Spital she had learned. (141-154)  
 
As Steinman notes, the Vagrant’s “artless” story – meaning natural, uncrafted, and also 
guileless -reveals Wordsworth’s “arfulness.” Steinman elaborates: “His [Wordsworth’s] 
readers hear a story in Spenserian Stanza (anything but artlessly uncrafted), and the plot 
has [a] design[s] on its audience” (63). In accounting for the female vagrant, therefore, 
the English word seems to be more fitting than Freud was willing to admit: beyond ken – 
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from “canny,” which means skilled in magic, artful, supernaturally powerful, easy, and 
comfortable, much in the same way that unheimlich is affiliated with heimlich. I argue 
that the female vagrant is represented as a rationalistic source of the uncanny.  
The poet’s access to another voice provides the occasion for the poet to enact his 
poetic force for a particular audition. As Coleridge notes in Chapter 4 of Biographia 
Literaria, he recalls a particularly singular impression that Wordsworth’s recitation of 
Salisbury Plain gives rise to: “I shall hardly forget the sudden effect produced on my 
mind, by his recitation of a manuscript poem, which still remains unpublished, but of 
which the stanza, and tone of style, were the same as those of the ‘Female Vagrant’ as 
originally printed in the first volume of the Lyrical Ballads” (79). Wordsworth’s 
Salisbury Plain poem engages the occasion of narration: how the telling of a story 
engages a reader both by rendering the scene of telling and by establishing the listener as 
a surrogate for the reader of the poem that the poet aspires to move. I argue that Salisbury 
Plain poem takes account of how you would put yourself in the position of attending to 
someone whose statement commits violence. The vagrant woman recounts her story:  
“The pains and plagues that on our heads came down, 
Disease and Famine, Agony and Fear, 
In wood or wilderness, in camp or town, 
It would thy brain unsettle even to hear. 
All perished, all in one remorseless year, 
Husband and children one by one, by sword 
And scourge of fiery fever: even tear 
Dried up, despairing, desolate, on board 
A British ship I waked as from a trance restored.” (316-24)  
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Her voice is queer in the double sense that she doesn’t have her mind at all and that it is 
almost indistinguishable whether the voice of the Female Vagrant reiterates or represents 
the voice of the poet. All the pairings in the vagrant woman’s story, such as “pains and 
plagues,” “wood or wilderness,” camp or town,” “sword and scourge,” “one by one,” 
“fiery fever,” “board a British” attest to the female’s emotional and the physical paralysis 
of her homelessness, i.e., her state of trance. The homonymic mechanics of the female 
vagrant’s language inscribes the poet’s sophisticated investment in the feminine feeling 
of suffering. As Adela Pinch’s study of the feminine in Wordsworth’s lyric suggests, the 
issue of gender “emerges in a turn away from a natural object, a turn into the self and into 
representation. . . . For Wordsworth, representing the power of imagination as the power 
of a woman’s voice represents a search for poetic power without agency, for affective 
lyric voice unhindered by the labor of its own production” (846). The female vagrant is 
exploited and “subjectivized” by the poet; that is, she serves as a local conduit through 
which the poet’s voice transits. The poet’s metrical “shuttling”82 back and forth in 
Spenserian repetition weaves and fashions the voice of the female woman whose 
rhetorical efficacy is capable of harrowing and moving a virtual public to be 
distinguishable from the public that will witness the gibbet at the end of Adventures on 
Salisbury Plain. 
The female vagrant has power to fundamentally unsettle one’s mind, because she 
has been expelled by force from home. 
“Three years a wanderer round my native coast 
My eyes have watched yon sun declining tend 
Down to the land where hope to me was lost;  
And now across this waste my steps I bend: 
Oh! Tell me whither, for no earthly friend 
Have I, no house in prospect but the tomb.” 
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She ceased. The city’s distant spires ascend 
Like flames which far and wide the west illume, 
Scattering from out sky the rear of night’s thin gloom. (388-96) 
 
While keeping the reader imagining a social predicament of homelessness, Wordsworth 
exercises his poetic power in the two procedures of adjunction and condensation. The 
female vagrant’s story specifies the adjunct fields of social problems in all their 
dimensions: the British participation in the American war, the death of husband and 
children, the loss of home, family, income, and self-respect “that is dear in being,” the 
“loss of little range of water,” her father’s right of access to his property, and the dreadful 
tale of a murderer. The female vagrant’s narrative is true not because it persuasively 
depicts casual links, but because it forcefully prescribed sympathy.83 Her story is so 
instrumental that she seems to appeal to the immediate political programs, but her 
unintentional words of trance is far more actionable than any prescribed political 
programs. 
The sheer bulk of her continued story is now committed to throwing “an old man 
[who] comes tottering sidelong down to ask the hour” (SP 165-7) in the epochal suspense 
of a trance. The kind of perspective that I am adopting by the term “trance” indicates a 
constellation of meanings: not only, as the OED tells us, a state of dread or suspense, or 
an unconscious or insensible condition, or an intermediate state between sleeping and 
awaking, or a dream-like state; not only these, but a connection as well with a potent state 
of being- that is, an unwilled paralysis derived from a multitude of causes. Taken 
together, all these meanings are all inflected in the following notions of psychoanalysis: 
that of a state of the unconscious; and that of the resistance to transference.    
 107 
The Sailor of Salisbury Plain, who remained inapparent, hidden, or latent as in 
metaphoric stoppage, is brought to Adventures on Salisbury Plain. Wordsworth 
“salvages” the Sailor from a different “need” from the occasion for the poet to practice 
the voice of a moving trance that the Female Vagrant carries in order to “unsettle thy 
brain to bear” in his early Salisbury Plain. Why does Wordsworth make the Female 
Vagrant’s moving narrative serve as a “cover” for a more profound repetition, which is 
played in another dimension, a staff or the gibbet in which roles and garbs are furnished 
by the “death instinct” of the Sailor? How is it that the theme of death can be in itself the 
most positive element to the point of affirming repetition and also of “transcending” the 
gibbet audience in the practical sense of “being capable of interesting the other readers?” 
The emergence of the Sailor constitutes disguised repetition in the sense that an 
entirely other announces itself in disguising itself in the Soldier’s garb. What defines the 
extraordinary power of that clothed repetition is the poet’s dramatization of social 
accidents by staging them in the “puppet theatre” that Cixous theorizes and thereby 
condensing them one into another with a resonance which makes each the double of the 
other. Wordsworth’s reference to the Sailor in the 1799 letter to Coleridge strengthens the 
case: 
He [the Sailor] has risen in my esteem. Heaven knows there was need. The 
third part I think interesting a praise which I give myself with more 
pleasure as I know that in general I can lay little claim to it. I also took 
courage to devote two days (O Wonder) to the Salisbury Plain. I am 
resolved to discard Robert Walford and invent a new story for the woman. 
The poem is finished all but her tale. Now by way of a pretty moving 
accident and to bind together in palpable knots the story of the piece I 
have resolved to make her the widow or sister or daughter of the man 
whom the poor Tar murdered. So much for the vulgar. Further the poet’s 
invention goeth not (Emphasis added 1799 256-7).  
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Wordsworth attempts to congeal, condense, and precipitate “circumstance which did all 
faith exceed” (ASP 24) into “knots” of social accidents, in order to give testimony to the 
“truth” that society is unjust and also that “hard is the world’s law” (ASP 659). As 
Wordsworth declares to Francis Wrangham in 1795, its [ASP’s] object is to expose the 
vices of the penal law and the calamities of war as they affect individuals (Letters 159).84 
Early in the Letter to Landaff, Wordsworth recalls: “Our penal code is so crowded with 
disproportioned penalties and indiscriminate severity that a conscientious man would 
sacrifice in many instances a respect for the laws to the common feelings of humanity. . . 
[that] a man cannot be instrumental without forfeiting his self-esteem and incurring the 
contempt of his fellow citizens” (40). Instead of adopting the story of a local murderer, 
whose name is arguably Robert Walford, Wordsworth reinvents a new story in which an 
“eventful” encounter of the two remote entities, that is, the Female Vagrant and the 
Sailor, come closer once again into the relationship between father and daughter, between 
husband and wife, or between brother and sister. Such an encounter is eventful in the 
sense that another always thinks in him, another who must also be of “all present thought 
forlorn” (ASP 558); and that the female vagrant’s narratives induce an involuntary trance 
toward the Sailor in order to move him into her compelling affect of sympathetic 
narrative.    
I argue that this poetic “turn” – a “revolution” in feeling draws the poet all too 
closer to the modern physician, Freud, who “revolutionized” hypnotic therapy by 
constructing the analytical treatment of the transference and its related resistance. Just as 
one reads so often, Freud “knows how to listen to his patients,” Coleridge knows how to 
listen to Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain to analyze an “involuntary dislike” that 
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Wordsworth’s poem causes to the patient-reader.85 In Chapter 4 of Biographia, Coleridge 
is describing the force of genius as to inducement of transference: “And therefore is it the 
prime merit of genius so to represent familiar objects as to awaken in the minds of others 
a kindred feeling concerning them and that freshness of sensation which is the constant 
accompaniment of mental, no less than of bodily, convalescence”(emphasis added 81). 
Much in the same way, Freud argues, in his essay titled “Remembering, Repeating, and 
Working through,” that transference is still repetition; that if repetition makes one ill, it 
also heals one; that all cure is a voyage to the bottom of repetitive compulsion. Freud 
says, “The main instrument for curbing the patient’s compulsion to repeat and for turning 
it into a motive for remembering lies in the handling of transference” (164). The more 
“repetitive” and “dramatic” operation by which the resistance and the cure take place has 
the name of transference:  
We admit it [compulsion] into the transference as a playground in which it 
is … expected to display to us everything in the way of pathogenic 
instincts that are hidden in the patient’s mind. Provided only that the 
patient shows compliance enough to respect the necessary conditions of 
the analysis, we regularly succeed in giving all the symptoms of the illness 
a new transference meaning and in replacing his ordinary neurosis by a 
“transference-neurosis” of which he can be cured by therapeutic work. 
The transference thus creates an intermediate region between illness and 
real life through which the transition from the one to the other is made. 
The new condition has taken over all the features of illness; but it 
represents an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to our 
intervention. (155)   
 
The analyst initiates an intermediate state that has all the aspects of an “artificial” 
compulsion; and the analyst invents a procedure that converts repetitive compulsion as a 
driving force of analysis. The patient is supposed to repeat the whole of his disturbance in 
artificial condition, taking the person of the analyst as “object.” By reorganizing the 
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patient’s compulsive repetition around the analyst, transference renders it intelligible, 
accessible, as Freud says, to the “artifice,” i.e., intervention of the analyst.  
I argue that Wordsworth does not have a strong stake in curing transference 
neurosis, unlike Freud whose “hubris” is to cure all symptoms of illness with an 
intelligible, veritable technique, the transference that is transmissible and thus, in 
principle, practicable by anyone. Wordsworth’s poetic intervention in the Sailor is, as far 
as poetry is concerned, far more abrupt and eventful to the extent to which the sacrifice of 
the Sailor “seals off”86 further eventfulness of committing a social crime even under “the 
vices of the penal law and the calamities of war” that Wordsworth suggests in the letter to 
Wrangham.   
The Sailor walks through the instrumental destiny of homelessness in propping 
himself on a staff: “An aged old man with feet half bare / Propp’d on a trembling staff he 
crept with pain / … His ragged coat scare showed the Sailor’s faded red” (ASP 2-9). The 
Traveler on the skirt of Sarum’s Plain asks: “And dost thou hope across the Plain to trail / 
That frame o’ercome with years and malady, / Those feet that scarcely can outcrawl the 
snail, / These withered arms of thine, that faltering knee?” (ASP 10-14) The proximity of 
the Sailor and the Traveler prompts the Sailor to ask “any causal theme” concerning his 
homelessness: “His mind was still as a deep evening stream; / Nor, if accosted now, in 
thought engross’d, / Moody, or inly-troubled, would he seem / To traveler who might talk 
of any causal theme” (ASP 132-136). The Traveler, however, gives the vagrant woman 
the job to give the Sailor causal links to his homelessness.  
The Female Vagrant’s “causal theme” represents social causes that would allow 
her narrative to flourish in history and that would allow her to thrive in a coherent, 
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biographical course of life by virtue of her individual closure of history. When she 
recounts some causality from which her story subsequently unfolds and to which it can 
repetitively return, her compulsive narration is not, however, the act of repression.87 The 
impulsive instinct is awakened by “some precipitating cause” into the Female Vagrant: 
  “Three years a wanderer, often have I view’d, 
  In tears, the sun towards that country tend 
Where my poor heart lost all its fortitude: 
And now across this moor my steps I bend- 
Oh! tell me whither –for no earthly friend 
Have I.”- she ceased, and weeping turned away,  
As if because her tale was at an end 
She wept; - because she had no more to say 
Of that perpetual weight which on her spirit lay.  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
She ended, of all present thought forlorn,  
Nor voice nor sound that moment’s pang express’d (ASP 550-562).  
 
The Female Vagrant regrets not having any more story or loss, because her story defends 
against pain, or to put it in psychoanalytical terms, the “ego defense” is shattered by the 
potent representation of suffering. From a formal point of view, however, the “perpetual 
weight” that the Female Vagrant carries as a surrogate narrator in Salisbury Plain and 
also as a surrogate “analyst” in Adventures on Salisbury Plain comes to a close.  
The vagrant woman has tries, in a continual effort to “treat” the Sailor in a trance, 
to multiply the versions of her narrative: “But soon her heart on other thoughts was bent / 
so friendly was his voice . . . Meanwhile discourse ensued of various kind / Which by 
degrees a confidence of mind / And mutual interest fail’d not to create” (254-259). The 
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multiple samplings of her “artifice” suggest that the transference of her “learned” and 
“artificial” narratives is as dangerous as real ones and no less dangerous as the analyst-
vagrant and as for the analysand-Sailor. Wordsworth’s interventional naming of the 
displaced populace of vagrancy,88such as the “wild assemblies,” the “wild brood (ASP 
503),” and the “earth tenants” recuperates the Jacobins in the historical development of 
the French Revolution, which accounts for the Sailor’s counter-pulsation and thus 
establishes the counterpoise to the delusive identification of the Female Vagrant’s 
narrative: “Nor to her friendly summons answer could return” (405). 
The “fruitless pains” of the Female Vagrant’s inducement of transference, 
nevertheless, bears fruit, fruit that bears the weight in the figure of the Sailor.   
The woman from the ruin’d tenement  
Did with a light and cheerful step depart,  
But deep into his vitals she had sent  
Anguish that rankled like a fiery dart  
She with affectionate and homely art  
His peace of mind endeavour’d to restore (586-591).  
 
Unlike the Female Vagrant, who reaches the closure of her story with “all forlorn thought 
present” in the poem, the Sailor becomes the one who takes the responsibility for what 
has happened to him.  
The Sailor’s encounter of the gibbet manifests his unconscious destination; that is, 
the gibbet comes athwart the Sailor’s “all track quite lost (ASP 165).” “As he [the Sailor] 
plodded on, with sudden clang / A sound of chains along the desart rang: A human body 
that in irons swang, / Uplifted by the tempest sweeping by” (ASP 113-116). A “gride” 
iron puts the Sailor’s “turns of chance” into a “quaestio,” the Latin for process, 
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proceeding, and also trial. The Plain emerges, in this light, as a site of multiple 
determinations between chains and chance, between pain and plain, and between gride 
iron and gibbet:    
In spot so savage but with shuddering pain 
Nor only did for him at once renew  
All he had feared from man, but roused a train 
Of mind’s phantoms, horrible as vain. 
The stones, as if to sweep him from the day, 
Roll’d at his back along the living plain; 
He fell and without sense or motion lay, 
And when the trance was gone, feebly pursued his way. (118-126) 
 
It is no doubt that the stones rolled as if they had an intention to sweep him. The stones 
serve as the natural signs that would attest to the power that the vagrant woman’s potent 
story conjures up. And yet the phenomenon of transference is arguably manifested in the 
trance that the Sailor seizes; the resistance to transference is, as Freud says, “as it were, 
drawn over by the ego to its side” (25).89  
In crucial aspects that an impassible political fate be may recuperated, the Sailor 
looks like “ghosts . . . on nightly roam intent” as if his ideational representative of his ego 
is denied entrance to the psychic apparatus and thus a fixation is established in the Plain. 
In the trance of the Sailor, Swann elaborates:  
The Sailor, whom we and he have been mistaking for an “individual 
mind,” is suddenly exposed as the trope or figure – as one signifier in a 
structure like an unconsciousness, or apparently less mysteriously, as one 
character in a poetic text. The poem’s repeated sudden openings onto an 
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“other world” shock not because one sees ghosts, but because in these 
moments one intuits “oneself” as a ghost (815).   
 
As in the transference of affect from an unconscious idea onto a preconscious one, “a 
train of mind’s phantoms” is roused in the Sailor. The mind’s phantoms are the true 
elements of theatre of justice: “Gigantic beings ranged in dread array; such beings, 
thwarting the traveler’s way, … stride across the wold, … their state unfold, / And … 
mysterious council hold” (ASP 238-243). The Plain reinforces its figurative operation; 
that is, primordial earth writing in the Wordsworthian sense of geo-graphy compensates 
for the Sailor by resisting to narrative.  
 Although the Sailor remembers nothing of what is repeated, he expresses it in 
action. “In sight of his own house, in such a mood / That from his view his children might 
have run, / He met a traveler, robb’d him, shed his blood; / And when the miserable work 
was done, / He fled, a vagrant since, the murderer’s fate to shun” (95-99). The Sailor 
repeats the crime without knowing that he repeats it; that is, he strikes the traveler down 
as the father stroke the infant in exactly the same place the Sailor had struck his murdered 
victim.90 The Sailor repeats committing a murder on the threshold of home as if he is 
inhibited from crossing the threshold. In the process of working through the transference, 
the Sailor is all the more bound to the spot of the gibbet: “Through his brain / At once the 
griding iron passage found/ Deluge of tender thoughts then rushed amain/ Nor could his 
aged eyes from very tears abstain” (645-648).  
The “passion” (ASP 634) of the Sailor carries the weight of his staff to the gibbet. 
The Sailor constitutes an allegorical figure that would be compared to Spenser’s Redcross 
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Knight or a figure of Druidic Sacrifice par excellence. The Sailor’s “rusty gun” in 
Salisbury Plain is now displaced into the staff that he leans on and the weight of “the 
griding iron” to cross his person. The Sailor’s allegorical movement is disturbing, 
because the Sailor’s “trajectivity,” though errant, kneads out difference from the public 
management of spectacle as a puppet. Social accidents derived from the Sailor’s 
homelessness- “I had hopes that I my home might yet regain” (ASP 738) inhibits his 
neighbor from keeping their imagination at home. “They, alone and tranquil, call’d to 
mind / Events so various; recollection ran / Through each occurrence and the links 
combin’d, / And while his silence, looks, and voice they scan, / And trembling hands, 
they cried, “He is the man!” (ASP 803-6) The Ecce Homo moment is eventful in that it 
testifies to the recurrence of an ancient form of violence: “The law must weigh him in her 
scale / Most fit it is that we unfold this woeful tale” (ASP 810-11). The Sailor’s “woeful 
tale” reinforces the power of suggestion that “hard is the world’s law” into the reader’s 
imagination.    
They left him hung on high in iron case, 
And dissolute men, unthinking and untaught, 
Planted their festive booths beneath his face; 
And to that spot, which idle thousands sought, 
Women and children were by fathers brought;  
And now some kindred sufferer driven, perchance, 
That way when into storm the sky is wrought, 
Upon his swinging corpse his eyes may glance 
And drop, as he once dropp’d in miserable trance (820-828).   
 
It may be that the sky is wrought or condensed into an eye drop of the storm, but what is 
certain is that the Sailor is not of this world of “idle” spectators to “plant their festive 
booths” beneath his fractured eye. Not only does the Sailor’s “passion” to cross him 
preclude the Romantic poet from committing a “crime” of violence himself, but, more 
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importantly, it also signifies the upsurge, as in surrection, of an “other” character at the 
end of the trance movement. By allowing the Sailor to occupy the position of sacrifice, 
the Romantic poet, William Wordsworth, comes very close to saintliness at the end of 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain.   
The Female Vagrant’s compelling power of affect orbits around the hollow 
ground in Salisbury Plain. The vagrant woman’s unsettling voice weaves out a series of 
the homonymic words of “horror,” “hollow,” “vacant,” and “vagrant” as if meaning is 
produced within the incommensurable hiatus of juncture like a caesura in blank verse. 
Much in the same way as the Traveler’s orbits, she has a diabolical movement in the 
sense that her narrative is capable of convoking a multiple sense of social “movement” 
without spatial movement. The Female Vagrant’s potent narrative calls not only in a 
libidinous economy of the unconscious repression but also in a liminal materialism of 
“destabilization on the move”: her uncanny, homeless narrative carries its own cultural 
enforcement in order to indelibly harrow one’s mind. By bringing home the vagrant 
woman’s story as a deliberate art and connecting it to his life, the Sailor states the theme 
that he is representing the inability of escaping “transference neurosis” when, under the 
stress of war, revolution, and social dislocation, transference neurosis has become 
ordinary neurosis. By ultimately holding the Sailor responsible for what has happened to 
him, however, Wordsworth testifies to the fact that the Sailor accepts the social 
consequence of the crime that he has himself given rise to, without escaping into the 
artificial and unpredictable pre-texts that the vagrant woman’s narrative suggest in 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain.  Subject to “strange repetitions,” Swann explains 
further, “they [the Female Vagrant and the  Sailor] dramatize, both minimally and 
 117 
sensationally, not simply the material conditions of writing, but the demands of the most 
elaborate and repetitive of poetic forms, the Spenserian Stanza” (817). While Swann 
suggests a poetic law of movement by means of Spenserian repetition, I’ve also found 
that Willy Maley’s Salvaging Spenser is useful in accounting for the traces of cloth in 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain. Keeping the track of the Spenser’s use “salvage” in The 
Faerie Queen, he is explaining that “Selvage” is defined as an “edge of cloth so woven 
that it cannot unravel; [as] border of different material or finish along edge of cloth 
intended to be removed or hidden; [or as] edge plate of lock with opening for the bolt,” 
derived from Middle English “self” and “edge” and that “the selvedge” is the margin 
between Self and Other, somewhere between salvage and savage (7). While “salvaging is 
a process of self-fashioning,” I suggest the textual possibility that the iron “gride” has 
been “salvaged” and “forged” in Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain poems.  
Wordsworth might speak of a hope of poetry as an ideal world by means of the 
Spenserian iron “gride.” Swann is elaborating that this rough word [of Gride] is also 
elegant, in the highest degree “poetic.” An archaism with a well-documented pedigree, it 
always functions as an allusion: [that] the poet who revives “gride” pierces back to a 
restricted number of literary instances of its use (823). When Coleridge mentions in 
Biographia Literaria that Wordsworth makes a progress as a poet, Coleridge is 
describing that the Spenserian own style would doubtless have authorized in his then 
opinion a more frequent descent to the phrases of ordinary life, that it was the depth and 
height of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the 
common view, custom had bedimmed all the luster (80). Wordsworth recalls in his 1805 
Prelude that “I seemed about this period to have sight / of a new world, a world, too, that 
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was fit / To be transmitted and made visible / To other eyes” (368-373). Freud might also 
define as an “ideal” scene the theoretical construction of the analytical scene in which 
marks a therapeutic progress in the treatment of transference. In this light, Wordsworth’s 
Salisbury Plain poem is “overdetermined” in relation to what causes would be associated 
with what effects.  
By referring to Badiou’s notion of “subjectivization” as the “interventional 
naming from the point of view of the situation, i.e., the rule governing the intra-
situational effects of putting a supernumerary name into circulation,” I claim that 
Wordsworth’s “interventional naming” of the Female Vagrant as artless is a process of 
subjectivation in the sense that her artless voice “traces in situ the multiple becoming of 
the true” voice in relation to social dislocation. In other words, the character of a 
philosopher that Wordsworth took in his 1793 Letter to Robert Watson, bishop of 
Landaff resembles the Female Vagrant in terms of “character traits.” In the Letter, 
Wordsworth searches for an “other,” “alien” form of political expression that would be 
distinguishable from Edmund Burke’s French Revolution as the irreconcilable Other. The 
Letter, however, puts one into the perspective of a longer process, than his poetic 
counterpart Coleridge, in which Wordsworth gets out repression, which is 
symptomatically derived from a political cause of which he stands in for. To make a 
counterargument against Watson, Wordsworth equips himself with the robe of a 
philosopher; that is, the character of a philosopher is woven out of the process of a 
fidelity to the political event, which is contingent upon the French Revolution. From a 
formal point of view of the Letter, the philosopher’s argument repeats, revolves around, 
and swing back and forth between Watson’s terms of argument and the terms of the 
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French revolution. The surrogate philosopher that Wordsworth adopts tries to speak, like 
William Godwin, from a position where truth and rhetorical persuasion may converge 
into a political praxis to perform its truth claim. However, he expresses an anxiety that he 
is losing his political ground. The philosopher whom Wordsworth adopts embodies the 
multiple determinations of “generic” republicanism in the sense that the philosopher’s 
engaged subjective perspective “generates” its own designation of the “other,” foreign 
principles.  
Therefore, Wordsworthian “it” convokes the void of the truth that life is hard 
without home. This procedure lends particular attention to causality in Salisbury Plain 
poems: “Does that which arrives at Salisbury Plain mean an event- ‘to happen,’ or ‘to 
arrive’ in the sense of the coming as well as the event?” “Does “fruitfulness” concern a 
possibility, or a chance of a political cause having its social consequence?” “Is, then, 
writing the Salisbury Plain poem the political result of his certitude in and a hope of small 
republicanism?” Or is it a yield of another pleasure of a different sort but none the less a 
more direct, acting cause?” Rather than answering this series of questions, Wordsworth 
sought for a poetic law of movement that would simulate real geographic movement in 
the material world.   
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NOTES 
 
 
Chapter II: Robinson Crusoe and the Counter-spaces of Imagination  
                                                
1 . For the reading of Romantic space not as a matter of subjective internalization of discipline, but as an 
effect of the extension of the techniques that constitute the physics of disciplinary power, as a portable 
substrate of power relations, refer to Ira Livingston’s An Arrow of Chaos (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997. I am also indebted to his brilliant reading of Foucault’s discourse throughout my 
dissertation.     
2. For this anecdote and the scientific development of the surface of the road, see Philip Bagwell’s The 
Transport Revolution. New York: Harper & Row, 1974 and also Richard Brown’s Society and Economy in 
Modern Britain 1700-1850. New York: Rutledge, 1991.  While Bagwell and Brown concur that the road 
transport system is the contemporary development of “a strange patch work of improved and unimproved 
roads” (Bagwell 41), I argue that the turnpike road system forms a self-organizing, dissipative structure of 
development across the nineteenth-century Britain. For this line of argument, refer to the following works: 
Schieve and Allen’s Self-Organization and Dissipative Structures, Austin: The State University of Texas, 
1978; Fernand Braudel’s The Wheels of the Commerce, California: University of California Press, 1992;   
Hohenberg and Lees’s The Making of the Urban Europe, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996;  
Ian Simmons’s Changing the Face of the Earth: Culture, Environment, History, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996; 
and also Deleuze and Guittari’s A Thousand Plateaus Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.    
 
3 . For the history of the turnpike system, I refer to Eric Pawson’s work on the economy of the turnpike 
titled Transport and Economy, New York: Academy Press, 1977. See also William Albert’s The Turnpike 
Road System in England 1663 and 1840, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972; W. T. Jackman’s 
The Development of Transportation in Modern England, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1916; 
Daniel lein’s work on the American turnpike road, “The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The 
Turnpike Companies of Early America” in Economic Inquiry 28 (1990): 788-812. The following Acts of 
the Parliament will be useful for the understanding of the relationship between the law and the turnpike 
investment: 1555- Statute of Mending Highways, 1562- General Highway Act, 1586- General Highway 
Act, 1662- Act for enlarging and repairing common highways, 1670, 1691-General Highway Acts, 1741- 
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Weighing Engines Act, 1751- Weighing Engines Amendment Act, 1753-Broad Wheels Act, 1757-General 
Highways Act, 1767, 1773-General Turnpike Act, 1822- Turnpike Act, 1855- General Highways Act. For 
further discussion, see Eric Pawson’s Transport and Economy. The establishment of turnpike trusts was a 
means of transferring the costs of main roads from those who happened to live alongside them to their users. 
The word “turnpike” originally meant a gate and there were gates at which tolls were collected on roads 
controlled by turnpike trusts. Such roads came to be called “turnpikes” and the processes of brining a road 
under the authority of a trust came to be described by the verb “to turnpike.”  
4 . John Galt’s Annals of the Parish (1821) describes how the construction and development of the turnpike 
road reconfigures the social life of the minister Balwhidder’s parish, Dalmailing, near the west coast of 
Scotland. At the heart of Galt’s parish is a revealing change and transformation that the turnpike road 
causes to accelerate. While Moretti has noticed how the system of central places works within the 
“changing geography of village narratives,” I read that the turnpike road shapes and affects a continuous 
process of societal restructuring of the parish across the scale of geography. The “system of central places 
at work” that Moretti enumerates consists of “school in Irville, university in Glasgow, lawyers and doctors 
in Edinburgh,” thus forming the radius of the central-peripheral zone based on the dichotomy of the city 
and the country. For Moretti, cotton-mill manufacture in Glasgow is a determining social event to “re-
center social life”: “the building of the cotton-mill, a new genius, as it were, had descended upon the earth, 
and there was an erect and out-looking spirit abroad that was not to be satisfied with the taciturn regularity 
of ancient affairs” (Galt 128). Moretti reads that the sense of the “region” is “gone, replaced by a “web of 
commercial reciprocities” ranging from Cayenneville via Glasgow and Edinburgh to London. Galt notices 
how city economy invents things that are to become city imports from the rural world, and then reinvents 
the rural work, how the new work is added to the older work and then the new divisions of labor are added 
to other appropriate varieties of older work4, as is the case of “tambouring, in such a manner as to 
supersede by precept and example that old-time honored functionary, the spinning-wheel” (Galt 128). 
Whereas Moretti reads a commercial web of central places, I call attention to the ways in which a 
communications network, such as the turnpike road, canals, and mails, underpins such a concatenation of 
developments as the  contemporaneous, the almost real time information transmission. It is from the mid-
eighteenth century when the development of the turnpike road system acquires national resilience that real 
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time supersedes real space. The turnpike road system underpins not only information at a distance, but also 
the power to act and move instantaneously, from afar. The turnpike road system contributes to the social 
formation of knowledge and power.   
5 . For Pawson’s “schema of relations between the parish repair system, Justice trusts, and turnpike trusts,” 
see the page 91 and also refer to the figure 2. Unlike his “source domination” approach, my reading of the 
turnpike road contributes to a critical, spatial reading of the capitalist production of space in England. 
Turnpike tolls were a matter of serious concern to William Cobbett, largely because he believed that toll 
owners and gate-keepers were changing the public more than they were legally entitled to charge. See 
Cobbett’s The Law of Turnpikes or an analytical arrangement of, and illustrative commentaries on, all the 
general acts relative to the turnpike roads of England. London: W. Cobbett, 1828.     
6 . John Barrell argues this point in his study of the cultural impact of enclosure and the turnpike road-
making on John Clare’s poems. See The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place 1730-1840, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972. The local newspaper of the time included regular reports of local 
market prices. The turnpike road contributes to the construction of a much wider national market.  
7 Mythological analysis of Roland Barthes scrutinizes everything that is considered as normal or natural in 
the name of myth. His analysis of myth bears witness to the fact that myth always has an “alibi” ready; that 
is, in images or spectacles of direct intelligibility, cultural mechanisms of signification are deeply involved. 
The mythologist way is in the semiological reading of the sign on the pages of a culture in order to 
decompose the sign into two series: signifier and signified. Barthes’s distinction is not necessarily 
concerned with two terms on their own but with correlation or trialectics by which the sign under 
consideration is bifurcated into double articulation. In the first articulation, the literary meaning of signifier 
is occupied fully by its analogous pair of content, signified- the arbitrariness of the sign is not necessarily 
arbitrary but rather conventional. In the second articulation, the sign becomes an empty signifier (like the 
zero) and keeps expanding laterally into a chain of mythical signifiers. Seen this way, the sign becomes a 
singular point, which stands at the end of its first exhausted meaning and simultaneously at the beginning 
of an empty code to be filled with second-order cultural implication.   
8 “It would be a great satisfaction to the Gentleman of the county to know the sentiments of the Duke of 
Sommerset, the Duke of Portland, the Earl of Carlisle, the Earl of Burlington, the Lord of Lonsdale and the 
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other Members of Parliament of the County in relation to the turnpike bills. And that the Duke of Portland 
be acquainted that it is the general opinion of the Gentlemen that no turnpike road between Cockermouth 
and Penrith can be of any service to the county in point of trade or accommodation” (The Order Book for 
Cumberland County, July 1745).  
9 . Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow), Critical Inquiry 28 (Winter: 2002): 369-
418, 380. 
10 . For this line of thought, I am heavily indebted to Lamb’s argument of the suffering of Job.  See his The 
Rhetoric of Suffering: Reading the Book of Job in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).  
 
Chapter III: In Search of Fantastic Geography in the South Seas 
 
11 . Rolland Munro also argues that the labor of division is also black-boxed in a truth regime in “Ideas of 
Difference: Stability, social spaces, and the labor of division,” in Kevin Hethrington and Rolland Munro’s 
Ideas of Difference. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 16. In arguing that there is no vision without division, he 
criticizes the black boxing of the claim to truth of vision: “Once a view has been ‘black-boxed,’ it lends 
itself to surveillance over its stability – say by asking the other to repeat itself” In terms of the  South Seas 
as the place to resist black boxing, Jonathan Lamb would argue as follows: “After the South Sea Bubble of 
1720, the South Pacific is the notorious object and medium of these pretenses [to truth], and therefore the 
hardest place of all in which to lodge a truth claim, which explains why many narratives of Oceanic 
discovery defensively present themselves as experimental natural history, not because the narrative egos 
believe themselves to be veridical, but because they require alibis for the uncertain testimony that coincides 
with their dilapidation” (203). For a detailed discussion, refer to his article titled “Eye-witnessing in the 
South Seas,” The Eighteenth Century Vol. 38. (1997): 201-211.    
 
12 . Latour. The Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Facts (London: Sage Publications, 1979). For 
further information on “fact construction,” see “The Slight Surprise of Action: facts, fetishes, and factishes” 
in Pandora’s Hope (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999). For the literary application of the 
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distinction between fact and factish, see Srinivas Aravamudan’s discussion of The Interesting Narrative in 
Tropicopoliticans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688-1804.  
13 . Rolland Munro also argues that the labor of division is also black-boxed in a truth regime in “Ideas of 
Difference: Stability, social spaces, and the labor of division,” in Kevin Hethrington and Rolland Munro’s 
Ideas of Difference. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 16. In arguing that there is no vision without division, he 
criticizes the black boxing of the claim to truth of vision: “Once a view has been ‘black-boxed,’ it lends 
itself to surveillance over its stability – say by asking the other to repeat itself” In terms of the  South Seas 
as the place to resist black boxing, Jonathan Lamb would argue as follows: “After the South Sea Bubble of 
1720, the South Pacific is the notorious object and medium of these pretenses [to truth], and therefore the 
hardest place of all in which to lodge a truth claim, which explains why many narratives of Oceanic 
discovery defensively present themselves as experimental natural history, not because the narrative egos 
believe themselves to be veridical, but because they require alibis for the uncertain testimony that coincides 
with their dilapidation” (203). For a detailed discussion, refer to his article titled “Eye-witnessing in the 
South Seas,” The Eighteenth Century Vol. 38. (1997): 201-211.    
14. Isabelle Stengers’s Invention of Modern Science (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 
100 -101 and Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer. Leviathan and the Air-pump (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 46.  Stengers argues that Robert Boyle’s experimental laboratory constitutes 
such a black boxing. Boyle’s air-pump and his experimental laboratory consolidate the common interests in 
empirical scientific experimentation so much so that Thomas Hobbs’s political interest in the plenary 
discussion of the void is rendered futile and void to the extent to which Hobbs is not willing to enter into 
the laboratory experimentation. To put it in the terms of Steven Shapin, Boyle’s laboratory is a space in 
which to do experiments and generate matters of fact without falling into futile metaphysical dispute, an 
experimental space about which new discursive and social practices could be mobilized to generate assent. 
Citing Latour, Stengers elaborates further, “Around the work of the air pump we witness the formation of a 
new Boyle, a new Nature, a new scholarly sociability, a new Society that will henceforth include the 
vacuum, scholars, and the laboratory.” On the other hand, Hobbs and Kant were faced with a violent 
choice: they either enter the laboratory – Hobbs discovers a weak detector for his ether wind- or they fall 
silent; unless they protest that science does not think.  
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15 .  Shapin, p. 56.   
16 . Tim Fulford. Literature, Science, and Exploration in the Romantic Era; Bodies of Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 12.  
17 . Quoted in original emphasis. Bruno Latour. Science in Action (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1987), p. 228.  
18 . Ibid, p. 229.  
19 . Latour. We have Never Been Modern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 74.  
20 . Latour, Science In Action, p. 230.  
21 . Ibid. p. 229.  
22 .  Koerner, Lisbet. “Purposes of Linnaean travel: a preliminary research report,” in Visions  of Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 153.   
 
23 Smith Bernard. Imagining the Pacific (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 213-222.    
 
24 . Quoted in original emphasis. Mary Louise Pratt. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation 
(London: Routledge, 1992), p. 25.  
25 . Ibid., p. 24-25.  
26 . Ibid., p. 33.  
27 . Ibid. p. 30.  
28 . Ibid., p. 30.  
29 . John Ellis to Carl Linnaeus, 19 August 1768, in Smith J. E. (ed.). A Selection of the Correspondence of 
Linnaeus and other Naturalists, vol. I., p. 230-232. For further information on Ellis, see Barbara Stafford. 
Good Looking; Essays on the Virtue of Images (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 148- 161.    
30 . This looks forward to Alexander von Humbolt.  
31 . Joseph Banks. The Endeavor Journal. 20 March 1769. April 2001. www. sl.nsw.gov.au/banks. 
December 2005.     
32 . As a point of observation, six other stations in the Pacific might have done as well and in fact no one in 
England even heard of the island of Tahiti until Captain Wallis in the Dolphin came back with the newly 
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“discovered” and possessed King George III island in June 1767. See Alan Morehead. Fatal Impact; the 
Invasion of the  South  Pacific 1767-1840 (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 20-21.  
33 . James Cook. The Journal of James Cook, Vol. I: 97-98.    
34 . Nigel Leask. Curiosity and the Aesthetics of Travel Writing, 1770-1840 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002).  
35 . Quoted in Koerner, p. 129.  
36 . The Younger Linnaeus assessment provides a link to Latour to discuss the open-boxed status of Banks’s 
journal writing. A variety of writing forms, ranging from Buchan’s and Parkinson’s drawings and figures to 
Banks’s description of his infatuation, performs additional work to make Banks the case of going 
scandalously native, thus prolonging any “nth+ 1 form” of the literary inscription, such as satiric poems (as 
the “n+2nd” form) and dramas (as the “n+3rd form). To put it in terms of Latour, “the nth order form gives 
an unexpected supplement – as if coming from another world; they are the result of a concrete work of 
purification- as if related to practical matters; they tie more elements – as if they were more real than any 
other convention passed among men” (original emphasis).  The persona of Banks is an artifact and 
“factish” as Latour has called it. Latour, Science in Action, p. 246.  
37 . Banks, 6 April 1769.  
38 . Ibid, 29 May 1769.  
39 . Ibid. 13 April 1769.  
40 . Ibid. 14 April 1769. Emphasis is added.    
41 . Ibid. 10 May 1769.  
42 . Ibid. 9 June 1769.  
43 . Ibid. 14 May 1769.  
44 . Ibid. 28 April 1769.  
45 . Purea was estranged from Oamo as the grand chief of Papara by the time of the Endeavor’s visit, but 
since Wall’s visit had lost much of her power and influence after being defeated by Tuteha. Banks also 
romanticizes the King of Borabora, who defeated Tupia and expelled him from the island of Raiatea, as a 
fierce young chieftain with the “terror of all other Islands.” But he is disappointed to be presented to “an 
old decrepid half blind man who seemed to have scarce reason enough left to send hogs, much less 
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gallantry enough to send ladies.” These examples illustrate how Banks romanticizes his encounter with the 
Tahitian people.             
46 . Banks, 13 April 1769.  
47 . Louis-Antoine de Bougainville. The Pacific Journal of Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, 1767-1768 
(London: Hakluyt Society, 2000), p. 72.  
48 . Philibert Commerson. A Letter from Tahiti, 1769 (Honolulu: Hamilton Library, 1955), p.  9.  
49 . Bougainville, p. 60.  
50 . Commerson, p. 9.  
51 . Bougainville, p. 72.  
52 . Emory Kenneth Pike. Stone Remains in the Society Islands (Honolulu: The Museum, 1933), p. 72-73  
53 . Banks, 5 May 1769.  
54 . Banks, 3 July 1769.  
55 . Alan Bewell. “On the Banks of the South Sea: botany and sexual controversy in the late eighteenth 
century,” in Visions of Empire, p. 185.  
56 . Banks, 12 July 1769.  
57 . Latour, Science In Action, p. 229.  
58 . Richard Grove. Green Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 12. The Western 
environment concerns both assist in and depend on the “presence of a coterie of committed professional 
scientists.” Banks’s fellow voyager, James Cook anticipates his expedition with Banks: I could venture to 
traverse a greater space of sea, till then unnavigated, to discover greater tracks of country in high and low 
South latitudes, and to preserve longer in exploring and surveying more correctly the extensive coasts of 
these new discovered countries, than any former Navigator, perhaps, had done during one voyage. Quoted 
in Stafford, Voyage into Substance (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1984), p. 21.    
59 . Banks, 12 July 1769.  
60 . Nicholas Thomas, In Oceania: Visions, Artifacts, Histories (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 
15.  
61 . Marshall Sahlins. Islands of History (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), p. 72. 
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Chapter IV: Georgic Poetry and the Topolitics of Empire  
 
62 . Frederic Jameson’s “Cognitive Mapping” in Poetics/ Politics: Radical Aesthetics for the Classroom 
(New York: New York University Press, 1999), 155-167.  
63 . Rachel Crawford, Poetry, Enclosure, and Vernacular Landscape, 1700-1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).  
64 . Suvir Kaul, Poems of Nation, Anthems of Empire: English Verse in the Long Eighteenth Century 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2000), 10.  
65 . While Dryden’s logics of perception and its renewed vectors delocalize optics, it is also ushered in 
eugenics of sight, a reemergence of a singularly fractured “species” with the soft flesh inside and the hard 
bones exterior, which moves singularly by the smell of the prey.      
66 .  The Satterthwaite anecdote did not specify the name of the engineer, but the likelihood that 
Wordsworth would have known Mudge and his Survey project is still high when we delve into a range of 
influential people Wordsworth met. A year after the Bootle holiday, when Wordsworth was in London, he 
met a colleague of Mudge’s, Charles Palsey (1780 –1861). He had awards for bravery against the French 
and had met Coleridge during his work in 1805 at Malta. Equally as important as tracing “networks” of the 
famous at this period is to note that Mudge’s godfather was no less a personage than Samuel Johnson and 
his father an associate of Sir Joshua Reynolds. For this information, refer to John Wyatt’s article titled 
“Wordsworth’s Black Combe Poems: The Pastoral and the Geographer’s Eye,” in Signatures, Vol. 3. 
(2001): 1-19.  
67 . For instance, John Dyer’s will to clothe the world with the fleece is coterminous with a georgic 
formalization to dress the geographical surface of the world in the moral praising of a pre-idealized British 
civility: “Rejoice, ye nations, vindicate the sway / Ordain’d for common happiness. . . She [Britain] never 
breaks / Her solemn compacts in the lust of rule: Studious of arts and trade, she ne’er disturbs / The holy 
peace of states” (4. 653-663).  
 
Chapter V: Salisbury Plain, Salisbury Place 
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1.Douglas Wilson’s study of Wordsworth’s poetics of the unconscious explores the uncanny to interrogate 
the relation of the “spots of time” with memory by drawing on Schelling’s definition of the uncanny. In 
contrast, my work rethinks the relation of the Freudian notion of the uncanny to the Plain to reconsider how 
place becomes a staff, a port as well as a spot in Salisbury Plain poems. Refer to Douglas Wilson, The 
Romantic Dream: Wordsworth and the Poetics of the Unconscious, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1993).  
69 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution in France, (London: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 
124. See alsoWordsworth’s unpublished Letter, “A Letter to the Bishop of Landaff on the extraordinary 
avowal of his Political Principles contained in the Appendix to his late Sermon by a Republican” in Prose 
Works of William Wordsworth, ed., M. H Abrahams and S. Gill ( New York: Norton, 1979).    
70 See Karen Swann’s excellent essay, “Public Transport: Adventuring on Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain,” 
ELH (1998): 811-831. she reads that Wordsworth “resembles all the vagrants, travelers, gypsies, who are 
opaque figures and inhabitants of another world, who halt and then pursue their way, ‘measuring’ and 
following the ‘dreary lines of measuring more antique systems of transport” (817).   
71 The Preface of The Borderers reinforces the commonality of this theme: “In real life we rarely see either 
the one or the other; and, when the distress comes, it prevents us from attending to the cause. This 
superstition of which I have spoken is not without its use; yet it appears to be one great source of our vices; 
it is our constant engine in seducing each other. We are lulled asleep by its agency, and betrayed before we 
know that an attempt is made to betray us. I have endeavored to shake this prejudice, persuaded that in so 
doing I was well employed. It has been a further object with me to show that, from abuses interwoven with 
the texture of society, a bad man may be furnished with sophisms in support of his crimes which it would 
be difficult to answer.” In this sense, the Sailor establishes a counterpoise to the Female Vagrant in 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain.  See The Borderers, Ed. Robert Osborn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1982).   
4. For a different formal question of Wordsworth’s “turns of chance,” refer to Swann’s essay. She 
understands that Wordsworth’s “turn” is his poetic venture to “revolutionize” the structure of feeling in the 
1790s. She reads Wordsworth’s resistance to narrative as the resistance to the sensationalism that Steinman 
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maps out in her discussion of Wordsworth. Steinman asserts, “The Salisbury Plain poems and ‘The Female 
Vagrant’ might be almost thought of as samples of narrative strategies- Thomsonian, Gothic, sensationalist, 
political, and allegorical – that test the capacity of poetry to resist sensationalism while remaining relevant” 
(63-64). See Lisa Steinman’s Masters of Repetition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). Hereafter 
Salisbury Plain is cited as SP and Adventures on Salisbury Plain as ASP in my quotations of the poems.  
73 Everything that counts falls under the unity of a count, while, inversely, only what lets itself be counted 
in this way can circulate. See David Simpson’s essay titled “Figuring Class, Sex, and Gender: What is the 
Subject of Wordsworth’s ‘Gypsies’” in Romantic Poetry: Recent Revisionary Criticism, ed. Karl Kroeber 
and Gene W Ruoff (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993). For the criticism of Simpson’s 
discussion of “Gypsies,” see James M. Garrett’s “The Unaccountable ‘Knots” of Wordsworth’s ‘Gypsies’” 
in SEL 40.4 (autumn 2000): 603-620.       
74 The Letter, however, puts one into the perspective of a longer process, than his poetic counterpart 
Coleridge, in which Wordsworth gets out repression, which is symptomatically derived from a political 
cause of which he stands in for.    
75 Asking what would be in opposition to the adjective “fruitless” invests in a series of questions that one 
will pose in relation to what it would be imagined to be “fruitful.”    
76 See Helene Cixous, “Fiction and its Phantoms: A Reading of Freud’s Das Unheimliche,” New Literary 
History 7 (Spring 1976): 525-548.  
77 For the issue of the weight of sedimentation of genre, refer to Jameson’s essay titled “Magical 
Narratives” in The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a socially symbolic act (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1981). Jameson’s notion of sedimentation pays attention to the contemporaneous layering of 
temporality; that is, two time forms work alongside each other. The past works alongside the present, by 
virtue of which the present continues to be mobilized, displaced, and transformed. To put it in his terms, the 
past “persist into the later, more complex structure as a generic message which coexists with the elements 
from later stages” of the present (141).    
78 Dorothy Williams describes Wordsworth’s habit of “backwards and forwards” while composing The 
Prelude, for instance, saying, “Though the length of his walk is sometimes a quarter or half a mile, he is as 
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fast bound within the chosen limits as if by prison walls” (437). See The Early Years: 1787-1805. Revised 
by C. L. Shaver. Vol. 1 of Letters of William and Dorothy Williams, ed. Ernest de Selincourt (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1967-93).   
79 See Michael Wiley’s Romantic Geography: Wordsworth and Anglo-European Spaces, (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).    
80 See Geoffrey Hartman’s analysis of the Salisbury Plain poems in Wordsworth Poetry 1787-1814 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Hartman reminds us that Salisbury Plain is a no-place, an “omphalos, 
or a strait between worlds and that it thereby rouses a nostalgia for specific place, for single or fixed points 
like spire, tree, or “one dwelling” (120 -123).  
81 Calling attention to “yawning” and “thrilling” from rifted tombs, Kurt Fosso argues that the Stonehenge 
exercises a reciprocal power to transform the dead. See his article titled “The Politics of Genre in William 
Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain,” New Literary History 30.1 (1999): 159-177.  
82 Hartman explains that the “shuttle” stands for the weaver’s instrument by the synecdochal substitution of 
part of whole, but it also contains a metonymy which names the productive cause instead of product (338). 
See Beyond Formalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). For the notion of “subjectivization,” I 
refer to a French philosopher, Alain Badiou, in his essay titled “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” Topoi 7 
(1988): 93-98. Badiou reads: “I call subjectivization the emergence of an operator which is consecutive to 
the interventional naming that decides the event . . . Subjectivization is the interventional naming from the 
point of view of the situation, i.e., the rule governing the intra-situational effects of putting a 
supernumerary name into circulation” (95).  
83  See Jerome Christensen’s “Site Two: Salisbury Plain, Sympathy, and Historicism.” In Finding Romantic 
Commonplaces. June 2002 http://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/christensen/site2.html, (January 2003).   
84 The premise of my argument is that Wordsworth’s does not simply revise Salisbury Plain into 
Adventures on Salisbury Plain to remark the moments of retreat from political to psychological. 
Wordsworth’s movement from London to Racedown does not constitute such a “retirement” into 
psychological disenchantment. For this kind of argument, See John Rieder’s article titled “Civic Virtue and 
Social Class at the Scene of Execution: Wordsworth Salisbury Plain Poems,” Studies in Romanticism 
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(1991): 325-43. In terms of the Sailor, Wordsworth also traces back his treatment of the Sailor in Salisbury 
Plain: “Mr. Coleridge, when I first became acquainted with him, was so impressed with this poem, that he 
would have encouraged me to publish the whole as it then stood; but the mariner’s fate appeared to me so 
tragic as to require a treatment more subdued and yet more strictly applicable in expression than I had at 
first given to it” (recited from Biographia 79). For the discussion of the poetic transactions that occurred 
between Coleridge and Wordsworth, see Christensen’s “Ecce Homo” in Contesting the Subject (Perdue: 
Perdue University Press, 1991).   
85 For a far more complicated discussion of the relationship of inversion between remembrance and 
recognition, between an “involuntary dislike” and a negative transference, see Jerome Christensen’s “The 
Romantic Movement at the End of History.” Critical Inquiry 20 (Spring 1994): 452-476. As Jerome 
Christensen argues, to cure means to bring up occult, pointlessly reproductive emotions, to recognize them, 
and to subject them to the guillotine of analysis, thereby adjusting the  patient to the “artificial” world that 
Freud calls “real life” (466). Freud elaborates that every step of the treatment is accompanied by resistance; 
that every single thought, every mental act of the patient’s must pay toll to the resistance, and represents a 
compromise between the forces toward the cure and those gathered to oppose it. Pressing the metaphor of a 
“toll-gating” further, it may be possible to suggest that to cure means to put the patient on a controlled-
access turnpike road, to inspect the movement or flow of the patient’s “unconscious feelings” under the 
surveillance of psychoanalysis that Freud aspires to intervene in. For Freud’s own explanation of the 
speeding-up of a therapeutic treatment, see his later essay titled “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” in 
Therapy and Technique (New York: Collier Books, 1963). For the issue of transference, I also rely on 
Cynthia Chase’s “Transference as Trope and Persuasion,” in Discourse in Psychoanalysis and Literature, 
ed. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (London: Methuen, 1987) and Stuart Schneiderman’s Jacques Lacan: The 
Death of an Intellectual Hero (Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1983). Insofar as the Sailor asks his 
homelessness to the law, he might also seeks for the juridical method of transference, which is different 
from the medical method of transference in that it speaks of sickness, cure, and healing. The juridical 
method seeks after truth as a process in a “quaestio,” the Latin for process.        
86 See Jerome Christensen’s “Ecce Homo,” in Contesting the Subject, Ed. William Epstein, (Perdue: Perdue 
University, 1991), p. 65-66.  
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87 . Note the difference from Freud’s account of a process of what he calls “the return of the repressed. See 
Freud’s “The Origins of Religion” (New York: Penguin Books, 1985). 
88 See Toby Benis’s Romanticism on the Road (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Benis sees the Plain 
as a place where healing takes place for the Female Vagrant takes place. He also claims that the homeless is 
at the center of the social-geographical matrix of the 1790s. See also Celeste Langan’s argument of 
vagrancy in Romantic Vagrancy: Wordsworth and the Simulation of Freedom (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). Langan argues that his project of Romantic Vagrancy describes a certain 
idealization of the vagrant: a reduction and abstraction.   
89  See Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York: Norton & Company, 1961). The original 
passage reads, “The phenomena of transference are obviously exploited by the resistance which the ego 
maintains in its pertinacious insistence upon repression; the compulsion to repeat, which the treatment tries 
to bring into service is, as it were, drawn over by the ego to its side. A great deal of what might be 
described as the compulsion of destiny seems intelligible on a rational basis; so that we are under no 
necessity to call in a new and mysterious motive force to explain it” (25).     
90 See the lines of ASP: the boy turn’d around / His batter’d head, a groan the Sailor fetch’d. / The head 
with streaming blood had dy’d the ground, / Flow’d from the spot where he that deadly wound /Had fix’d 
on him he murder’d (641-645).  
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